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This paper empirically explores the critical connection between intellectual capital disclosure and 
corporate governance variables, while having firm-specific control variables, for a sample of 137 
Indian listed firms. Intellectual capital disclosure is recorded by a self-developed index score used 
on the annual reports of the sample companies, along with an attempt to capture the qualitative 
aspect of the intellectual capital disclosure in the form of semantic properties underpinned by Time 
Expectation theory and the overall word count of intellectual capital in the annual reports. The 
analysis is further widened by analyzing individually the corporate governance factors with all the 
three forms of Intellectual capital (Internal, External and Human). Most of the corporate governance 
variables within the analysis is associated with the disclosure practices of Intellectual capital be it 
quantitative or qualitative. Thus, this paper attempts to extend the previous literatures with a 
specialized case of an emerging economy along with contributing towards the agency theory by 





'The ability of organizations to cope, survive, grow, and otherwise attain and maintain business 
successes is related to their abilities to use various ``capitals'' in order to create and leverage value, 
and to accomplish their missions, visions and especially financial goals' (Keenan and Aggestam 
2001). The growth in interest surrounding knowledge management and intellectual capital (IC) has 
occurred proportionally with the rise of implicit corporations and a prospering service industry 
(Guthrie and Petty, 1999). The role of Intellectual capital, as an unchallengeable resource (Hart and 
Moore, 1994), has become very crucial in managing the firm in such environments where the  
source of competitive advantage is strongly based on knowledge and intangible resources (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998). Authors, such as Edvinsson (1997), Sveiby (1997) and Lynn (1998) 
emphasized the importance of IC, which they consider the main source of value creation in the new 
knowledge-based economy. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to reveal the influence of Corporate Governance on Intellectual Capital 
Disclosures in annual reports of Indian Corporate firms. In recent years, the OECD and securities 
regulators in many countries have considered corporate governance and corporate disclosure as 
inseparable issues for investor protection and for the efficiency of capital markets (Cadbury 
Committee Report, 1992; OECD, 1999; Blue Ribbon Report, 2000). 
Corporate governance is a framework of legal, institutional, and cultural factors that plays a major 
role in influencing model that stakeholders make effort on managerial decision-making (Weimer 
and Pape, 1999). Intellectual capital is the ``knowledge and knowing capability of a social 
collectivity, such as an organization, intellectual community, or professional practice'' (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998:245). Corporate governance uses financial, physical-plant, and intellectual 
capital to create and leverage value. Intellectual Capital is defined as knowledge that can be 
converted into value (Edvinsson and Sullivan, 1996, p. 358). One of the rigorous definitions is that 
offered by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1999) which describes 
IC as "the economic value of two categories of intangible assets of a company: organizational 
("structural"') capital; and Human capital. Intellectual Capital includes intellectual assets that can be 
converted into revenues (Sullivan 1998). Intellectual capital refers to and includes relatively 
intangible and/or hidden assets of enterprises that are or can be leveraged to create value for the 
stakeholders of the organizations (Keenan and Aggestam, 2001). 
 
There are various studies providing Research on IC disclosure, and has grown exponentially in the 
past two decades (Garcı´a-Meca et al., 2005). Edvinsson and Malone (1997) provided the schema of 
IC in the form of Skandia Value Scheme wherein it was classified as Human capital and Structural 
capital. Sveiby (1997, pp. 10–12) offered a framework that separates intellectual capital into three 
classes: human capital, internal structure and external structure. All forms of IC that is provided by 
the firms through disclosures are important from investor’s point of view to make an optimal 
decision with respect to resource allocation efficiency within the market. 
 
Increasing competition, new business sectors and technological developments have led to the 
decreasing relevance of financial statements and the increasing relevance of narrative reporting 
(Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Breton and Taffler, 2001). The capital market is requesting more reliable 
information regarding knowledge resources in a company, such as risk factors, strategic direction, 
managerial qualities, innovatory skills, experience, and integrity. These variables are the key drivers 
of value creation. Despite the growing importance of intellectual capital, users of financial 
statements have an incomplete picture of them due to identification, recognition and measurement 
problems (Garcia- Meca ; 2005). 
 
Intangible intellectual capital transforms the relatively tangible financial and physical capitals into 
benefit and wealth (Keenan and Aggestham 2001). There is sufficient studies providing enough 
evidence Low (2000, p. 256) that the improvement in intangibles disclosure resulted in an increase 
in market value. The present system of accounting seriously fails to represent the intangibles and 
thus reflect the appropriate enterprise value and performance of the organization (Lev and Zarowin 
1999, p. 354). Various reports and considerations of agencies around the world including governing 
bodies do support the argument over the accounting flaws of reporting the intangibles (FASB, 2001; 
CICA, 2002), (SEC, 2003). Usefulness of financial information has been deteriorating over the past 
20 years (Lev, 1989; Lev and Zarowin, 1999). Current intellectual capital paradigms require 
corporate governance members to think holistically about all the intangible assets that can be used 
to create both change and stability for the firm and to create value through both intra-organizational 
and extra-organizational relationships (keenan and aggestham 2001). 
 
The value creation of IC disclosure for the organization, and being termed as an important 
performance indicators and a strategy to gain competitive advantage has been widely documented 
(Firer and Williams, 2002; Williams, 2001; Ante, 2001; Stewart, 1997) and being practiced 
especially that in the developed nations. In addition, fewer studies have addressed the effect of the 
corporate governance on IC disclosure (Li et al., 2008). Little is known about the development IC  
of and that of its determinants in the developing nation (kamath 2008, yi and davey 2010). This 
paper attempts to gain the insight about the voluntary Intellectual Capital disclosure in 137 annual 
reports of Indian Companies and assess the influence of Corporate Governance on those 
disclosures. Using various measures of IC frameworks developed in the previous studies (esp. 
Sveiby 1997) and the components of corporate governance and its sub categories in the light of 
various disclosure method. Considering Agency theory as the central theme, and the components of 
Corporate Governance to be the determinants of IC disclosure the study considers the corporate 
voluntary disclosure from Indian Perspective. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; Section two describes the previous studies and 
the related literatures, section three is composed of determinants of Intellectual capital and 
development of hypotheses. While, methodology is discussed in section four. Section five, is 
discussed with detailed result for the analysis and the paper is finally summarized and concluded in 
section six. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Intellectual capital is designated as an intangible assets that comprises brand name, customer 
information, technology, reputation and corporate culture that are of the utmost importance to an 
organizations reasonable potential (Low and Kalafut, 2002). With the swift expansion of the global 
economy, Intellectual Capital, which has the power to replace the primary resource of diverse 
industries and firms within, and is being perceived as a crucial factor for an organization’s 
sustainability in the long term (Bontis, 2001). According to Low and Kalafut, (2002) IC consists 
three important spheres, to be classified into implicit knowledge and innovativeness of the 
employees, infrastructure of human capital, and external relationships. These resources are blended 
closely in every part of the organizations and are not necessarily to be seen always. They contribute 
companies an underlying tenet for economical lead and competitive success in the marketplace 
(e.g., Penrose, 1959). 
 
The important consequence of these soft assets in organizing the complex structures and the various 
contingencies has surged the deficiency of the reporting system, and henceforth transforming the 
very essence of the Corporate Governance (CG) alliances (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) and that 
elucidates the obligation of the management. According to Darrough and Stoughton, (1990) 
disclosure is expensive considering it directly reflects the emergence of proprietary and litigation 
costs. The proprietary costs theory states that, costs related to disclosure could discourage the 
dissemination of information (Prencipe, 2004). If the count and the extent of rivals increase, 
disclosure becomes more expensive (Darrough and Stoughton 1990). 
 
In the global economy considering the intricate nature of the firms and added the complex incentive 
system by establishing numerous intangible resources, that is also represented by a severity of 
information asymmetry, leads to the classic agency cost problem (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). 
According to Libskind (1996), business success in particular, which are termed as sustainable, is 
based on the company's intangible resources that comprises its complete organizational ability. 
Sullivan (2000) demonstrates by conducting a study based on 250 companies, that the symbolic 
institutional investor assign extensive consideration to non-financial performance indicators. 
Calibrating on this estimate, Sullivan concludes that investors take around 35 per cent of the 
investment decision after evaluating of non-financial data, such as the quality of a firm’s intellectual 
capital. 
Prior studies emphasize the alliance between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure (e.g. 
Forker, 1992; McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993, Eng and Mak, 2003). There are studies that also 
indicates the reasoning of corporate governance in direction such as corporate culture, debt costs, 
auditing, transparency, profitability, and handling. (E.g. Healy and Palepu, 2001, Hannifa and 
Cooke, 2002; Millar et al. 2005). However, there is insufficient information for the impact of 
corporate governance on the disclosure of intangibles and particularly the intellectual capital. 
 
Intellectual capital is very important towards the firm’s sustainable success and competitive 
advantage of the corporation. Where once “hard” assets – property, plant and equipment – 
accounted for a big piece of a company’s market value, today it is intangible assets that rule –  
things like innovation, brand development and training, (Low 2000, p. 253). It is gradually 
perceived as the most crucial aspect to generate and preserve competitive advantage for 
organizations (Li et al., 2008). According to Bontis et al. (2000), Intellectual Capital has an 
important and absolute affiliation with organizational accomplishment irrespective of industry. 
While Klein, (1998), has called, the term "intellectual capital" have been included to the financial 
and physical capitals of enterprises. 
 
Information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior can be drastically curtailed due to the better- 
concentrated observing platform provided by Intellectual capital disclosure (Li et al., 2008). The 
same way as it function with the adoption of various Corporate Governance practices within the 
organization like role duality, board composition, Audit committees that are purely appointed with 
the purpose to diminish the agency problem. 
 
Studies on Intellectual Capital disclosure has increased significantly in the last two decades 
(Garcı´a-Meca et al., 2005). Petty and Guthrie (2000) cornered the Intellectual Capital literature 
review, specifically with respect to its measurement and reporting. Bornemann et al. (1999) and The 
Danish Trade and Industry Development Council (1997) studied the indicators of Intellectual 
Capital. Tan et al. (2008) contributed a productive summarization on the stages of development of 
Intellectual Capital, its application towards the research in different cultures, and to overall business 
and management issues. Brennan and Connell (2000) provided a summary of 14 empirical analyses 
on various behavior of Intellectual Capital. 
 
Most of these studies were carried out during the late 1990s. Studies covering various aspects such 
as developing an Intellectual Capital framework and its indicators, measurement and its reporting. 
The foundational schema were constructed by a few researchers such as Kaplan and Norton (1992) 
who developed the balanced scorecard; Petrash (1996) who described the value platform; Sveiby 
(1997) who elaborated on the intangible asset monitor; Edvinsson and Malone (1997) who created 
the Skandia value scheme. Researchers such as Johanson et al. (1999), Canibano et al. (1999) and 
Miller et al. (1999) studied on measurement of Intellectual Capital. 
 
According to Li et al., (2008), a series of the researches for the Intellectual Capital are cross- 
sectional and more country specific., for example, Australia (Guthrie and Petty, 2000), UK 
(Williams, 2001), Ireland (Brennan, 2001), Canada (Bontis, 2003), Italy (Bozzolan et al., 2003), 
Japan (Mavridis, 2004), Malaysia (Goh and Lim, 2004), Taiwan (Chen et al., 2005), Sri Lanka 
(Abeysekera and Guthrie, 2005), New Zealand (Wong and Gardner, 2005), Italy (Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2006), Singapore (Tan et al., 2007), India (Kamath, 2007, 2008), New Zeland (Whiting 
and Miller, 2008), Spain (Oliveras et al., 2008),UK (li et al. 2008). These researches due to their 
characteristics of being specific provide understanding with respect to the level of Intellectual 
capital disclosure in the specific country throughout diverse industrial sectors. As evident even from 
the above summarization of the previous studies that the researches is mostly concentrated towards 
the developed economies and are subject to very limited focus towards the developing economies. 
The results of these studies vary from country to country and there are number of factors that could 
be used to explain these situations. According to Ahmed and Courtis (1999, p. 36) who claimed that 
‘these inconclusive results could be due to differences in socio economic and political environments 
between countries, organizational structures, construction of the informational items in disclosure 
indices and sampling error’. Previous literatures have accentuated formulated definition, 
measurement (Stewart, 1997; Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Youndt, Subramaniam, Snell, 2004; 
Juma & Payne, 2004), the impact of Intellectual Capital, and few of its aspects on firm performance 
(Youndt, Subramaniam, Snell & Golden, 1999; Youndt, Subramaniam & Snell, 2004). However, it 
is also argued that the ‘failure to include corporate governance characteristics could account for the 
inconsistent results since corporate disclosure policies emanate from the board’ (Gul and Leung, 
2004, p. 355). 
 
The literature regarding Intellectual Capital and its association with Corporate Governance is 
limited and inconclusive. However, a review of the current state of financial and external reporting 
research by Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2006) identified Intellectual Capital and its association with 
Corporate Governance research as being still in its infancy and a major area for further research. 
Investors are increasingly aware of the importance of company information not directly reflected in 
financial statements and so its determinants (Mavrinac and Boyle, 1996). Capital markets are 
looking for more fundamental information about expertise domain in an organization, such as 
managerial qualities, risk factors, experience, innovatory skills, integrity, and strategic direction 
(Eccles et al. 2001) especially, when faced with agency problems, information transparency, 
investor profits and asymmetrical information, (Li et al 2008). 
 
While the effects of corporate governance characteristics on financial disclosure have received 
considerable research interest (Wild, 1996; Klein, 2002; Anderson et al., 2004; Beekes et al., 2004), 
we still have much to learn about the impact of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure of 
Intellectual Capital (Cerbioni and Parbonetti 2006; Abeysekera, 2007; Li et. al 2008). While several 
IC disclosure studies have been carried out in developed nations, there is a dearth of research on the 
IC disclosure practices of firms located in developing nations (Abeysekera, 2007). Previous studies 
mostly focuses on measuring the degree of Intellectual Capital information being disclosed in 
corporate annual reports, but there is little evidence that identify certain tendency deciding the 
variation across firms (Gracia et al 2010) especially when we are not focusing on corporate 
governance mechanisms rather than accounting reasons, moreover the scenario is even 
disappointing from developing country perspectives. Especially, when it comes to India, Intellectual 
capital is in the stage of infancy with other developing countries (Kamath 2008). 
 
In cessation from prior literatures, we contemplate the feasible affiliation of earlier established 
governance structure with both the quantity and the quality of intellectual capital information 
voluntarily disclosed by organizations in various forms identified along with its outlook orientation. 
In particular, our sample consists of Indian companies publicly listed on the stock market. The 
flourishing implication of India in contributing towards the developing global economy makes it 
crucial to analyze various emerging factors as it may not only concern the research community as a 
whole to explore the similarities and differences in Intellectual Capital (Kamath 2008) and 
corporate governance with other countries in the globe but also add to the existing base of 
knowledge. 
 
According to Booth (1998) a sole combined strategy to capture the Intellectual Capital  
measurement is pointless, but mostly, there exist three strategy used to measure intellectual capital 
(Brennan (2001)). The first methodology is to utilize and also being termed as the value-based 
measures by calculating the value of intellectual assets through the difference between the market 
value and book value of the firm. The another strategy also known as “Skandia Navigator” refers to 
the methodology which identifies and quantifies the critical success factors in five areas of the 
organization (Brennan, 2001) mentioned as ; (1) financial; (2) client; (3) human; (4) processes; (5) 
renewal and development as a crucial factor of the intellectual capital system (Edvinson and Malone 
(1997)). Whereas, there is also a widely used approach known as the Intellectual Capital Index, 
wherein key measures of success of a single organization must be identified and weighted to 
provide a single summary index. 
 
The study uses the content analyses approach in order to identify and assign appropriate measure 
towards the factor to conclude the overall Intellectual Capital of an organization under scrutiny. 
Wherein the term intellectual Capital is broadly classified into three categories of Internal 
Intellectual Capital, External Intellectual Capital and Human Capital. A content analysis of the 200 
annual reports was carried out considering an annual report is a useful source of information about 
an organization. As companies not only reports what is important for the company to its 
shareholders and the public but also firms annual report is a tool through which a firm conveys its 
image to the public. Besides, the complete control of the discretionary disclosure of information in 
the annual report is with the management of the company. Of which after screening further 137 
companies (Annual reports) were selected for further study. The content analysis involved reading 
the 2012-13 annual report of each company, incorporated in conformance with a selected 
framework of 43 attributes, as shown in Table 5. 
 
We evaluate the composition of information as proxies for the quality of voluntary disclosure on 
intellectual capital and quantity for the various dimensions identified along with its outlook 
orientation (historical versus forward looking). In terms of practical implications, this study should 
be of interest to investment professionals, market participants as a whole, and regulators, we 
contribute to agency theory by indicating that corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary 
disclosure can be strategically used to diminish agency conflicts. 
 
3. Determinants of IC disclosure and development of Hypotheses 
 
Corporate governance is a framework and a mechanism that guarantees investors of the 
corporations get a return on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Corporate Governance 
has increasingly garnered attention due to the incorporation of different systems related to 
governance issues into the globalizing economy (Weimer and Pape, 1999). Both in the academic 
literature and the business press are increasingly receiving more and more attention with respect to 
designing corporate governance systems to improve firm transparency and to solve the information 
asymmetry problem arising from the separation between ownership and control (Garcia et. al 2010). 
According to Aggestam and Keenan (1999), the intellectual capital of the incorporations can be 
strengthened by mobilizing competent managers, executives and best board practices in corporate 
governance. A number of interrelated characteristics, which are extremely important to establish 
profound governance mechanism (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2006), forges a corporation’s 
governance system. 
 
'The constructs of corporate governance and intellectual capital are connected and becomes 
apparent' (Keenan and Aggestam 2001). Earlier researches does not establish if the corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure substitute or complement for accountability (Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2006). Since disclosure is not free; (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2006), corporations may 
prefer to decrease the costs associated with information asymmetries by enhancing corporate 
governance instead of increasing the level of disclosure. Keenan and Aggestam (2001), Li et al., 
(2008), Akhtaruddin et al., (2009) and Clemente and Labat (2009) stated that efficient corporate 
governance mechanisms have impacts on significant intellectual capital management, including the 
disclosure of information, considering the investors should be acquainted with respect to the core 
capability of the corporation especially with respect to its intellectual capital owned (Kavida and 
Sivakoumar, 2008), and thus, improving the transparency. Occupying various mechanism of 
internal control like separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive, and audit committees 
and non-executive directors, may improve monitoring quality in crucial decisions especially about 
the intellectual capital investment and performance (Keenan and Aggestam, 2001). 
 
According to the agency theory, an organization will try to curtail the high agency cost by 
increasing the monitoring activity of its corporate governance and the amount of voluntary 
disclosure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Agency theory provides a 
platform for associating disclosure management and corporate governance by considering both as 
mechanisms of accountability (Jensen and Meckling’s (1976). Agency cost theory predicts that due 
to the prevailing information asymmetries, managers may select a set of decisions to maximize their 
own utility. While it is also argued through the agency theory that disclosure is the key fundamental 
mechanism to reduce the agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Considering this arguments, 
corporate governance is seen as an important tool and mechanism that contributes through increased 
monitoring on users of fund i.e. the management of the organization like concealment and 
distortion. 
 
An effective corporate governance reduces any chances of the management to be opportunist and 
work for their interests due to the existing information asymmetries, rather it may compel them to 
better disclose all the relevant information. On the other hand, the primary function of the voluntary 
disclosure is to reduce the information asymmetries. However, both corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosure (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, (2006)) are termed as mechanisms of accountability. 
As witnessed in the literature discussed, the disclosure of intellectual capital is beneficial in value 
creation process in the long run not for the investors in general. Voluntarily disclosing information 
about the Intellectual Capital, helps investors to mitigate the information asymmetry and take 
informed and better decisions. But a sound Corporate governance may play a crucial factor for 
controlling the behavioral issues that of the management and thus further ensuring the voluntary 




'The board is viewed as a market-induced institution, the ultimate internal monitor of the set of 
contracts called a firm, whose most important role is to scrutinize the highest decision makers 
within the firm' (Fama 1980, p.294). According to Fama (1980) outside directors were treated as 
mediator with the sole objective of securing that the board protects the shareholder's interest, in 
monitoring managerial decision making. Since the independent directors are encouraged to execute 
their opinion guidance so as to cultivate their reputational capital the boards consisting of larger 
number of independent directors maintain efficient grip over managerial decisions (Fama and 
Jensen (1983). According to Beasley (1996) there is a stronger direct effect with the embodiment of 
a greater percentage of Independent Directors on boards as it diminishes the chances of financial 
statement fraud. The greater proportion of independent board of directors creates an efficient 
control on board decisions and effects to better value creation for the organization (Bueno et al. 
(2004). Corporate delegations like Tread way Commission, 1987; Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999 
have actualized that Independent Directors and various board committees comprising of 
independent directors will enhance the transparency within the organization. 
There are quite number of literatures providing evidence to prove also the otherwise, that is the 
inclusion of Independent members of the board is adversely affecting the disclosure practices in 
general. According to Conyon and Peck (1998) the motivation to protect the shareholder interests 
may not be substantial for the independent directors considering they either do not hold shares or 
they hold a negligible amount of shares. According to Forker (1992), no statistically fundamental 
relationship exist between the proportion of independent directors and of disclosures regarding 
stock options. Conyon and He, (2004), states that independent directors may tend to form a 
cooperative alliance due to good relations with the top Management for their personal interest at the 
expense of the shareholder. While the presence of independent directors do not have any impact on 
the quality of imperative disclosure on stock options (Forker (1992)). Al-Moataz and Hussainey 
(2012) found a conflicting connection between corporate governance voluntary disclosures and 
board independence in Saudi Arabia. On the contrary, previous studies like Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) gave evidence of greater percentage of independent directors on the board may be valuable 
to the organization and positively associated with the voluntary disclosures as the independent 
members bring networks, reputation, and far reaching experience. Based on these arguments and 
past literatures we also include the variable of independent directors and hypothesize that: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there exist a positive association between the level of voluntary intellectual 
capital disclosure and the composition of independent directors on the board. 
 
 
3.1.3.Board of Directors Size 
 
An important area of crafting the mechanism for Corporate Governance is to determine the perfect 
size of the board of directors. Considering numerous studies have been carried out with 
contradictory outcomes. At one end, there are studies that proves the positive association of the 
board size and the voluntary disclosures. Authors like Chaganti and Mahajan (1985) place 
confidence in the bigger board size as they term them to be worthy as they bring wider expertise 
and diverse experiences to the board decision making process. According to (Yermack, (1996) who 
stated bigger boards tends to add more experience from wider ranges in the board including 
financial reporting or other disclosure expertise. 
 
There are also some literatures that remains inconclusive or do not find any effect through the board 
size towards organizations voluntary disclosures (Lakhal, 2005). While some studies even claims 
that the size of the board is negatively associated to the firm value (Fuerst and Kang (2000)) and 
hence often argued that slimmer boards will not be slowed down due to ritualistic complications  
and may ease and help firm for the smooth transitioning from one phase to another, and quick 
decision making thus enhancing firm performance. Members of bigger boards are more probable to 
be interested in conservative approach taking calculated decision mostly surrounding to 
sustainability and less excited to engage in strategic decision making including the decision of 
voluntary disclosures. Concluding on that it may be expected for the size of the boards to be having 
negative relationship with disclosure practices. Bigger board size may impact negatively on the 
overall of the board (Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker (1994)). Studies also reported that there is a 
conflicting relationship amid size of the board and earnings management, indicating bigger board 
size may result in higher disclosure quality (Akhtaruddin et. al (2009)). Therefore, we may 
generalize that, organizations with bigger size of the boards might be more probable to voluntarily 
disclose more information in their annual reports and other forms of communication. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relation between Board of Directors size and quantity and 




Fama and Jensen (1983) states that the important and crucial responsibility for the board  of 
directors is to reduce agency costs due to the detachment of ownership and control. ‘The board is 
not an effective device for decision control unless it limits the decision discretion of individual top 
managers’ (Fama and Jensen (1983), p. 314), as according to Fama and Jensen (1983) CEO duality 
neglects the merit of separating decision management and control. According to Boyd (1994, p. 
338) ‘holding the highly symbolic position of board chair would provide the CEO with a wider 
power base and locus of control’. Despite previous studies repeatedly dispute in favor of the 
positive association amid the separation of decision management and control, while it should be 
more crucial to investigate if the separation does leads to better monitoring and higher amount of 
voluntary disclosure or increase in the value for the overall organization in general. 
Not substantial differences in various financial performance were evidenced between organizations 
that experienced CEO duality and that did not, in a study carried by Berg and smith (1978). Many 
previous scientific studies did not find any substantial relationship between the role duality and firm 
performance (Ho & Wong, 2001; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Ghazali &Weetman, 2006). Studies 
even claim that organizations with role duality consistently outperform corporations with a CEO 
non-duality structure (Rechner and Dalton (1991)). However authors like Boyd (1995), validates the 
separation of the two positions ensuring the independency of the decision control and decision 
management since role duality has the gist of authority in the core of the structure. Substantial 
decision-making and managing authority due to the role duality held by a single person may limit 
the independency of the board and reduce the board's effective functioning and governance (Gul 
and Leung (2004)), impairing the quality of the firm's disclosure practices. Considering these 
findings with respect to the role duality as for CEO and Chairman, we hypothesize that: 
H3: ceteris paribus, there is a negative association amid the level of intellectual capital disclosure 
and role duality. 
 
3.3. Ownership structure – share concentration 
3.3.1. Family Ownership 
Previous studies have proved that promoters and the management of the family firms are more 
likely to involve in managerial intrusion at the cost of firm interest, leading to fragile 
accomplishment (Thomsen and Pedersen, (2000) ; Gomez-Mejia et al., (2001); Cronqvist and 
Nilsson (2003)). Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) have confirmed a negative association amid the level 
of family control and the profitability in the form of return on assets (ROA) of Swedish listed firms 
used as sample. 
Although there are studies that argues and maintains that when compared to various forms of 
ownership, family ownership have proved to be a value intensifying channel in the listed firms 
(Anderson and Reeb (2003), Maury (2006) and Barontini and Caprio (2006)). In the corporations 
which are owned by families, and the chairman of such organization maintains cordial and informal 
relations with the prime shareholders there is sufficient evidence to prove that there is infringement 
at the expense of corporations interest (De Angelo and De Angelo (2000); Go´mez-Mejı´a et al. 
(2001)) 
H4: Ceteris paribus, Family ownership has negative relationship with disclosure of intellectual 
capital. 
 
3.3.2. Institutional shareholding 
 
Larger or institutional investors possess the right motivation and means to maintain its influence 
over the management and control its activities while retaining the power to initiate changes if 
required. According to Lang and McNichols, (1997), Institutional investors are competent and 
powerful to exert diagnosis over other's investments. Earlier studies have also provided sufficient 
evidence that the impact of institutional investor on firm valuation is mostly positive (McConnell 
and Servaes (1990)). Considering these findings, we are satisfied to believe that monitoring by 
institutional investors of the corporate may bring more concentration towards performance and 
reduce opportunistic behavior. 
H5: Ceteris paribus, there exist a positive association between the presence of director's from 
institutional investors on the board and the level of Intellectual Capital Disclosure. 
 
3.3.3. Ownership concentration 
 
 
According to Jensen & Meckling (1976), Agency theory predicts corporations with diffused 
ownership structure is more likely to disclose better. However, since there is greater variations in 
the related interest of various groups involved, corporations with diffused ownership structure is 
more likely to have higher amount of agency conflict. The structure of the ownership and the 
system created to govern the organization may have impact on management's risk appetite and to 
act accordingly (Zahra, 1996). 
According to Schipper, (1981), Disclosure can help curtailing the agency conflict as it reduces 
information asymmetry and monitoring difficulties experienced by diffuse owners. Previous studies 
have concluded a significant negative association amid ownership concentration and the level of 
Intellectual Capital Disclosure. 
Considering these findings, we believe that there exist a negative relationship with the Ownership 
concentration and the Intellectual Capital Disclosure. 
H6: Ceteris paribus, Ownership concentration has a negative relationship with disclosure of 
Intellectual Capital. 
 
3.2. Board committee size and frequency of meetings 
 
3.2.1 Internal Auditing Mechanism - number of meetings 
 
Prior literatures have already established that audit committee is necessary to govern the behavior of 
the board, and its efficiency is more robust according to the independency of the audit committee 
(Menon and Williams (1994), Abbott et al. (2000), Klein (2002) and Xie et al. (2003)). Studies also 
indicate that in order to effectively supervise the activity of the management, sufficient the audit 
committees as committees, which are dormant, may not be able to monitor management efficiently 
(Olson (1999)), must conduct number of meeting for the issues of high priority. 
H7: Ceteris Paribus, there exist a positive association amid the level of intellectual capital 




Empirical evidence have demonstrated that corporate governance structure is affected by the 
business surroundings (see, e.g., Boone et al. 2007; Linck et al. 2008; Coles et al. 2008; Lehn et al. 
2009). For instance, an organization with more institutional investor operating in a volatile 
environment would benefit more from the presence of the institutional directors and independent 
directors on the board. Corporate governance is termed as a function of an organization’s regulatory 
operational and cultural environment. 
 
As knowledge creation, diffusion, and storage are inherently evolutionary in nature, the degree to 
which an organization develops its intellectual capital may vary with its age. Likewise, 
organizational size may influence the development and level of intellectual capital through 
increased access to resources and market power (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). The size of the 
firm is positively associated with discretionary disclosure practices of the firm (Meek et al. (1995)). 
 
Accordingly, we control for both organizational age and size in our analyses. We also include two 
other control variables that we regard as exogenous determinants of corporate governance that is 
Growth opportunities and Return on Equity. The high-growth firms have a greater information 
asymmetry, and they bridge the information gap by discretionary disclosure to meet investor 




This study examines intellectual capital disclosure in corporate annual reports of Indian fully listed 
companies on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) for financial year-ends between March 2012 and 
February 2013. The firms chosen for the study are the top 100 firms (based on their market 
capitalization) from the BSE were chosen from several industry sectors containing high intellectual 
capital companies (IT, Food Production & Beverage, Telecommunications, Media & Publishing, 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology, Banking & Insurance, and Business Services). 
 
Intellectual capital disclosure (ICD) comprises of tangible and intangible information as well as a 
significant narratives that ensures the indicators are within a strategic structure (Bukh, 2003). The 
information plays a crucial role in reducing the information asymmetries that may result in a 
potential conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, who may prefer to abstain such 
information to enhance their interests (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). There may be number of 
frameworks or conceptual models to distinguish and record ICD. Mostly, in all the frameworks, 
human capital is a common component (Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Stewart, 1997; Sveiby, 1997) 
that includes the organizational capabilities such as knowledge, abilities, and skills that inhabit in 
individuals. Internal Intellectual Capital also known as Structural capital typically comprise of 
organizational characteristics such as Communications systems, Research and Development, 
Intellectual Property, corporate culture, leadership, Technology, and structure. 
 
Authors like Brooking (1996) termed a separate tier for intellectual property, by naming another 
category as the term ‘infrastructure assets’ to assess the organizational level. Another frequent 
component of IC is External intellectual capital also known as Relational Capital (Edvinsson & 
Malone, 1997; Roos et al., 1998), usually defined as the relationships between an organization and 
its other stakeholders especially its customers and suppliers. This category is quiet adequate in the 
adaption and diffusion of Intellectual Capital as it leverages individual motivation, cooperation and 
communication. 
 
Following Sveiby (1997) framework and several later studies (Guthrie and petty 2000, Cerbioni et 
al (2007), and Li et al 2011) we use a modified and detailed ICD checklist belonging to the three 
common categories discussed above: Human capital (HICD), Internal Structure (IICD) and External 
structure (EICD), capturing information in the forms of text, numerical and pictorial/graphical. We 
considered the research technique usually used in disclosure studies, known as the Information 
Disclosure Index. The information disclosure index includes 43 items classified into three 
categories discussed. Specifically those items were chosen considering that this method will help us 
to obtain objective results, as well as a significant sample size composing of various industries that 
exhibits the different behaviors of the variables in our study. 
 




Past researchers have analyzed with respect to the voluntary disclosure of Intellectual Capital in the 
annual reports only to address the specific measure of IC in terms of its presence or absence, and 
thus creating the disclosure index thus retaining only the Quantitative aspect of the IC Disclosure 
(Cerbioni and Parbonetti 2007). There are studies who attempted to capture the Qualitative part of 
ICD using indices of disclosure assigning the weight to each item disclosed or based on the type of 
measure (Botosan, 1997, Guthrie et al., 1999). In short giving a proxy for the information targeted 
with respect to the quality of disclosure (Gul and Leung, 2004). In the same vein many researchers 
have argued the importance of the quality of the Intellectual capital but had also confirmed 
weakness of the index method and so its difficulty to assess (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Botosan 
1997). Qualitative content analysis goes beyond merely counting words to examining language 
intensely for classifying large amounts of text into an efficient number of categories that represent 
similar meanings (Weber, 1990). 
 
Following existing studies (Garcı`a-Meca and Martı`nez, 2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti 2007; 
Haniffa et. Al, 2007), we considered voluntary ICD as a multidimensional and complex concept. 
This paper attempts to cover both the quantity and the quality of disclosure. We drew on the time 
expectation of the information disclosed and on the content of information as proxies for the 
quality. Time horizons (historical versus forward looking) having economic relationships and the 
governance aspects of intellectual capital are being utilized in order to look for more qualitative 
aspects of ICD. The Weimer-Pape taxonomy argues governance systems as being primarily 
concerned with either short-term or long-term economic relationships. Studying CG mechanism in 
various developed economies Weimer and Pape (1999:157) reports based on findings by Gelauff 
and Den Broeder (1996) that in such market-oriented governance systems unrestricted markets 
ensure rapid adjustment to changing circumstances and hence favor more short term results rather 
than the long term economic goals. In the same vein, studies constructively states that constant and 
rapid adjustments to changing market dynamics and its relationship in terms of its economics has 
created governance and management to be focused on the accomplishment of short-term rather than 
long-term results (Porter ,1992; Prodham, 1993). This very precisely indicates the crucial 
relationship between the time horizon of ICD and the associated Corporate Governance. Short term 
and long-term time horizons affect the use and management of component intellectual capitals 
differently as the time expectation explains. 
 
As the Management is responsible for the ICD irrespective of the merits of either short-term or 
long-term outlooks, and hence the firm's existing intellectual capital needs to be deployed and 
disclosure. We also try uncovering the assistance received in doing so by the CG mechanism 
discussed here. This paper also explores this semantic property of the ICD of time orientation as 
being highlighted its importance in terms of time Expectation strategy being deployed by the 
Management. Specifically we also wanted to see the role played by Corporate Governance for it, as 
with other capitals (tangibles), CG is also responsible for directing and taking responsibility in the 
creation, deployment, and leveraging of existing and available intellectual capital. This 
methodology allowed building both a total score for a company and various scores for more specific 
aspects of its disclosure quantitatively and qualitatively. It was thus an attempt to increase the scope 
of the analysis of the ICD by considering various aspects classifying towards the Quantitative and 
Qualitative details. 
 
To develop ICD index from the annual reports, we used content analysis, a method widely used in 
previous research on ICD (Guthrie et al., 2004; Garcia-Meca et al 2010). According to Krippendorff 
(1980) definition content analysis is a research methodology for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data to their context. Strategizing and developing components into which content 
units can be classified is an essential element of content analysis (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). 
Content analysis attempts to study published information reliably, objectively and systematically 
(Krippendorf, 1980). 
 
According to Kerlinger (1986) who defined content analysis as a research technique of examining 
communication in an objective, systematic and quantitative aspect for the objective of measuring 
variables. It is also termed as a research technique that exploits a set of agenda that make valid 
inferences from text and it is context-sensitive and so can proceed significant meanings of data 
(Weber (1985)). Although largely seen as a quantitative research technique, it can conclusively 
acquire qualitative content as well (Stempel, 1989). We developed an overall ICD index for each 
annual report as the sum of scores on each IC component. 
 
The intellectual capital disclosure index ICDIj for each company is calculated based on the 
disclosure index score formula used in previous literatures (Haniffa et al, 2005; 2011) as follows: 
 
 
Where nj = number of items for jth firm, nj = 129 (i.e. 43 items in three formats), Xij = 1 if ith item 
disclosed, 0 if ith item not disclosed, so that 0 ≤ ICDIj ≤ 1. 
 
Sentences containing general assumptions, over emphasis or even repetition were coded as 0 to 
prevent firms to obtain a higher disclosure score while a concise report could have a lower score. 
Two researchers having expertise in content analysis created IC Indexes by frequency of occurrence 
in the annual report for every listed company under investigation, recording 1 for each component 
and 0 otherwise. The index creation by the two researchers given the benchmark for the degree of 
contentment as a measure of reliability, using Scott’s p (>0.9). 
 
Variable Data Collection Methods 
 
The use of a dichotomous procedure in scoring the instrument for the disclosure index can be 
criticized because it treats disclosure of one item (regardless of its form or content) as being equal, 
and does not indicate how much emphasis is given to a particular content category (Haniffa et al 
2011). To capture the intensity of intellectual capital content and to partly overcome the problem of 
using an index score, we follow Haniffa et al 2011 to add another ICD component namely 
intellectual capital word count (ICWC). We also attempted to analyze the level of focus exhibited in 
the communication i.e. Annual report through measuring the intensity of the ICD. Intensity or 
direction implies the measurement of the direction of the symbolic meaning contained in the 
message. According to Krippendorff (1980) words are a preferred measure when intended to 
measure the amount of total volume devoted to a topic and to ascertain the importance of that topic. 
Since the new component of ICWC is added to capture the intensity of the ICD in the overall ICD 
of the firm, in the departure from the previous studies graphical and pictorial messages were 
included in the word count measure. Every component of the ICD under study (Internal, External, 
and Human) in the form of graphical and pictorial messages were given the score of 1, so as to 
arrive the total volume of the ICD measuring the Intensity. 
 
Following Haniffa et al (2011) and Beattie and Thomson (2007), and taking ‘phrases’, or what term 
‘pieces of information’ and in this study also the pictorial and graphical messages as the basis of 
coding, the number of words/figures relating to each intellectual capital item in the checklist was 
counted and added together to arrive at ICWC for each company. 
 
Table 2 
Variable name Variable Measure 
   
ICDI Overall Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure 
Number of items disclosed in the annual 
report divided by 129 
   
FICD Total disclosure score related to 
forward-looking information 
IC Disclosure for all the forward-looking 
oriented Intellectual Capital information. 
HICD Total disclosure score related to 
historically oriented information 
IC Disclosure for all the Historical oriented 
Intellectual Capital information 
   
WCIC Volume of intellectual capital 
disclosure 
Total number of words disclosed in relation 
to Intellectual Capital information 
 
PrID Proportion of Independent 
Directors (Board Composition) 
Number of independent directors on board 
divided by total number of directors on 
board 
   
BZ Board Size Total number of Board of Directors 
   
RD Role Duality Take the value of 1 if the Chairman is also 
the CEO of the firm; 0 otherwise. 
   
SHFL Family Shareholding of 
promoters family 
Share ownership more than or equal to 1% 
held by promoters family members of the 
company. 
   
SHIN Shareholding of institutional 
investors 
Shareholding of institutional investors by 
any number 
   
SHCN Shareholding Concentration Share ownership held by one person or 
more for more than or equal to 5% 
   
NACM Number of Audit committee 
meetings 
Total number of Audit committee meetings 
   
AGE Age of the Organization Time since founding 
   
SIZE Size of the Company The natural logarithm of total assets 
   
GRTH Growth opportunities of the firm Market value to Book value of equity shares 
   
ROE Profitability Return on Equity 
 
 
While the indexes of the Intellectual capitals are termed in the dependable category, corporate 
governance and control variables are termed to be the independent variables. The data for the 
independent variables were collected from that of the annual reports of the companies and from the 
database of Ace Equity. Table 2 summarizes the definition of both independent and dependent 
variables. 
A Multiple regression method is used to test the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure 
based on the indexes and the various corporate governance and control variables. In this case, the 
model for regression is specified thus: 
 
𝐈𝐂_𝐢𝐣 = 𝛃_𝟎 + 𝛃_𝟏 𝐏𝐫𝐈𝐃_𝐢𝐣 + 𝛃_𝟐 𝐁𝐙_𝐢𝐣 + 𝛃_𝟑 𝐑𝐃 _𝐢𝐣 + 𝛃_𝟒 𝐒𝐇𝐌𝐃 _𝐢𝐣 + 𝛃_𝟓 𝐒𝐇𝐅𝐋_𝐢𝐣 
+ 𝛃_𝟔 𝐒𝐇𝐈𝐍_𝐢𝐣 + 𝛃_𝟕 𝐒𝐇𝐂𝐍 _𝐢𝐣 + 𝛃_𝟖 𝐍𝐀𝐂𝐌_𝐢𝐣 + 𝛃_𝟗 𝐀𝐆𝐄 _𝐢𝐣 
+ 𝛃_𝟏𝟎 𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄 _𝐢𝐣 + 𝛃_𝟏𝟏 𝐆𝐑𝐓𝐇_𝐢𝐣 + 𝛃𝟏𝟐 𝐑𝐎𝐄_𝐢𝐣 + 𝛆_𝐢𝐣 
 
where IC = Overall Intellectual Capital Disclosure measured in different form of indexes, PrID = 
Proportion of Independent Directors (Board Composition, BZ = Board Size, RD = Role Duality, 
SHFL = Family Shareholding of promoters family, SHIN = Shareholding of institutional investors, 
SHCN = Shareholding Concentration, NACM = Number of Audit committee meetings, AGE = Age 
of the Organization, SIZE = Size of the Company, GRTH = Growth opportunities of the firm, ROE 
= Return on Equity (Profitability), β = parameters, ε = error term, i = the ith observation, j = jth 
firm. 
To wean out possible multi collinearity issues, the correlations among the independent variables 
were computed and examined. In addition, the variance inflation factors (VIF) were reviewed. To 
ensure normality, test were performed for the skewness and kurtosis properties of the data and were 
reviewed under shapiro-wilk test to ensure goodness of fit. Finally, the data were transformed when 
normality was an issue. A series of analysis were conducted to ascertain the normality, 
homoscedasticity and linearity assumptions in the form of Q-Q plots, analysis of residuals and plots 
of the studentised residuals against predicted values. 
 
Table 3 presents the result for the correlations between all the variables. Since the correlation is 
being carried on untransformed data, we have carried and presented the Pearson’s and Spearman’s 
form of correlation to give a clarity towards the association between variables. Kennedy (1985) 
suggested that multi collinearity be viewed as a serious problem only if the correlation between 
explanatory variables exceeds 0.8. All the association among the Independent variables with the 
exception of SHFL – SHIN do not exceed the mentioned threshold. In addition, the VIF computed 
for the explanatory variables are not more than five for any of them giving sufficient evidence (Hair 
et al., 1995, Ringle et al., 2015). Consequently, we can confirm there is no multi collinearity issues 
among the explanatory variables. 
 
The results clearly indicates the association of majority of the variables with one or more of the 
Intellectual Capitals form. The correlation table clearly indicates PrID as the most common 
explanatory variable significantly correlated with various forms of ICD at both 5% and 1% level. 
PrID is also significantly correlated with all the external forms of ICD. While, SHCN is correlated 
with ICDI, FICDI and FLEICD significantly. RD is significantly correlated with ICDI and HEICD. 
In addition, SHFL, BZ, are significantly correlated with FICDI, IICWC respectively. Moreover, 
NACM and SHIN both are significantly correlated with HEICD. Among the controls, AGE is 
significantly correlated with ICDI, FICDI, HICDI, WCIC, EICWC and HEICD. In addition, SIZE  
is also significantly correlated with ICDI, WCIC, HEICD, FLEICD and EICWC. GRTH and ROE 






The table (number) describes the descriptive statistics for the various forms of Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure discussed along with the Independent variables and control variables for all the sample 
firms undertaken for the study. The Intellectual capital disclosure index ranges between 0.062 to 
0.2946 with a mean of 0.177 and median of 0.186. The stats for the sub categorical intellectual 
capital disclosure is not very far from ICDI even though it highly depends on the extent of measure 
for the index calculation. As evident, the mean for ICDI, EICDI, and HICDI is 0.180, 0.202, and 
0.150 respectively. 
The mean word count for the overall Intellectual capital disclosure in the form ICWC stood for 
2175 words, which is quite low compared to that of developed economies (Li. Et al 2008) and with 
the minimum and maximum value being 324 and 4584 respectively. The mean words for the 
Forward looking intellectual capital disclosure (FICD) and Historical intellectual capital disclosure 
(HICD) remained at 335 and 721 words respectively clearly indicating the company’s focus more 
towards the achievement for the financial year completed in the view of cause and effect 
relationship as predicted by the time expectation theory. Among the explanatory variables, PrID 
stood at 39% mean while NACM and BZ remained at 5.6 and 11. The average AGE of the sample 




The first column of Table 5 represents the regression result for the overall intellectual capital 
disclosure. The regression result of ICDI produces the r square of 45% and adjusted r square of 
41%. Apart from BZ, in Corporate Governance variables and GRTH in control variables all the 
variables from the explanatory variables and the control variables are significant. NACM is 
significant at 1% level, while PrID, SHFL, SHIN, SHCN and RD are significant at 5% level. AGE 
is significant at 1% level, and the other control variables viz SIZE and ROE are significant at 5% 
level. With the exception of RD, in explanatory variables and SIZE in control variables all the 
factors regressed are positively associated with ICDI. 
 
The second column represents the regression result for the Forward-looking Intellectual Capital 
disclosure (FICDI). The regression that comes with the R Square and adjusted R square of 32% and 
26% respectively, is significantly associated with explanatory variables like SHFL, SHIN and 
SHCN. Moreover, with control variables in the form of AGE and ROE, Although ROE is  
associated negatively. In the third column, the result for Historical Intellectual Capital Disclosure 
(HICDI) with the R square of 23% and showing significant results for the SHFL, SHIN and SHCN, 
while for control variables with AGE and ROE. SHCN and ROE are negatively associated. The 
fourth column represents the regression result for the Intellectual capital word count (ICWC) with 
the R square of 29% with the variables of SHFL and SHIN associated significantly along with AGE 
and ROE among the controls. Wherein, ROE is associated negatively and is significant at 1% level, 
while the rest mentioned are positively associated and are significant at 5% level. 
 
The first column of the next table 10 shows the regression result for the (HIICD) Historical Internal 
intellectual capital disclosure with the R square of 18%. The variable SHFL is positively associated 
being significant, while among the controls only ROE is significant although being associated 
negatively. The second column of the same table represents result for the Forward-looking Internal 
Intellectual capital (FIICD) with R square of 14%, Wherein PrID and SHFL are statistically 
significant, while ROE among the controls is negatively associated and is significant at 5% level. 
The third column represents the result for the Internal Intellectual capital word count (IICWC) with 
the r square of 17% with BZ and SHFL being positive and significant at 5% level and within 
controls, ROE is significant and negatively associated. 
 
In the table 11, the first column represents the regression result for the dependent variable of 
historical external intellectual capital disclosure (HEICD) producing R square of 34%. Only 
variable SHIN is significant among the explanatory variables while AGE and ROE among the 
control variables. ROE is significant at 1% level and is negative while rest both variables are 
significant at 5% and are positive. The second column represents forward looking external 
Intellectual capital disclosure (FLEICD), with the R square of 18% with SHCN (positively) and 
ROE (negatively) the only variables significant at 5% level. The third column represents the result 
for External Intellectual capital word count (EICWC) producing the r square of 26% with SHFL 
(positively) and ROE (negatively) the only variables significant at 5% level. 
 
Finally, the first column of the table 12 represents the regression result for the Historical human 
Intellectual capital disclosure (HHICD), with the R square of 17% and the variables PrID, SHFL 
and RD are positively significant at 5% level among all the variables examined. The second column 
displays the result for the Forward-looking human Intellectual capital disclosure (FLHICD) with the 
r square of 17%, with SHFL and AGE are the only variables that are significant (positively). Lastly, 
the third column represents the result for the Human intellectual capital disclosure (HICWC) 
producing R square of 16%, where in the PrID and SHFL are statistically significant at 5% level 




Analyzing the findings of the regression results and with that of the hypotheses framed will give us 
the better picture of the research direction. The first hypotheses expected of PrID to be associated 
with overall ICD is very well supported by the regression result with its significant level of 
association not only with ICDI but also various other forms FIICD, HHICD, HICWC at 5% level. It 
did not yield any statistical meaningful results for the semantic properties (Historical and forward 
looking) of overall ICD nor for the word count. But looking at the individual results especially the 
variables mentioned, it clearly says that more the proportionate of independent directors within the 
board more the disclosure of Intellectual capital in the form of Forward-looking internal, Historical 
human and word count for the overall human Intellectual capital. Thus, contributing towards both 
the time expectation theory and the agency cost theory. The second hypotheses, of BZ is rejected,  
as it does not influence the disclosure of overall intellectual capital. 
 
The third hypotheses of role duality of having negative influence over intellectual capital disclosure 
is confirmed by the significant regression result, so the companies having chairperson on the board 
also acting as CEO of the firm will hurt the overall Intellectual Capital Disclosure practice of the 
firm. The fourth hypotheses family ownership being negatively associated with ICD did not hold 
true as it turned out to be positively associated with ICD, as SHFL is significant and positively 
associated with ICDI and all the qualitative forms (semantic and word count) of ICDI along with 
various other forms of ICD. This finding strongly supports the previous studies of family 
shareholding of listed firms prove to be value intensifying in various forms (Anderson and Reeb 
(2003), Maury (2006) and Barontini and Caprio (2006)). 
 
The hypotheses of institutional investor is also very well supported by the regression result. As 
SHIN is positively significant with ICDI and all qualitative aspects of ICDI (FICD, HICD, and 
ICWC) thus supporting the presence of institutional investor as it promotes better transparency and 
dissemination of information process. The sixth hypotheses of ownership concentration (SHCN) 
having negative consequences on the Intellectual capital disclosure does not hold true as the 
variable is positively associated with the overall ICDI. An interesting part of the finding is while the 
variable is positively associated with FICDI it is negatively associated with HICDI, giving a clear 
indication of the Time expectation theory in order to create and maximize value of the concentrated 
ownership. 
 
The hypotheses of number of audit meetings having positive influence on the level of intellectual 
capital disclosure holds true as NACM is significantly (at 1% level) and positively associated with 
overall ICDI. Thus confirming, more the number of audit meetings within the firm is likely to 
increase the Intellectual capital disclosure of the given firm. Thus providing a platform for reducing 
the Information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior and contributing towards agency cost theory. 
AGE is very well positively associated with the overall intellectual capital disclosure as is 
significant with ICDI and FICDI at 1% level. While that with HICDI and ICWC at 5% level. ROE 
is positively significant with the overall ICDI at 5%, but also significant (1% and 5%) negatively 
with the qualitative aspects of ICD. SIZE is negatively associated with the overall ICDI at 5% level; 
however, it did not yield any significance on the qualitative aspects of ICD. GRTH is not having 
any significant influence with the Intellectual capital Disclosure. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In the age of globalization, in every economy regulators, managers and investors sought non- 
financial disclosure along with financial means to help them in their decision-making. 
Organizations taking precautions and stand out for the non-financial disclosure will  having an 
added advantage if such information is disclosed either qualitatively or quantitatively in all modes 
of communication. According to Keenan and Aggestam (2001) critical association exist between 
corporate governance and intellectual capital, wherein, the former shapes the patterns of stakeholder 
influences that affect managerial decision-making, while the latter focuses on forming and 
leveraging an organization’s intangible capital. Based on this theory and focusing on this 
interpretation the purpose of this study was to analyze corporate governance factors on voluntary 
disclosure of intellectual capital during fiscal years 2011–2012 for 137 Indian listed companies. 
 
Our results show that corporate governance plays an important role in orienting the amount of 
disclosure of Intellectual capital provided by Indian companies. Analyzing the statistical 
relationship among the variables and the intellectual capital disclosure it is very much evidenced 
about the direct association of the Intellectual capital disclosure with that of corporate governance 
variables. The overall Intellectual capital disclosure has direct association with all the variables 
except that of board size (CG variable) and growth of the firm (control variable). While, all the 
corporate governance variables are associated with one or more of the intellectual capital disclosure 
form (quantitative or qualitative). The proportion of independent directors is positively associated 
with the amount of intellectual capital disclosed. The relation empirically tested and thus 
established clearly demonstrate that greater the ratio of independent directors results in greater the 
quantity of intellectual capital disclosed, however, the results are partially different when the quality 
of disclosure is analyzed. This could be primarily due to independent directors not taking an active 
role on the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983) however, it also depends on their level of expertise and 
knowledge that influences the intellectual capital disclosure, especially qualitative along with 
internal and external. 
 
While role duality and size are negatively related with the overall Intellectual capital disclosure 
index. Our findings show that the size of the board of directors is not statistically significant factor 
in IC disclosure for Indian companies a view in contrast with other literatures (Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2006; Gracia et al 2010). We also find confirmation of our Institutional Shareholding 
and number of Audit committee meetings, underpinned by agency theory arguments to be positively 
associated and encouraging voluntary disclosure of Intellectual capital. The empirical results clearly 
demonstrates that the system of corporate governance is based upon the chain of interdependent 
factors, all of that plays a critical role in developing a governance framework. Which can be further 
derived from the result developed through the empirical testing in this study and can be stated as a 
governance framework developed through a board consisting of sizeable number of its members, of 
which majority are independent directors, having a clear separation of role between chairperson and 
CEO, having directors representing minority and institutional shareholders and having maximum 
number of audit meetings will directly encourage the overall disclosure of intellectual capital (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; 1994; Vafeas, 1999; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2006; Li et al 2008). 
The limitations in this study are varied and touches various dimension of the analysis. First, the 
index-creating sheet is developed considering the sample of Indian companies, so it is difficult to 
compare the scores with that of the literatures developed for the developed economies, The 
reliability and validity issues in content analysis remain unresolved (Krippendorff, 1980). Secondly, 
the study do not differentiate with the Intellectual capital-intensive industry with that of non- 
intensives. Thirdly, the sample size consist of only the listed companies while it completely ignores 
the non-listed firms. Fourth, the analysis can be increased while including other modes of 
communication as well along with annual reports. Lastly, the scope could have been increased by 
increasing the dimension of quality of voluntary disclosure and the number of financial years of the 
study. 
 
Despite several limitations discussed above, this paper contributes several ways towards the studies 
of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure especially in the form of Intellectual Capital. 
First, we establish the link between the corporate governance variables in the form of board 
characteristics and voluntary disclosure in the form of Intellectual capital. Secondly, we not only 
captured the quantitative details of Intellectual capital, but also the semantic properties in the form 
forward looking and historical information underpinned by time expectation theory, along with the 
word count of the Intellectual capital disclosure in the annual reports of the sample companies. 
Importantly, this study is first of its kind to extend the existing knowledge with respect to the 
corporate governance and intellectual capital (quantitatively and qualitatively) from an emerging 
economy point of view. 
 
In the future research, the analysis of intellectual capital should be explored from other media as 
well apart from the annual report for example; press releases. Organizational case studies can be 
used to establish the results with deeper examination. Moreover, it would it would certainly help to 
broaden this study to include other companies from the Asian Region, to corroborate and to clarify 
the similarity or performance of the internal corporate governance mechanism within the entire 
region. Moreover, expanding the sample companies to a period with greater number of years may 
favor the solidity of the results. It is also possible to conduct a study to look at how investing in 
Corporate governance mechanism and thus Intellectual capital efficiency can contribute to the 
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ICDI - HEICD -0.181 * -0.088  
ICDI - FLEICD -0.177 * -0.178 * 
ICDI - EICWC -0.187 * -0.114  
ICDI - HHICD 0.037  0.004  
ICDI - FLHICD -0.058  -0.029  
ICDI - HICWC 0.075  0.045  
ICDI - PrID 0.122  0.081  
ICDI - SHFL 0.134  0.068  
ICDI - SHIN -0.028  -0.011  
ICDI - SHCN 0.270 ** 0.173 * 
ICDI - NACM 0.086  0.148  
ICDI - RD -0.202 * -0.183 * 
ICDI - BZ -0.058  -0.045  
ICDI - AGE 0.345 *** 0.341 *** 
ICDI - GRTH 0.377 *** 0.367 *** 
ICDI - SIZE -0.218 * -0.237 ** 
ICDI - ROE 0.394 *** 0.308 *** 
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FICDI - IICWC 0.625 *** 0.597 *** 
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HICDI - EICWC 0.533 *** 0.482 *** 
HICDI - HHICD 0.656 *** 0.634 *** 
HICDI - FLHICD 0.625 *** 0.573 *** 
HICDI - HICWC 0.690 *** 0.664 *** 
HICDI - PrID -0.131  -0.088  
HICDI - SHFL 0.077  0.037  
HICDI - SHIN 0.022  0.043  
HICDI - SHCN -0.101  -0.122  
HICDI - NACM 0.052  0.045  
HICDI - RD 0.060  0.060  
HICDI - BZ 0.083  0.086  
HICDI - AGE 0.210 * 0.192 * 
HICDI - GRTH -0.233 ** -0.274 ** 
HICDI - SIZE 0.046  0.093  
HICDI - ROE -0.332 *** -0.431 *** 
WCIC - HIICD 0.745 *** 0.705 *** 
WCIC - FIICD 0.705 *** 0.666 *** 
WCIC - IICWC 0.740 *** 0.695 *** 
WCIC - HEICD 0.673 *** 0.683 *** 
WCIC - FLEICD 0.548 *** 0.560 *** 
WCIC - EICWC 0.526 *** 0.523 *** 
WCIC - HHICD 0.659 *** 0.657 *** 
WCIC - FLHICD 0.646 *** 0.629 *** 
WCIC - HICWC 0.707 *** 0.706 *** 
WCIC - PrID -0.147  -0.116  
WCIC - SHFL 0.046  0.036  
WCIC - SHIN 0.060  0.052  
WCIC - SHCN -0.059  -0.084  
WCIC - NACM 0.105  0.112  
WCIC - RD 0.057  0.058  
WCIC - BZ 0.118  0.122  
WCIC - AGE 0.201 * 0.168 * 
WCIC - GRTH -0.313 *** -0.333 *** 
WCIC - SIZE 0.138  0.169 * 
Correlation Table 
   Pearson  Spearman  
   r  rho  
WCIC - ROE -0.422 *** -0.513 *** 
HIICD - FIICD 0.873 *** 0.805 *** 
HIICD - IICWC 0.935 *** 0.908 *** 
HIICD - HEICD 0.260 ** 0.306 *** 
HIICD - FLEICD 0.265 ** 0.315 *** 
HIICD - EICWC 0.079  0.105  
HIICD - HHICD 0.368 *** 0.339 *** 
HIICD - FLHICD 0.342 *** 0.316 *** 
HIICD - HICWC 0.519 *** 0.481 *** 
HIICD - PrID -0.042  -0.045  
HIICD - SHFL 0.118  0.103  
HIICD - SHIN -0.048  -0.039  
HIICD - SHCN 0.074  0.072  
HIICD - NACM -0.029  -0.021  
HIICD - RD 0.069  0.076  
HIICD - BZ 0.155  0.156  
HIICD - AGE 0.091  0.122  
HIICD - GRTH -0.190 * -0.186 * 
HIICD - SIZE -0.143  0.016  
HIICD - ROE -0.277 ** -0.366 *** 
FIICD - IICWC 0.889 *** 0.833 *** 
FIICD - HEICD 0.238 ** 0.284 *** 
FIICD - FLEICD 0.114  0.156  
FIICD - EICWC 0.058  0.088  
FIICD - HHICD 0.418 *** 0.398 *** 
FIICD - FLHICD 0.348 *** 0.322 *** 
FIICD - HICWC 0.486 *** 0.446 *** 
FIICD - PrID 0.035  0.060  
FIICD - SHFL 0.081  0.061  
FIICD - SHIN -0.039  -0.017  
FIICD - SHCN 0.040  0.036  
FIICD - NACM -0.002  0.010  
FIICD - RD 0.060  0.030  
FIICD - BZ 0.137  0.138  
FIICD - AGE 0.077  0.109  
FIICD - GRTH -0.190 * -0.156  
FIICD - SIZE -0.132  -0.030  
FIICD - ROE -0.245 ** -0.316 *** 
IICWC - HEICD 0.271 ** 0.335 *** 
IICWC - FLEICD 0.268 ** 0.326 *** 
IICWC - EICWC 0.062  0.073  
IICWC - HHICD 0.371 *** 0.347 *** 
IICWC - FLHICD 0.304 *** 0.284 *** 
IICWC - HICWC 0.424 *** 0.386 *** 
IICWC - PrID -0.048  -0.032  
IICWC - SHFL 0.101  0.069  
IICWC - SHIN -0.040  -0.003  
IICWC - SHCN 0.047  0.042  
IICWC - NACM 0.019  0.039  
IICWC - RD 0.057  0.054  
IICWC - BZ 0.175 * 0.182 * 
IICWC - AGE 0.129  0.160  
IICWC - GRTH -0.210 * -0.235 ** 
IICWC - SIZE -0.093  0.077  
IICWC - ROE -0.293 *** -0.420 *** 
HEICD - FLEICD 0.627 *** 0.583 *** 
HEICD - EICWC 0.778 *** 0.727 *** 
HEICD - HHICD 0.294 *** 0.263 ** 
Correlation Table 
   Pearson  Spearman  
   r  rho  
HEICD - FLHICD 0.515 *** 0.456 *** 
HEICD - HICWC 0.372 *** 0.380 *** 
HEICD - PrID 0.330 *** 0.219 * 
HEICD - SHFL 0.007  -0.080  
HEICD - SHIN 0.073  0.185 * 
HEICD - SHCN -0.025  -0.034  
HEICD - NACM 0.205 * 0.126  
HEICD - RD 0.189 * 0.105  
HEICD - BZ 0.028  0.058  
HEICD - AGE 0.289 *** 0.173 * 
HEICD - GRTH -0.308 *** -0.318 *** 
HEICD - SIZE 0.377 *** 0.226 ** 
HEICD - ROE -0.462 *** -0.481 *** 
FLEICD - EICWC 0.645 *** 0.555 *** 
FLEICD - HHICD 0.283 *** 0.338 *** 
FLEICD - FLHICD 0.162  0.160  
FLEICD - HICWC 0.309 *** 0.343 *** 
FLEICD - PrID 0.245 ** 0.129  
FLEICD - SHFL 0.076  -0.022  
FLEICD - SHIN -0.043  0.069  
FLEICD - SHCN 0.200 * 0.156  
FLEICD - NACM 0.042  0.037  
FLEICD - RD 0.149  0.132  
FLEICD - BZ 0.108  0.164  
FLEICD - AGE 0.114  0.079  
FLEICD - GRTH -0.184 * -0.299 *** 
FLEICD - SIZE 0.154  0.235 ** 
FLEICD - ROE -0.264 ** -0.384 *** 
EICWC - HHICD 0.299 *** 0.290 *** 
EICWC - FLHICD 0.499 *** 0.426 *** 
EICWC - HICWC 0.211 * 0.167  
EICWC - PrID 0.338 *** 0.284 *** 
EICWC - SHFL 0.119  0.046  
EICWC - SHIN -0.032  0.041  
EICWC - SHCN -0.116  -0.108  
EICWC - NACM 0.142  0.091  
EICWC - RD 0.113  0.110  
EICWC - BZ -0.011  -0.004  
EICWC - AGE 0.233 ** 0.089  
EICWC - GRTH -0.257 ** -0.353 *** 
EICWC - SIZE 0.293 *** 0.179 * 
EICWC - ROE -0.348 *** -0.316 *** 
HHICD - FLHICD 0.711 *** 0.705 *** 
HHICD - HICWC 0.855 *** 0.839 *** 
HHICD - PrID 0.020  0.057  
HHICD - SHFL 0.094  0.060  
HHICD - SHIN -0.018  0.013  
HHICD - SHCN 0.047  0.010  
HHICD - NACM 0.070  0.141  
HHICD - RD -0.111  -0.111  
HHICD - BZ 0.016  0.012  
HHICD - AGE 0.082  0.047  
HHICD - GRTH -0.198 * -0.235 ** 
HHICD - SIZE -0.006  0.154  
HHICD - ROE -0.223 ** -0.291 *** 
FLHICD - HICWC 0.709 *** 0.693 *** 
FLHICD - PrID -0.101  -0.051  
FLHICD - SHFL 0.138  0.082  
Correlation Table 
   Pearson  Spearman  
   r  rho  
FLHICD - SHIN -0.079  -0.013  
FLHICD - SHCN 0.110  0.100  
FLHICD - NACM 0.086  0.140  
FLHICD - RD -0.051  -0.065  
FLHICD - BZ -0.040  -0.049  
FLHICD - AGE 0.185 * 0.106  
FLHICD - GRTH -0.243 ** -0.203 * 
FLHICD - SIZE 0.104  0.078  
FLHICD - ROE -0.270 ** -0.262 ** 
HICWC - PrID 0.040  0.076  
HICWC - SHFL 0.076  0.050  
HICWC - SHIN -0.006  0.023  
HICWC - SHCN 0.068  0.056  
HICWC - NACM 0.006  0.095  
HICWC - RD -0.092  -0.074  
HICWC - BZ 0.010  0.015  
HICWC - AGE 0.059  0.037  
HICWC - GRTH -0.220 ** -0.155  
HICWC - SIZE -0.047  0.089  
HICWC - ROE -0.220 ** -0.261 ** 
PrID - SHFL -0.416 *** -0.408 *** 
PrID - SHIN 0.295 *** 0.267 ** 
PrID - SHCN -0.007  -0.008  
PrID - NACM -0.318 *** -0.163  
PrID - RD -0.244 ** -0.238 ** 
PrID - BZ -0.060  0.019  
PrID - AGE -0.232 ** -0.118  
PrID - GRTH 0.228 ** 0.232 ** 
PrID - SIZE -0.290 *** 0.011  
PrID - ROE 0.225 ** 0.194 * 
SHFL - SHIN -0.843 *** -0.860 *** 
SHFL - SHCN 0.167  0.109  
SHFL - NACM 0.059  0.006  
SHFL - RD 0.049  0.047  
SHFL - BZ -0.200 * -0.212 * 
SHFL - AGE 0.011  -0.053  
SHFL - GRTH 0.140  0.090  
SHFL - SIZE -0.128  -0.248 ** 
SHFL - ROE 0.104  0.044  
SHIN - SHCN -0.074  -0.009  
SHIN - NACM 0.037  0.105  
SHIN - RD 0.012  0.019  
SHIN - BZ 0.224 ** 0.242 ** 
SHIN - AGE -1.603e -4  0.060  
SHIN - GRTH -0.141  -0.117  
SHIN - SIZE 0.125  0.343 *** 
SHIN - ROE -0.087  -0.046  
SHCN - NACM -0.007  -0.044  
SHCN - RD -0.032  -0.032  
SHCN - BZ -0.035  -0.027  
SHCN - AGE 0.086  0.101  
SHCN - GRTH 0.005  0.114  
SHCN - SIZE -0.132  -0.033  
SHCN - ROE 0.017  0.062  
NACM - RD 0.231 ** 0.122  
NACM - BZ 0.170 * 0.162  
NACM - AGE 0.197 * 0.151  
Correlation Table 
   Pearson  Spearman  
   r  rho  
NACM - GRTH -0.181 * -0.261 ** 
NACM - SIZE 0.602 *** 0.477 *** 
NACM - ROE -0.132  -0.148  
RD - BZ 0.268 ** 0.261 ** 
RD - AGE 0.067  0.042  
RD - GRTH -0.248 ** -0.312 *** 
RD - SIZE 0.252 ** 0.187 * 
RD - ROE -0.106  -0.048  
BZ - AGE 0.007  0.008  
BZ - GRTH -0.217 * -0.154  
BZ - SIZE 0.170 * 0.280 *** 
BZ - ROE -0.133  -0.060  
AGE - GRTH -0.040  -0.116  
AGE - SIZE 0.192 * 0.043  
AGE - ROE -0.077  -0.146  
GRTH - SIZE -0.262 ** -0.633 *** 
GRTH - ROE 0.766 *** 0.643 *** 
SIZE - ROE -0.191 * -0.413 *** 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive (Untransformed) 
 
Variable Mean StDev Minimum Median Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
ICDI 0,17728 0,03908 0,06202 0,18605 0,29457 -0,27 1,00 
FICD 334,7 128,7 54,0 308,0 764,0 0,71 0,75 
HICD 720,8 266,8 108,0 668,0 1528,0 0,41 0,11 
WCIC 2175,1 795,5 324,0 2016,0 4584,0 0,39 0,06 
IICDI 0,18027 0,04850 0,06977 0,18605 0,30233 0,11 -0,21 
EICDI 0,20183 0,05483 0,04651 0,20930 0,32558 -0,49 0,57 
HICDI 0,15040 0,05321 0,04651 0,13953 0,30233 0,77 0,68 
HIICD 283,9 141,4 43,0 267,0 764,0 0,83 0,67 
FIICD 140,89 70,56 32,00 130,00 382,00 0,93 0,65 
IICWC 822,1 444,1 111,0 745,0 2292,0 0,80 0,48 
HEICD 214,94 115,55 23,00 197,00 650,00 1,25 2,09 
FLEICD 106,25 58,08 15,00 94,00 303,00 1,38 1,94 
EICWC 649,2 335,1 48,0 545,0 1950,0 1,38 2,00 
HHICD 208,15 100,19 4,00 200,00 553,00 0,88 0,90 
FLHICD 118,36 57,99 11,00 111,00 341,00 0,99 1,89 
HICWC 660,0 335,3 88,0 601,0 1842,0 0,73 0,33 
PrID 0,3802 0,1818 0,0000 0,4000 0,8330 -0,40 0,11 
SHCN 0,9197 0,2727 0,0000 1,0000 1,0000 -3,12 7,87 
NACM 5,679 2,036 3,000 5,000 13,000 1,46 1,90 
RD 0,3139 0,4658 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 0,81 -1,36 
BZ 10,993 2,375 4,000 11,000 16,000 -0,15 0,06 
SHFL 54,04 19,07 0,00 54,93 88,63 -0,74 0,31 

















GRTH 5,030 5,971 0,000 3,331 40,372 3,33 14,08 
SIZE 56182 114707 56 6300 627037 2,90 8,61 
ROE 19,63 17,95 -37,60 16,32 131,80 2,32 13,26 
 
 
Table 5. Variance inflation factor 
 VIF Tolerance 
PrID 1.60 0.624 
SHFL 4.27 0.234 
SHIN 3.73 0.268 
AGE 1.11 0.902 
GRTH 2.80 0.357 
SIZE 1.96 0.511 
ROE 2.53 0.395 
SHCN 1.07 0.933 
NACM 1.71 0.584 
RD 1.22 0.820 






Test of Normality (Shapiro-Wilk) 
 W p 
ICDI 0.969 0.003 
IICDI 0.976 0.015 
EICDI 0.956 < .001 
HICDI 0.939 < .001 
FICDI 0.962 < .001 
HICDI_23 0.980 0.042 
WCIC 0.980 0.038 
HIICD 0.956 < .001 
FIICD 0.931 < .001 
IICWC 0.952 < .001 
HEICD 0.913 < .001 
FLEICD 0.884 < .001 
EICWC 0.883 < .001 
HHICD 0.951 < .001 
FLHICD 0.950 < .001 
HICWC 0.959 < .001 
PrID 0.960 < .001 
SHFL 0.952 < .001 
SHIN 0.968 0.003 
AGE 0.943 < .001 
GRTH 0.652 < .001 
SIZE 0.542 < .001 
ROE 0.808 < .001 
SHCN 0.301 < .001 
NACM 0.813 < .001 
RD 0.584 < .001 
BZ 0.975 0.013 





Variable Mean StDev Minimum Median Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
ICDI 0,17788 0,03851 0,08000 0,18000 0,28000 0,09 -0,15 
FICDI 337,4 128,0 20,0 333,8 659,2 0,06 -0,20 
HICDI 726,2 265,7 68,9 723,4 1432,3 0,08 -0,16 
ICWC 3,3033 0,1828 2,8500 3,3000 3,7700 0,07 -0,20 
IICDI 0,18027 0,04850 0,06977 0,18605 0,30233 0,11 -0,21 
EICDI 0,20183 0,05483 0,04651 0,20930 0,32558 -0,49 0,57 

















FIICD 142,37 70,22 -31,42 141,65 327,12 0,08 -0,17 
IICWC 2,8549 0,2602 2,2100 2,8500 3,5100 0,06 -0,20 
HEICD 217,15 115,18 -68,29 216,06 510,12 0,07 -0,20 
FLEICD 106,86 57,18 -35,89 108,13 247,89 0,02 -0,29 
EICWC 2,7690 0,2419 2,2100 2,7600 3,9800 0,84 3,62 
HHICD 210,13 100,00 -36,22 207,09 498,22 0,12 -0,06 
FLHICD 119,33 58,30 -23,65 119,06 299,54 0,16 0,07 
HICWC 2,7647 0,2465 2,1500 2,7600 3,3900 0,07 -0,19 
PrID 0,3802 0,1818 0,0000 0,4000 0,8330 -0,40 0,11 
SHCN 0,9197 0,2727 0,0000 1,0000 1,0000 -3,12 7,87 
NACM 5,679 2,036 3,000 5,000 13,000 1,46 1,90 
RD 0,3139 0,4658 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 0,81 -1,36 
BZ 10,993 2,375 4,000 11,000 16,000 -0,15 0,06 
SHFL 54,04 19,07 0,00 54,93 88,63 -0,74 0,31 
SHIN 27,71 14,26 0,02 26,19 87,13 0,75 1,35 
AGE 48,92 27,03 3,00 48,00 124,00 0,69 -0,20 
GRTH 5,030 5,971 0,000 3,331 40,372 3,33 14,08 
SIZE 3,9677 0,8822 1,7490 3,7993 5,7973 0,22 -0,71 








Model Fit Measures for ICDI 
Overall Model Test 
Model R R² Adjusted R² F df1 df2 p 
ICDI 0.675 0.456 0.408 9.52 11 125 < .001 




HICDI 0.478 0.228 0.160 3.36 11 125 < .001 
 





Model Coefficients for ICDI 
Predictor Estimate SE Stand. Estimate t p 
Intercept 0.05284 0.03159 
 
1.672 0.097 
PrID 0.04468 0.01769 0.2109 2.525 0.013 
SHFL 7.19e-4 2.75e-4 0.3558 2.609 0.010 
SHIN 9.13e-4 3.44e-4 0.3382 2.655 0.009 
AGE 5.45e-4 9.90e-5 0.3828 5.511 < .001 
GRTH 4.40e-4 7.12e-4 0.0682 0.618 0.538 
SIZE -0.01265 0.00403 -0.2897 -3.138 0.002 
ROE 4.81e-4 2.25e-4 0.2240 2.133 0.035 
SHCN 0.01924 0.00964 0.1363 1.995 0.048 
NACM 0.00540 0.00163 0.2857 3.310 0.001 
RD -0.01349 0.00603 -0.1631 -2.238 0.027 
BZ 0.00106 0.00116 0.0652 0.910 0.365 
 
Model coefficients for FICDI 
 
Predictor Estimate SE Stand. Estimate t p 
Intercept -73.061 117.545 
 
-0.6216 0.535 
PrID 13.247 65.829 0.01881 0.2012 0.841 
SHFL 3.394 1.025 0.50544 3.3119 0.001 
SHIN 3.135 1.280 0.34920 2.4500 0.016 
AGE 1.449 0.368 0.30595 3.9363 < .001 
GRTH -0.864 2.649 -0.04030 -0.3262 0.745 
SIZE 11.103 14.996 0.07651 0.7404 0.460 
ROE -1.722 0.838 -0.24139 -2.0540 0.042 
SHCN 101.770 35.883 0.21680 2.8362 0.005 
NACM -4.876 6.073 -0.07755 -0.8028 0.424 
RD -15.667 22.418 -0.05699 -0.6988 0.486 
BZ -0.246 4.323 -0.00457 -0.0570 0.955 
Model Coefficients for HICDI 
Predictor Estimate SE Stand. Estimate t p 
Intercept 230.64 259.673 
 
0.888 0.376 
PrID 92.34 145.426 0.0632 0.635 0.527 
SHFL 6.89 2.264 0.4942 3.042 0.003 
SHIN 6.95 2.827 0.3727 2.457 0.015 
AGE 2.24 0.813 0.2276 2.752 0.007 
GRTH 1.04 5.851 0.0234 0.178 0.859 
SIZE 11.45 33.128 0.0380 0.346 0.730 
ROE -5.47 1.852 -0.3698 -2.956 0.004 
SHCN -159.72 79.270 -0.1639 -2.015 0.046 
NACM -11.80 13.417 -0.0904 -0.880 0.381 
RD -11.27 49.525 -0.0198 -0.228 0.820 

















Intercept 2.92070 0.17230 
 
16.9515 < .001 
PrID 0.05823 0.09649 0.05790 0.6034 0.547 
SHFL 0.00462 0.00150 0.48250 3.0790 0.003 
SHIN 0.00486 0.00188 0.37890 2.5889 0.011 
AGE 0.00127 5.40e-4 0.18832 2.3596 0.020 
GRTH 2.53e-4 0.00388 0.00828 0.0652 0.948 
SIZE 0.01470 0.02198 0.07094 0.6687 0.505 
ROE -0.00442 0.00123 -0.43441 -3.6000 < .001 
SHCN -0.08420 0.05260 -0.12565 -1.6008 0.112 
NACM -0.00431 0.00890 -0.04807 -0.4847 0.629 
RD -0.01908 0.03286 -0.04862 -0.5806 0.563 




Model Fit Measures 
 
Overall Model Test 
Model R R² Adjusted R² F df1 df2 p 
HIICD 0.414 0.171 0.0984 2.35 11 125 0.011 
 
 
FIICD 0.383 0.146 0.0713 1.95 11 125 0.039 
IICWC 0.415 0.173 0.0998 2.37 11 125 0.011 
 













Intercept -57.575 140.929 
 
-0.4085 0.684 
PrID 124.747 78.925 0.16169 1.5806 0.117 
SHFL 3.206 1.229 0.43597 2.6096 0.010 
SHIN 2.044 1.534 0.20783 1.3320 0.185 
AGE 0.756 0.441 0.14578 1.7134 0.089 
GRTH 1.712 3.176 0.07290 0.5391 0.591 
SIZE 1.308 17.979 0.00823 0.0728 0.942 
ROE -2.993 1.005 -0.38311 -2.9781 0.003 
SHCN 10.522 43.021 0.02047 0.2446 0.807 
NACM -8.450 7.282 -0.12271 -1.1605 0.248 
RD 5.746 26.878 0.01909 0.2138 0.831 





Model Coefficients for FIICD 
Predictor Estimate SE Stand. Estimate t p 
Intercept 16.044 72.158 
 
0.2223 0.824 
PrID 106.697 40.411 0.27616 2.6403 0.009 
SHFL 1.285 0.629 0.34901 2.0433 0.043 
SHIN 0.618 0.786 0.12543 0.7863 0.433 
AGE 0.322 0.226 0.12384 1.4235 0.157 
GRTH -0.636 1.626 -0.05408 -0.3911 0.696 
SIZE -7.862 9.206 -0.09876 -0.8540 0.395 
ROE -1.122 0.515 -0.28690 -2.1813 0.031 
SHCN -4.982 22.028 -0.01935 -0.2262 0.821 
NACM -0.516 3.728 -0.01496 -0.1384 0.890 
RD 0.902 13.762 0.00599 0.0656 0.948 
Model Coefficients for FIICD 
Predictor Estimate SE Stand. Estimate t p 


















Intercept 2.22654 0.26329 
 
8.457 < .001 
PrID 0.22065 0.14745 0.1541 1.496 0.137 
SHFL 0.00513 0.00230 0.3759 2.235 0.027 
SHIN 0.00330 0.00287 0.1808 1.151 0.252 
AGE 0.00156 8.25e-4 0.1619 1.890 0.061 
GRTH 0.00327 0.00593 0.0749 0.550 0.583 
SIZE 0.00820 0.03359 0.0278 0.244 0.808 
ROE -0.00548 0.00188 -0.3779 -2.918 0.004 
SHCN -0.01506 0.08038 -0.0158 -0.187 0.852 
NACM -0.00849 0.01360 -0.0665 -0.624 0.533 
RD -0.01124 0.05022 -0.0201 -0.224 0.823 




Model fit measures 
 





















































Model Coefficients for HEICD 
95% Confidence Interval 
Predictor Estimate SE Lower Upper Stand. Estimate t p 
Intercept 143.825 104.134 -62.2704 349.92 
 
1.381 0.170 
PrID -83.362 58.319 -198.7821 32.06 -0.1315 -1.429 0.155 
SHFL 1.188 0.908 -0.6090 2.98 0.1966 1.308 0.193 
SHIN 2.477 1.134 0.2336 4.72 0.3067 2.185 0.031 
Model Coefficients for HEICD 
   
95% Confiden ce Interval 
   
Predictor Estimate SE Lower Upper Stand. Estimate t p 
AGE 0.734 0.326 0.0885 1.38 0.1722 2.250 0.026 
GRTH 2.475 2.347 -2.1690 7.12 0.1283 1.055 0.294 
SIZE 10.359 13.285 -15.9338 36.65 0.0793 0.780 0.437 
ROE -3.312 0.743 -4.7814 -1.84 -0.5161 -4.460 < .001 
SHCN -16.812 31.789 -79.7265 46.10 -0.0398 -0.529 0.598 
NACM -1.011 5.380 -11.6597 9.64 -0.0179 -0.188 0.851 
RD 12.116 19.861 -27.1909 51.42 0.0490 0.610 0.543 





Model Coefficients for FLEICD 
95% Confidence Interval 
Predictor Estimate SE Lower Upper Stand. Estimate t p 
Intercept 38.539 57.551 -75.3606 152.4389 
 
0.670 0.504 
PrID -25.000 32.230 -88.7879 38.7875 -0.0795 -0.776 0.439 
SHFL 0.713 0.502 -0.2802 1.7058 0.2377 1.421 0.158 
SHIN 0.615 0.627 -0.6248 1.8553 0.1534 0.982 0.328 
AGE 0.265 0.180 -0.0914 0.6221 0.1254 1.472 0.144 
GRTH 0.931 1.297 -1.6357 3.4975 0.0972 0.718 0.474 
SIZE 14.251 7.342 -0.2799 28.7820 0.2199 1.941 0.055 
ROE -0.830 0.410 -1.6424 -0.0180 -0.2606 -2.023 0.045 
SHCN -39.953 17.568 -74.7233 -5.1831 -0.1906 -2.274 0.025 
NACM -4.919 2.974 -10.8043 0.9656 -0.1752 -1.654 0.101 
RD 4.070 10.976 -17.6534 25.7931 0.0332 0.371 0.711 





Model Coefficients for EICWC 
95% Confidence Interval 
Predictor Estimate SE Lower Upper Stand. Estimate t p 
Intercept 2.58724 0.23190 2.12828 3.04620 
 
11.157 < .001 
PrID -0.19860 0.12987 -0.45563 0.05844 -0.1492 -1.529 0.129 
SHFL 0.00417 0.00202 1.72e-4 0.00817 0.3289 2.064 0.041 
SHIN 0.00411 0.00252 -8.85e−4 0.00911 0.2424 1.629 0.106 
AGE 0.00122 7.26e-4 -2.22e−4 0.00265 0.1358 1.673 0.097 
Model Coefficients for EICWC 
   
95% Confide nce Interval 
   
Predictor Estimate SE Lower Upper Stand. Estimate t p 
GRTH 0.00251 0.00523 -0.00783 0.01285 0.0619 0.480 0.632 
SIZE 0.04317 0.02959 -0.01538 0.10173 0.1574 1.459 0.147 
ROE -0.00465 0.00165 -0.00792 -0.00137 -0.3448 -2.810 0.006 
SHCN -0.10345 0.07079 -0.24356 0.03666 -0.1166 -1.461 0.146 
NACM -0.00761 0.01198 -0.03133 0.01610 -0.0641 -0.635 0.526 
RD 0.02299 0.04423 -0.06454 0.11053 0.0443 0.520 0.604 




Model Fit Measures 
Overall Model Test 
Model R R² Adjusted R² F df1 df2 p 





















Model Coefficients HHICD 




Estimate SE Lower Upper Stand. Estimate t p 
1 Intercept -25.783 101.248 -226.166 174.600 
 
-0.255 0.799 
 PrID 129.372 56.702 17.151 241.593 0.2351 2.282 0.024 
 SHFL 2.550 0.883 0.803 4.297 0.4862 2.889 0.005 
 SHIN 1.784 1.102 -0.397 3.966 0.2544 1.619 0.108 
 AGE 0.397 0.317 -0.231 1.025 0.1073 1.251 0.213 
 GRTH -3.461 2.282 -7.976 1.055 -0.2066 -1.517 0.132 
 SIZE 4.809 12.917 -20.755 30.373 0.0424 0.372 0.710 
 ROE -0.804 0.722 -2.232 0.625 -0.1442 -1.113 0.268 
 SHCN -20.013 30.908 -81.183 41.158 -0.0546 -0.647 0.519 
 NACM 2.140 5.231 -8.213 12.493 0.0436 0.409 0.683 
 RD -44.999 19.310 -83.217 -6.782 -0.2096 -2.330 0.021 
 BZ 1.321 3.724 -6.049 8.691 0.0314 0.355 0.723 
 
 
Model Coefficients FLHICD 




Estimate SE Lower Upper Stand. Estimate t p 
1 Intercept 35.469 58.952 -81.20513 152.142 
 
0.6017 0.548 
 PrID 38.129 33.015 -27.21190 103.470 0.11887 1.1549 0.250 
 SHFL 1.060 0.514 0.04313 2.077 0.34677 2.0630 0.041 
 SHIN 0.639 0.642 -0.63080 1.910 0.15640 0.9963 0.321 
 AGE 0.368 0.185 0.00225 0.733 0.17047 1.9913 0.049 
 GRTH -2.172 1.328 -4.80071 0.458 -0.22242 -1.6347 0.105 
 SIZE 0.577 7.521 -14.30757 15.462 0.00873 0.0768 0.939 
 ROE -0.507 0.420 -1.33884 0.325 -0.15607 -1.2058 0.230 
 SHCN 7.358 17.996 -28.25888 42.975 0.03442 0.4089 0.683 
 NACM 1.057 3.046 -4.97150 7.085 0.03691 0.3470 0.729 
 RD -17.412 11.244 -39.66429 4.840 -0.13911 -1.5486 0.124 





Model Coefficients HICWC 
95% Confidence Interval 
Predictor Estimate SE Lower Upper Stand. Estimate t p 
Intercept 2.26902 0.25082 1.77261 2.76543 
 
9.0463 < .001 
PrID 0.32371 0.14047 0.04571 0.60172 0.23872 2.3045 0.023 
SHFL 0.00585 0.00219 0.00152 0.01018 0.45278 2.6765 0.008 
SHIN 0.00479 0.00273 -6.17e−4 0.01019 0.27700 1.7532 0.082 
AGE 9.18e-4 7.86e-4 -6.37e−4 0.00247 0.10064 1.1681 0.245 
GRTH -0.01134 0.00565 -0.02253 -1.56e−4 -0.27479 -2.0067 0.047 
SIZE -0.00318 0.03200 -0.06651 0.06015 -0.01138 -0.0993 0.921 
ROE -0.00163 0.00179 -0.00517 0.00191 -0.11848 -0.9095 0.365 
SHCN -0.01391 0.07657 -0.16545 0.13762 -0.01540 -0.1817 0.856 
NACM -7.89e−4 0.01296 -0.02644 0.02486 -0.00651 -0.0608 0.952 
RD -0.08408 0.04784 -0.17876 0.01060 -0.15890 -1.7576 0.081 
BZ 0.00218 0.00923 -0.01608 0.02044 0.02101 0.2364 0.814 
APPENDIX 
 




IC Form Measures 
Internal Intellectual capital Intellectual property (patents, copyrights, Trademarks) 
 Management Process (flexibility, structure, overall learning process) 
 Corporate culture 
 Research & development (R&D), Innovation 
 Customer support function 
 Information -based infrastructure 
 Accreditations (certificate) 
 Technology and Overall infrastructure capabilities 
 Networking systems 
 Quality management & improvement. 
External Intellectual capital Customers 
 Investors relationships 
 Financial Contracts 
 Customer Management (acquisition, relationships, involvement, and 
retention) 
 Customer training & education (CTE) 
 Company image/ reputation 
 Company awards 
 Public relation 
 Brands 
 Distribution channels 
 Relationship with suppliers 
 Business collaboration 
 Business agreements 
 Competitive contract 
 Research and Development collaboration 
 Market leadership 
Human capital Employee count 
 Employee age 
 Employee diversity, Employee equality 
 Employee relationship, Employee teamwork 
 Employee education 
 Skills/know-how, Employee capabilities 
 Employee work-related competences 
 Employee work-related knowledge 
 Employee attitudes/behavior, Employee motivation 
 Employee commitments 
 Employee productivity 
 Employee training, Employee development 
 Vocational qualifications 
 Employee flexibility 
 Entrepreneurial spirit 
 Employee involvement with community, 
 Other employee features 
Time horizons Historical Intellectual Capital Disclosure 
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Abstract 
 
Accounting narratives is one of the valuable communication tool for the management to provide 
extensive information that supports the financial statement of the company and thus elaborates more 
on its performances. If used opportunistically by the management of the firm, it may lead to 
inaccurate perception of the firm performance leading to misappropriation of capital. We estimate 
corporate governance as a critical mechanism that may control such practices and encourage more of 
the neutral and balanced reporting for the corporates. We analyze 85 Indian listed firms accounting 
narrative in the form of chairperson letter to identify the link between various impression 
management techniques and the corporate governance variables along with identified control 
variables. The result establishes that efficient governance does discourages Impression management 
especially the thematic analyses and does have limited control over quantitative aspects of 
Impression management. This result holds for the accounting narrative of chairman letter and 





The purpose of this paper is to identify the presence of self-serving disclosure practices in the 
Chairman's letter of the annual reports and establish the effect of Corporate Governance in order 
to control such practices. The Chairman's letter is a crucial narrative disclosure strategy (Jones, 
1988; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003, 2006) between organizations and stakeholders (Bartlett & 
Chandler 1997; Healy & Palepu 2001) and has been under investigation in numerous studies 
(Courtis, 2004; Clatworthy and Jones; 2003), yet the association with the Corporate Governance 
mechanism and this disclosure form is barely explored (Mather and Ramsay, 2007). 
 
Corporate narrative documents are considered potential impression management vehicles, which 
can be used by managers to present a self-interested view of corporate performance (Bettman and 
Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983; Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Beattie and Jones, 2000; 
Clatworthy and Jones, 2006; Mather et al., 2000). Many researchers have worked in past decades 
to clarify the strategies adopted for preparation of those documents (e.g. Bettman & Weitz 1983; 
Dierkes & Antal 1986; Neuet al. 1998; Prestonet al. 1996). However, the effects of any 
controlling measures in the form of Corporate Governance is barely documented (Mather and 
Ramsay 2007). Recent reports focusing on corporate governance in listed companies include 
Cadbury (1992), Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and the ASX Corporate Governance Council 
(2003). As the recommendations of the corporate governance codes impose implementation costs 
on companies, it is considered useful to examine empirically the efficacy of some of the 
regulators’ recommendations (Mather and Ramsay 2007) with respect to the Impression 
Management practices adopted by the Management. 
The increasing relevancy of the narrative sections in corporate communications allows the 
organizations and provides them a platform to reduce the information asymmetries, channeling the 
information that is explained in detailed manner, and providing a better informed decision making 
process. Meanwhile, they also serve as a tool at the disposal of management to present the financial 
and other such performance related information which highlights their performance in the best 
possible manner working to the contrary of its original intention. As Holthausen,(1990) stated 
incremental disclosures furnishes information of future cash flows and other such value creating 
inputs thus resulting better and informed decision making, on the contrary, impression management 
results in potential capital misallocations. 
 
While it is based on the assumption that the investors are unable to gauge the Impression 
management tactics used by the managers. Due to which, managerial bias is very much effective in 
affecting the share price movements leading further capital misallocations consequently, improved 
remunerative conditions for the senior managers (Rutherford, 2003 and Courtis, 2004a, p. 293). 
Developing a set of hypotheses on investors’ reaction, towards specific form of impression 
management by means of public presentations of overall strategy by Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs), Whittington et al (2016) suggest that such strategy presentations exhibit valuable 
information to investors, specifically in conditions of increased information asymmetry linked with 
different types of new CEOs. Hadro et al (2017) using k-means clustering displayed the more 
concentrated ownership is, management invest less effort in communicating with investors, contrary 
to impression management practices. While, companies controlled by foreign shareholders prepare 
letters that are longer and which are more likely to present defensive arguments. 
 
Since, corporate narratives are mostly unregulated, apart from providing the management an 
opportunity of discretionary disclosure it also encourages the ground for Impression Management. 
Yang et al (2017), demonstrates that firms present themselves on social media opportunistically to 
construct a positive public image. By minimizing the disclosures of negative information but 
employ various patterns and dissemination techniques to emphasize positive information. 
Consequently, there could be further implication on social and political grounds for the organization 
from impression management in the form of dwindling support and alliances and further its 
functionality from the entire stakeholder involved and thus at large with society. Benson et al 
(2015) finds that entrepreneurs are less likely to apply camouflage during times of high scrutiny, as 
analyzed by industry analyst following, industry concentration levels, and IPO clustering. The 
authors also suggest that greater use of camouflage is associated with raising more capital, due to 
both greater offer proceeds as well as less underpricing. Hence, the implications for the impression 
management are very important from legal and corporate governance perspectives. 
 
The managerial impression management techniques being viewed from the perspective of economic 
and social psychology are more importantly focusing towards managing perceptions and opinions 
of shareholder’s and thus other important stakeholders with overall performance of the firm 
especially financial performance and thus leading to short term capital misallocation (Merkl-Davies 
and Brennan, 2007). Rhetorical impression management is stronger in the US companies, but higher 
expected scrutiny in the US institutional environment affects sensitivity of rhetorical postures (Aerts 
et al, 2016) to message credibility and litigation risk, attenuating the acclaiming and rationalizing 
profile, while marginally increasing the less litigation-sensitive defensive framing style in US 
letters. Thus, when discretionary accounting narratives are used for the impression management 
motivations then the purpose of narratives will be distorted resulting inappropriate capital allotment. 
As Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) stated Impression management, in line with earnings 
management, necessitate “managers using judgment in financial reporting to alter financial reports 
to mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company”. Hence, 
impression management like earnings management necessitates the adverse risk of inappropriate 
capital allocation. 
The managerial bias strategy motivated by impression management in the form of discretionary 
disclosures is established on fragile market productivity. According to Ginzel et al (2004), the 
reciprocal mechanism between the managers and the readers can be drawn upon the stream of social 
psychology. In the same vein, (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2011, p. 425) stated “Impression 
management is embedded in and dependent on management’s relationship with organizational 
audiences’’. Thus, it is radically intertwined amid management and its various stakeholders. The 
definition of Impression management provided by Hooghiemstra [2000, p. 60] as “a field of study 
within social psychology studying how individuals present themselves to others to be perceived 
favorably by others.” 
 
The impression management studies primarily concentrated on earnings management (Schipper, 
1989), however gradually it has garnered consideration and has moved the areas of research on 
various other accounting issues like graphs (Beattie and Jones, 1999), photographs (e.g. Graves et 
al., 1996; McKinstry, 1996) and accounting narratives (Aerts, 1994, 2001; Courtis, 1998). 
 
In accounting narratives perspectives impression management is termed to be a concerted effort as 
precisely pointed by Clatworthy and Jones, (2001, p. 311) “to control and manipulate the impression 
conveyed to users of accounting information”. Thus, managers are supposedly, using annual reports as a 
tool for impression management in order to maneuver the judgement and thus the decisions of 
stakeholders in a very calculative manner (Yuthas et al., 2002). These statements inherently 
conclude that managers intentionally employ impression management techniques. 
 
Research in the past focusing on the quality of the financial reporting specifically outlined issues 
like fraud (Rezaee, 2005) and earnings management (Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). Meanwhile, 
there is an increasing trend with respect to the Impression management literatures,  considering 
firms have gradually started distorting reader’s perception with respect to its performance by using 
various subtle forms of impression management techniques could in the form of content 
manipulation or by presenting information with a purpose to manage the perception of the 
stakeholders (Godfrey et al., 2003). 
 
Despite its growing relevance, research for impression management remains in its infancy stage. 
Specifically, if we analyze with respect to the efforts and number of research being carried out on 
financial and other accounting issues. The importance for Impression management research 
increases many folds considering the fact that there is an increasing trend among the corporate to  
use unregulated accounting narratives on a massive scale. The accounting narratives used in this 
paper focusing impression management is the Chairman’s letter to the shareholder in the Indian 
companies. The chairman’s letter also known as chairman’s statement or chairman’s address is an 
ubiquitous and popular part of the annual report. It is generally used to furnish synopsis about the 
firms overall performance and activities critical during the year and for the future. The chairman’s 
letter is particularly interesting considering its popularity and its comprehensiveness couple with its 
unregulated and unaudited features. 
 
According to Bartlett and Chandler (1997) among the narratives of the annual report, Chairman 
Letter is the most read section of the accounting narratives and its one of the most popular part of 
annual report among the shareholders universally (Courtis 1986, Subramanian et al 1993). Its 
importance is also evident from the various research being carried out on behalf of narratives 
(Courtis 1986, Jones 1988, Subramanian et al 1993, Courtis 1998, Clatworthy and Jones 2001). 
Meanwhile, Abrahamson and Amir (1996) in their empirical analyses of earnings and share price 
data argues, the president’s letter hold effective clues with respect to the company’s future 
endeavors. Chairman’s letter is also termed to be the most influential source of information to 
financial analyst and institutional investors after the financial statements (Arnold and Moizer, 
1984). Chairman’s letter is also termed to demonstrate and of high predictive nature of the firms 
bankruptcy likeliness (Smith and Taffler, 2000). Even cosmopolitan investors like those of 
corporate investors and investment advisor demonstrate that the accounting narratives are 
influential in investment decision (Lee and Tweedie, 1981). 
 
The psychologist initiated the evolutionary work on the topic of impression management 
(Schelenker 1980). Soon afterwards, Impression management found its way to numerous 
accounting and other business related streams which may include but not limited to environmental 
and social accounting (Neu et al., 1998; Hooghiemstra, 2000), self-presentation (Gardner and 
Martinko, 1988), manipulation of earnings by managers (Griffiths, 1986; Tweedie and Whittington, 
1990), and corporate structural changes (Arndt and Bigelow, 2000). 
 
Surprisingly, only a few recent studies focus on impression management through accounting 
narratives such as the chairman’s statement (Smith and Taffler, 1992, 2000; and Aerts, 1994, 2001). 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one prior paper looking at the impact of corporate 
governance on impression management. Mather and Ramsay (2007) study the association between 
board independence and disclosure practices in Australia. They find evidence of lower impression 
management in the presence of stronger boards. Along with the Osma and Guillamón-Saorín (2011) 
wherein they studied different form of impression management (narrative disclosures of both 
quantitative and qualitative financial information) in annual result press releases of the Spanish firms. 
 
The study summarizes its findings based on the sample collected from 85 Indian Listed firms. We 
specifically focus on the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and voluntary or 
unregulated discretionary disclosure in the form of Impression management. The study is carried on 
the accounting narrative in the form of chairperson’s statement (letter) to the shareholders in the 
annual report of the chosen companies. Various mechanism of corporate governance is chosen in 
the light of previous literatures for the study and for measuring the Impression management; we 
follow the methodology Tran-scripted by Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin, and Pierce (2009) in the form 
of disclosure tone, emphasis, performance comparisons; and selectivity in chairperson’s statement. 
 
Manual content analysis is being used to in order to measure the various Impression management 
technique as being used by various previous literatures (Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Courtis, 1986; 
Jones, 1988; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). Once captured the measurements are further quantified 
to arrive at an individual score for each category of the Impression management identified. Which is 
further tested with the corporate governance variables using the multiple regression in order to 
determine the association between the various components of corporate governance and the 
Impression management individual scores. The findings clearly demonstrate the direct association 
with various corporate governance mechanism identified in this analysis especially from the 
qualitative point of view. Thus, contributing towards the agency theory, and signaling theory this 
paper could be of value to policy makers, investors, managers and regulators alike. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; Section two describes the previous studies and 
the related literatures, section three is composed of various Corporate governance mechanism and 
measurement of Impression Management. While, methodology is discussed in section four. Section 
five, is discussed with detailed result for the analysis and the paper is finally summarized and 
concluded in section six. 
 
Literature Review 
Accounting narratives a phenomena introduced in 1973, by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants which states (AICPA: 13): ‘Financial statements should not be limited solely to 
quantified information. Amplification, in narrative form, of data included in statements may be 
required’. Within a span of few decades, most of the annual reports contains extensive narratives. 
According to Jones (1996), narratives form an integral part of modern annual reports, while it also 
provides an equally crucial enhancement to the financial statements of these reports (Courtis 2002). 
 
Past literatures have already confirmed that these narratives are crucial better understanding the 
health of the firm and thus its potential for financial performance in the future (Beynon et al., 2004) 
and if heading towards bankruptcy (Smith and Taffler, 1995, 2000). According to Courtis (1998: 
459) Corporate annual reports dispense an all-inclusive reference of data on all corporate 
achievements and “facilitate the confirmation, revision and formation of readers’ expectations 
about a company in which they have an interest”. The narratives that are now endorsed by the 
regulatory authorities like Directors report, or management discussion and analysis in India are 
increasingly becoming a communication tool for their personal motivations, and they are one of the 
useful vehicles that corporates may use to draw attention of their existing and potential investors 
(Khanna and Irvine 2012). There is an increasing trend among the corporates to use annual reports 
and accounting narratives for marketing purposes and other such motivations apart from meeting 
their obligatory requirements (Clarke 1997). 
 
Research on accounting narratives has increased exponentially, considering the fact that researchers 
are gradually convinced that the fluctuations of the share price due to the basic accounting 
represents a very small part (Cenesizoglu and Timmermann, 2008). Not surprisingly, Impression 
management represents a variety of accounting research issues for example: earnings manipulation 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Smith 1992), Photographs (McKinstry, 1996; Preston et al., 1996), 
the accounting profession (Neu and Wright, 1992), graphs (Beattie and Jones, 1992; 1998). 
 
The transparency of the narratives in the annual reports are very crucial from non-financial 
investor’s point of view (Rutherford 2003), considering the alarming rate of increase in the usage of 
these narratives (Courtis 1998) and the reliance of the naïve investors on these reports for their 
decision making. Narratives originally termed as supplying incremental information to enhance 
decision-making process, but it could very much be used for furnishing biased information with the 
purpose of Impression management (Merkl- Davies and Brennan, 2007). Naïve investors or non- 
financial users of the narratives will use the narratives as a basis or platform in order to cement their 
decision, especially when the accounting information or the numbers in the financial statements and 
the narratives of the performance or earnings provide information contrary to each other. Thus, 
there is an effort to mislead the investor with their judgement about the company and encouraging 
an inappropriate decision-making by the readers (Smith et al 2004). 
 
Apart from being an important regulatory issue, Impression management has also serious implications 
on corporate governance. When management attempts impression management in either form has 
serious motivations to do so as Aerts (2001) notes that, the incentives are bigger especially for the listed 
corporates. The practice of impression management with the intention to portray their firms in the best 
possible light especially by representing ‘selective financials’ (Revsine, 1991) has numerous personal 
motivations which includes but not limited to increased remunerations and longer contracts within the 
firm along with the better goodwill in the market (e.g., DeAngelo, 1988. 
 
As mentioned, the literature of accounting narratives is crucial part of the overall accounting 
literature and so its importance is very well documented. Epstein and Pava, (1993) provides 
evidence from US, while Anderson and Epstein, (1996) provides evidence from Australia and New 
Zealand, and Bartlett and Chandler, (1997) from UK. These studies demonstrates accounting 
narratives especially Chairman’s letter crucial role from reader’s point of view. As in the UK out of 
17 sections of the annual report chairman’s letter is ranked second and is the most read section of 
the report by the shareholders (Bartlett and Chandler, 1997). Studies also demonstrate how 
managers use the chairman’s letter to conceal negative outcomes as Aerts (1994) in his study 
illustrates how managers use technical terms to furnish negative performance but use plain language 
for positive outcomes in the Belgian directors report. The study of accounting narratives is very  
well extended to interim reports and prospectuses (Courtis, 2004a), as rightly pointed by Gibbins 
and Pomeroy (2007) by referring it as an enhanced corporate reporting where in various disclosure 
media provides huge number of research opportunities which include but not limited to websites, 
conference calls and other electronic media’s used for communication. 
 
Accounting narratives being not only important from the investor’s point of view but it also provides 
management to present a coordinated, and the overall annual description of corporate financial 
performance. Although the accounting narratives including the chairman’s letter are voluntary form of 
communication but is crucial in providing general idea about the corporate performance. Given the 
regulatory scenario and the bodies governing it, in India law suit action by shareholders is not very 
common like it is a practice in United states or other developed nation (Weetman, and Collins, 1996), 
allowing more liberal approach by the chairman in their statement and other such narratives. 
 
Despite, US having reputation for providing a better regulatory platform and thus a greater control over the 
narratives (Bolger, 1994; Weetman and Collins, 1996), yet studies empirically tested and confirmed that the 
presidents letters has profound effects on the decision making process of the ground level investors. Thus, 
these studies contributes towards the propensity of such audiences and impression management within the 
parameters of cognitive limitations and factors affecting their decision making process, despite being any 
documentation of the short term and  long term effects of Impression management. 
 
The chairman’s statement (also known as the chairman’s address or the president’s letter) is an 
almost universal, and widely read, feature of the annual report. Smith and Taffler (1995) show that 
the chairman’s statement is a crucial index of financial performance, while both keywords and 
narrative themes in the chairman’s statement are useful for discriminating between bankrupt and 
financially healthy firms (Smith and Taffler, 2000). In India, for example, auditors review the text 
to ensure that it is materially consistent with the financial statements. However, the exact nature of 
this review is currently unclear. 
 
The chairman’s statement has also been shown to influence investors’ decision making (Staw et al., 
1983; Kaplan et al., 1990; Abrahamson and Amir, 1996). Although such narratives may not 
necessarily provoke a direct share-price response (Holland, 1998), they can act to augment and 
contextualize other price-sensitive information. Such “framing” of accounting outcomes with 
narratives may also help to build investors’ confidence in the company and lend credibility to 
management (Aerts, 2001, 2005). A number of prior studies demonstrate impression  management 
in the chairperson’s statement. Courtis (1998) argues that narratives can be obfuscatory by burying 
adverse or negative news through more difficult writing styles. He finds that the chairman’s 
statements of companies with high press exposure are more difficult to read and have more variable 
readability scores than companies with low press coverage. Moreover, Breton and Taffler (2001) 
show that financial analysts rely on non-financial, qualitative and accounting narrative information 
when making stock recommendations which may be influenced through the use of impression 
management. Kohut and Segars (1992) investigate the president’s letters of the top and bottom 25 
US companies in the Fortune 500 ranked by return on equity (ROE). 
 
Clatworthy and Jones (2001) find that very profitable companies are more inclined to discuss their 
results, acquisitions, and disposals, while very unprofitable companies include more discussion of 
board changes. The primary focus of Clatworthy and Jones (2001) is on the readability of the 
chairman’s statement. Specifically, they examine how the coefficient of variation of readability is 
driven by the thematic content of the chairman’s statement. 
 
Research into impression management in the chairman’s statement is important for a number of 
reasons. First, the chairman’s statement is a component of the annual report used by investors (e.g. 
Jones, 1988; Courtis, 2004). Second, there is evidence that the content of the chairman’s statement 
affects investors’ decision-making, and potentially corporate value (Segars and Kohut,  2001). 
Third, even if investors and annual report users are not influenced by impression management in the 
chairman’s statement, research into whether such strategies are employed in the writing of the 
chairman’s statement may still be useful to provide an insight into whether managers believe 





The accounting research encompasses various areas that covers the theoretical and practical aspects 
of impression management. Although, its origin can be traced into the human psychology and its 
reaction from the human cognitive processes which has an extensive coverage in psychological 
studies. Nevertheless, Impression management also ranges among various stream of literatures 
including that of but not limited to human behavior and politics. Hooghiemstra (2000) argues 
Impression management roots in the stream of social psychology and is associated with analyzing 
strategy used by individuals to portray themselves in a way to be perceived favorably by others. In 
the words of Schlenker (1980), Impression management is concerned with shaping the readers 
(audience) perception of an idea, object, person or an event mostly with the purpose of appealing 
(Gioia et al., 2000) to the stakeholders (audiences). The risk follows are manifold as the perception 
passed through the impression management may communicate contrary to the truth. On the other 
hand, it may lead to heighten not so important aspects of the organization at the cost of paramount 
areas for the organization (Gioia et al., 2000). 
 
Thus, the opportunistic attitude of the management thriving to maneuver the asymmetric pattern of the 
information towards the stakeholders for personal motivations is impression management (Merkl- 
Davies and Brennan 2007). Impression management techniques results in either portraying a line of 
image or at large creating a new image in itself (Merkl-Davies, Brennan, and McLeay, 2011). Portraying 
a line of image is essentially painting an accurate picture of the corporate performance but the picture 
represents more of the best view or best performance of the overall performance of the firm. On the 
other hand, creating a new image in itself necessitate of creating an image that id far from accuracy. As 
previous studies have time and again demonstrated that impression management do exist in various 
forms of communication between management and their concerned stakeholders (Clatworthy and Jones, 
2001.2003, 2005; Mather and Ramsay, 2007; Osma et al ,2011). Managers and thus firms engaging 
themselves in Impression management tactics can be termed as a propensity to present information 
scrupulously in order to portray themselves and the firm in the best possible light could be triggered by 
the incentives possible, due to framing the corporate performance in the favorable light by maneuvering 
the reporting strategies. These incentives are greater for listed firms (Aerts, 2005) and of critical 
importance when the performance is not encouraging. If not controlled, Impression management may 
result in serious economic, political and sociological effect all stakeholders involved and society for 
example scandals like Satyam in India (Srinivasan ?) and Enron in US were a lethal combination of 
fraud and impression management (Davidson, 2004). 
 
Accounting research field that covers the corporate reporting also encompasses issues like those 
design and photographs that are used in the accounting narratives indicates the motivation being 
Impression management. For example, studies analyzing the usage of different designs in the 
annual report of a single public listed company for a range of period, demonstrates that managers 
had thrived to present the achievement of the company performance in the entire time range in the 
best possible manner by keeping the designs that is focusing on shareholders concern the most  
rather than any other stakeholder not even the managers (McKinstry (1996). Literatures have also 
confirmed the rhetorical usage of the photographs in the annual reports (Graves et al, 1996 and 
Preston et al, 1996). Dwindling environmental results is directly related with escalated scale of 
environmental disclosure optimism was found by Cho et al. (2010), when analyzing the 
employment of language and verbal tone in environmental disclosures. Various forms of Impression 
management techniques specifically of Disclosure tone, Emphasis, Location and selectivity were 
found to be linked with corporate governance mechanism in a study recently conducted by Osma et 
al (2011), Wherein strong Governance mechanism discourages Impression management practices. 
 
Impression management, according to Leary and Kowalski (1990), p. 34) “refers to the process by 
which individuals attempt to control the impressions others form of them.” This statement explicitly 
confers that Impression management is a common human idiosyncrasy, which tends to occur on 
individual, collective and even organizational level. In the right atmosphere, Impression management 
occurs, could intentionally or unintentionally, with the motivation to show themselves in the most 
favorable image. A tendency due to the idiosyncrasy also subliminal process to put your best foot 
forward (Davidson et al, 2004, p. 267). This tendency of aligning the most favorable image based on 
accurate and unbiased information is irreprehensible (Courtis, 2004). Meanwhile, there exist a threat, 
when impression management strategies adopted by the management and the requirement of 
communicating the financial performance in an impartial way may give conflicting information. Thus, 
the act of voluntarily pursuing the practice of impression management does not remain a kind of human 
attribute rather it infringes principle of true and fair presentation of the financial reporting. 
 
It could largely derail the process of the corporates seeking tirelessly to accomplish a relation with 
the all the stakeholders concerned and the society (Bozzolan et. al (Fiat Case)). Nonetheless, 
Impression management more generally accounting narratives might be distinguished by 
retrospective rationality that implicate forming the actions and events acceptable of the past year 
(Aerts, 2005). 
 
The Indian companies act (1956 – 2013), does not give any guidance specifically for the narratives 
although it mentions with respect to the accounting policies and the notes on accounts for disclosing 
mandatory items specified under the act. In addition, it cautions the true and fair presentation for the 
notes to the account. The true and fair perception is to be decided by the auditors of the company, in 
line with the developed nations, like that of UK wherein SAS No. 160, the applicable UK auditing 
standard, states ‘auditors have no responsibility to report that the other is properly stated. Auditors 
should, however, read the other information and if they identify material inconsistencies with the 
financial statements or misstatements within the accounting narratives they should seek to resolve 
them’ (APB, 1995, para. 4). 
 
Considering, the complexity of executing these provisions, management have ample of occasion to 
extensively cover the corporate financial performance that are almost untroubled by any mandatory 
constraints. Thus, management may adopt opportunistic behavior by managing the perception of the 
readers for the corporate narratives; consequently, it may lead to conflicting messages (Smith and 
Taffler, 1995) amid the corporate financial reporting and the financial statements. 
 
Organizations adopt a number of specific impression management strategies to attempt to maintain 
or enhance their image (Elsbach, 1994; Ginzel, Kramer, & Sutton, 1992; Livesey & Kearins, 2002). 
Both Aerts (1994) and Clatworthy and Jones (2003), in their respective studies of corporate reports, 
found that corporations tend to attribute positive organizational outcomes to internal factors and 
negative organizational outcomes to external factors. Aerts (1994) also found that negative 
performances are more likely to be discussed in technical accounting terms while positive 
performances are presented in more straightforward, cause–effect language. 
 
This attitude of management thus engages to enhance the positive outcomes while suppressing the 
shortcomings of the overall performance by not the neutral tone in the accounting narrative (Merkl- 
Davies and Brennan 2007). Prior literatures have demonstrated in number of ways of the management 
practice of heightening successful outcomes while downplaying the negative performances (Cho et al. 
2010; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). In the same vein, a study by Lang and Lundholm (2000) 
demonstrate that the management tend to inflate the encouraging news prior to equity offerings schedule 
and thus suggesting the narrative communication choices having impacted the perceptions of the 
investors and those concerned alike. Numerous literatures advocated the use of other techniques like 
visual and illustrative to enhance the successful outcomes while minimizing the bad news (Beattie & 
Jones, 2002; Bowen et al., 2005; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Courtis, 2004). According to (Krische, 
2005; and Schrand & Walther, 2000), the frequent strategy to carry out impression management is to  
use positive and shiny language despite where neutral or even negative language is sought, in order to 
communicate positive perceptions or to enhance the successful outcomes. Along 
with spreading the peak of the good news within the entire communication space available and 




Studies from the past have repeatedly found the senior managers having opportunistic attitude 
motivated by personal reasons (Staw, et al. 1983; Abrahamson & Amir, 1994). Economics-based 
theories, especially the agency theory could update the prevailing approach on impression 
management in a corporate disclosure framework (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). As agency 
theory, is based explicitly on the understanding that individuals behave opportunistically and will 
try to maximize their benefit at the cost of society’s benefit. It targets the accord amid the managers 
and the shareholders, wherein it constitutes the legal responsibility of managers with that of value 
creation of shareholders. Within the frame of corporate disclosure analyses, it is interpreted that the 
management having opportunistic attitude may enhance the successful outcomes while 
communicating through narratives and may conceal any negative outcomes (Courtis 1998). On the 
contrary, the shareholders desire the appointed management to be working in the most efficient way 
to have the maximum utility, while maintaining a neutral reporting system of the performance. 
 
Disclosures within the narratives and the capital allocation decision are made on the basis of 
calculating the cost benefit ratio and is drawn upon various factors from external bounds. According 
to Rutherford (2003, p. 189), managers perform in a milieu wherein their remuneration and success 
is dependent upon the financial and sustainable accomplishment of their firm, giving a  strong 
reason for the management to have an opportunistic attitude and engage in Impression management 
tactics. Since, both the parties that is the principle (shareholder) and the Agent (management) are 
termed as rational individuals who make decision based on their benefit, the decision making 
process is followed by the calculation and analysis, while the motivation to do so is found  
rigorously in utilitarian grounds. The corporate reporting process could thus be used to provide 
incremental information or could be used to mislead the investors by providing inaccurate 
information and thus engaging in impression management. 
 
Since, the impression management and incremental information, the competing school of thoughts 
have their foundations based on the agency theory assumptions (Baiman, 1990), it is confirmed that 
the research in this sector is headed by the agency theory. The incremental information school of 
thought is based on the assumption, which the managers thrive to enhance their remuneration by 
supplying discretionary corporate reporting directed to augment the capital supply and thus 
improving the overall share performance (Baginski et al, 2000). On the contrary, the impression 
management school of thought advocates the personal motivations, as the driving factor for the 
senior management in order to engage in opportunistic strategies of discretionary corporate 
reporting’s (Smith and Taffler, 1992a, 2000; Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Courtis, 1995, 2004a, 
2004b; Godfrey et al, 2003; Aerts, 2005). 
 
According to Aerts, (2005), senior managers engage in managing the perception of the readers 
about performances and future prospects and thus their decision on investment, considering the fact 
that bad news with respect to the performance results in conflict of interest between the managers 
and the financial stakeholders. The attitude of senior managers to engage in managing perceptions 
have resulted to what Courtis (1998), mentions obfuscation hypotheses. According to which, 
managers enhances the success and conceal the bad news (Adelberg, 1979), and do not practice true 
and fair presentation in corporate reporting by being neutral (Sydserff and Weetman, 1999). 
 
Literatures advocating for Impression management, especially during the challenging times like that 
of environmental disasters (Hooghiemstra, 2000), corporate scandals (Linsley and Kajüter, 2008), 
major reorganization (Arndt and Bigelow, 2000) and finally during adverse financial performance 
(Abrahamson and Park, 1994), as it may aid re-establishment of the lost stature and defend ability. 
 
Impression management also stems from the necessity to convince the concerned stakeholders of the 
rare situations and unique event with the respect to the challenging times the company is witnessing, and 
thus restoring the reliability (Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012). Its use under action-reaction theory for 
reinstating the legitimacy is well documented (Odgen and Clarke, 2005; Linsley and Kajüter, 2008), and 
managing perceptions in the form of demutualization and reorganization (Arndt and Bigelow, 2000). 
The standpoint ratified dictates the course of reasoning, as a confined approach sequels the strategy of 
impression management tactics that involves managing perception of the concerned stakeholders with 
respect to performances (Clatworthy and Jones, 2001, 2003; Rutherford, 2003). Paradoxically, a broader 
approach leads to analyze wider issues like managing perception of the concerned stakeholders with 
respect to structural changes like privatization, demutualization, mergers or acquisitions (Arndt and 
Bigelow, 2000; Odgen and Clarke, 2005) and of sociological and political prestige, organizational 




Although, the tactics used by the senior managers of financially strapped companies could be 
described by the agency theory, the Signaling theory explain the stratagem of managers from well 
performing corporations. Morris (1987) introduced signaling theory to demonstrate the 
complication of information asymmetry. Whereas, with respect to Impression management it was 
primarily discussed by Smith and Taffler (1992), and was considered extensively in Rutherford 
(2003). The theory proposes a reasoning of rationally behaving individuals and thus mangers of 
corporates that engage in voluntary disclosures. According to signaling theory, voluntary 
disclosures directs additional information about the companies in the competitive capital markets. 
Which according to its effectiveness adds value as a participant to gather resources in the form of 
capital allocation and enhances competitive advantage. 
 
Senior managers, especially from financially successful firms engage in impression management 
with a purpose to provide signal with respect to their meritocracy in the form of enhanced clarity 
provided in the voluntary disclosure of corporate reporting (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007). 
According to Toms (2002), and Branco et al, 2006), there has been widespread contemplation of 
signaling theory with respect reputation management, especially organizations thrive to enhance 
their reputation though signaling towards stakeholders concerned of its most favorable image. Due 
to this motivation to pursue personal interest and maximize personal gains, signaling theory could 
be regarded as a prolongation of Agency theory. 
 
Both the theories, agency and signaling advocate from the accounting perspective, that corporates 
will embrace suitable accounting practice with the assistance of voluntary corporate reporting 
practices (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 1990; Ross, 1979; Morris, 1987), as there is an established 
nexus amid the corporate performance and clarity of exposition (Smith and Taffler, 1992). In this 
manner, reducing uncertainty by reporting broadly, accurately, and thus lowering the risk for the 
investment and subsequently the cost of capital for the corporate. Past literatures covering 
extensively on the signaling structure (Ross, 1977; Brennan & Thakor, 1990) demonstrates, that the 
paradoxical interest amid the shareholders and the manager’s, results in management working  on 
the signal directed towards the capital market on lean but important points (Cho and Sobel, 1990; 
Kreps and Sobel, 1994), which just hits the spot of reader’s requirement. 
 
The signaling theory explicitly assume that even the most successful corporates draw signaling 
mechanism so as to provide their competing fortitude information by covering them extensively and 
clearly. In the fast computer age, financial agreements are carried out and revived rapidly, signaling 
theory advocates, the shareholders seek the corporates who are chasing capitals and require them to 
impart information extensively and clearly about their performance (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 
1992). Hence, the agents or the manager’s as anticipated transmit signals to the capital market 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). 
 
Signaling theory has been applied to a wide area of research framework especially, to describe the 
importance of information asymmetry for example, Zhang & Wiersema, (2009), in their analysis of 
CEO’s communication strategy, demonstrate the way CEO signal to the capital market the 
imperceptible characteristics of their company with the help of noticeable characteristics of the 
financial statements. Signaling theory has also been applied to various management and corporate 
governance issues like venture capitalist and angel investor presence (Elitzur & Gavious, 2003), and 
signaling value of board characteristics (Certo, 2003). Miller & Triana, (2009) show how signaling 
theory demonstrate the firms using heterogeneous form of board to manage perception and 
maintaining adherence with respect to social values and thus its stakeholders concerned. While, it 
also has a contribution in managing human resource, especially focusing on signaling aspects 
during the recruitment process (Suazo et al, 2009). In the context of this paper, it is  expected that 
the firms having better governance practices will lower the impression management usage leading 




The corporate governance research was originated and can be sketched back to at least Berle and 
Means (1932), wherein they corroborated that the managers rather than the owners or the 
shareholders of the companies were persuasively commanding the corporates trading publicly. 
Considering this extensive continuance of corporates distinguished by the ownership and control, 
the research in corporate governance usually targets the structure within the organization to reduce 
the agency problems and thus encouraging these economical and social foundations. According to 
Sloan (2001, p. 336), corporate governance can be defined as “the mechanisms that have evolved to 
mitigate incentive problems created by the separation of management and financing of business 
entities”. This viewpoint terms corporate governance as a sequence of contractual and control 
structure especially among the publicly traded corporates, where ownership and control is seperated 
so as to supervise and control management’s conduct. 
 
According to Neu (1991), Impression management is associated with the management’s effort to 
influence the understanding of financial statements thus lending additional encouragement for 
exploring association amid corporate governance and impression management. Impression 
management takes place, when selective information is chosen by the management with the 
motivation to manage or distort the perception of the information user with respect to the corporate 
performance which in turn may induce misappropriation of capital allocation by the investor’s and 
stakeholders concerned. The possibility for Impression management to occur is maximum in the 
deregulated sections of accounting narratives, therefore it is utmost crucial to scrutinize the data of 
the front section of the annual reports like chairman’s letter considering the investors and 
stakeholders alike seemed to be very sensitive for this section as opposed to the financial statement. 
(Bartlett and Chandler, 1997). 
 
The OECD (1998b) describes holistically the value of good corporate governance in its report on 
Corporate Governance: Improving Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets, 
which promoted the seriousness of transparency and disclosure: 
 
‘‘The disclosure of the corporation’s contractual and governance structures may reduce 
uncertainties for investors and help lower capital costs by decreasing related risk premia. Such 
transparency may also encourage a common understanding of the ‘rules of the game’, and provide 
employees with information that may help reduce labor friction’’. 
 
In one of its report, OECD (2004) principles of corporate governance is that: 
 
“The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made 
of all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, 
ownership, and governance of the company.” 
 
Essentially, an established corporate governance, true and fair representation of the corporate 
reporting and thus the enhanced reliability of the corporate image, may not completely diminish the 
chances of performance deficiency. However, it could supply wake up calls or such noticeable 
warnings to the stakeholders and legal authorities concerned. Information asymmetry can be thus 
curtailed drastically between principal and agent and all the stake holders concerned by increasing 
the clarity and dissemination of information in the form of extensive coverage and fair presentation 
by practicing good governance. 
 
We estimate an established corporate governance structure will discourage the perception 
manipulation and propagate the accuracy of the disclosure practices, it will thus dissuade the 
possibility for fallacious decision making by concerned stakeholders in the form of various  




The research background of corporate governance from accounting perspective is that an 
established corporate governance mechanism procures substantial amount of return on investment, 
resulted through efficient mechanism of corporate governance. That ultimately promote the 
movement of securities market and thus the applicable financial and human capital along with 
encouraging investment atmosphere. Corporate governance as defined by La Porta et al. (2000) as 
“a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by 
corporate insiders”. It is crucial to realize that an established corporate governance structure is 
efficient through a number of governance techniques working together and thus making it essential 
to analyze individually each of them. 
 
Independence of board of directors 
 
It is being argued that the Board of directors is the primary and centralized control mechanism 
internally for supervising and auditing manager’s role (Fama, 1980). Both the theories of Agency 
theory and Resource dependent theory advocates for the greater the number of Independent 
directors amid the total number of board of directors for their capability to accomplish their 
controlling and auditing functions (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Pearce and Zahra, 1992), along with 
ensuring the fair and balanced approach towards communication within narratives. 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling, (1976), agency theory provides the reasoning of Independent 
directors be sought within the boards to supervise and audit the actions of insider or non- 
independent directors. In the similar vein, Fama and Jensen (1983) consider the independent 
directors as proposed “decision experts”. Managerial Impression management may receive further 
protection by non-independent directors especially while evaluating manager’s performances 
(Schaffer, 2002). Independent directors are less associated with the management as compared to  
that of insider directors and thus shall be more motivated to reveal important information to outside 
investor’s (Eng and Mak, 2003). 
Past literatures, empirically found the evidence of positive association amid the proportion of 
independent directors and voluntary disclosure (Chen and Jaggi, 2000). In addition, that the presence of 
Independence directors discourage potential fraud in financial statements (Beasley, 1996). On one hand, 
Daily and Dalton, (1994), demonstrated that the greater proportion of independent directors improved 
performances, on the other Hermalin and Weisbach, (1991), have found no association between them. 
Nevertheless, the presence of independent directors does increases the value for shareholders in 
numerous way which may include but not limited to tendering offers for bidders (Byrd and Hickman, 
1992), and in in hostile take-over threats (Gibbs, 1993). 
 
Hypotheses 1: ceteris paribus, there exist a negative association amid the proportion of independent 
directors and the level of impression management in chairman letter. 
 
Chairman and CEO role separation 
 
It is very well known that there is an established conflict (Forker, 1992), between the independent 
directors and Chief executive Officer due to the “dominant personality” factor. The independent 
directors are motivated to supervise the Chief executive Officer, replace them wherever applicable, 
and preserve their independence level, while the CEO has reasons to direct the board to magnify 
their personal interest (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The argument speculate over role duality, by 
way of, when the Chairman of the board is also the CEO. 
 
Past researches, provides two distinct glimpse for this argument. At one hand, literatures of the agency 
theory enthusiast (Argenti, 1976; Blackburn, 1994) advocate for the segregation roles, to necessitate 
checks and balances system over the performance of the management. However, the alternate view is 
created upon the stewardship theory, advocating for not separating the roles as organizations are better 
controlled and function with the dual roles managed by single person (Eisenhardt, 1989, Dahya et al. 
1996, Donaldson et al., 1991 and Rechner et al, 1991), as stewardship theory argues that managers 
perform in the best interests of the firms and its owners, so the role duality maximizes the capability of 
the boards. The Indian best practice guidelines include a recommendation that the same individual 
should not exercise the role of chairperson and chief executive officer and so the regulation does not 
encourage it either (Indian companies act, 2013). It is argued, that the chairman of the board who is also 
the CEO tends to decline the boards effectiveness to monitor efficiently. 
 
While, researchers like Brickley et al, (1996) propose of combining the roles, as there is not any effect 
on performance of the firm or from the external factors by combining or separating these roles. 
However, the same perception is doubted from monitoring perspective, as Dechow et al., (1996) 
demonstrates that corporates manipulating earnings are more inclined role duality within their boards. 
 
Conclusively, a role separation between the CEO and Chairman of the board will support the 
monitoring process and reduce opportunistic behavior, consequently enhancing the quality of the 
corporate reporting. 
 
Hypotheses 2: ceteris paribus, there exist a negative association between Chairman and CEO role 
separation and the level of Impression management used in the chairman letter. 
 
Presence of a remuneration - nomination committee 
 
The remuneration committees accommodate the compensation of the Chief Executive Officer to 
curtail the opportunistic attitude (Dechow, Huson, and Sloan (1994), while these committees also 
enhance the effectiveness of the audit committee and the board in general in order to minimize the 
manipulation practices (Osma et al, 2007). The nomination committee scrutinize the facts collected 
about potential candidates to select and nominate for the board selection. Evidently, NYSE 
mandated in 2003 to furnish if the firms do have a separate nomination committee or not. 
 
These committees are capable of mitigating the agency problems stemming from the separation of 
ownership and control by formulating and executing mechanism that considers the interest of both 
the parties that is the shareholders and the management. Thus, it could be widely argued that by 
taking care of both the parties, the committees enhance the smooth functioning and so the corporate 
reporting practices of the company. 
 
Hypotheses 3: ceteris paribus, there exist a negative association between presence of remuneration 
and nomination committee and the level of Impression management used in the chairman letter. 
 
Number of board meetings 
 
According to Fama and Jensen, (1983a, 1983b), the board of directors has direct control to  
authorize and audit management’s activities, along with assessing and judging their performances. 
The non-independent directors exhibit the crucial knowledge about the corporate activities, whereas 
the independent directors contribute critical consultation and neutral evaluation of the 
management’s decision. Adams and Ferreira, (2008), argue board meeting is the crucial mechanism 
for independent directors, as it is the only way, they could perform their duty of getting knowledge 
about the management in general and thus, monitor and take decisions accordingly. Vafeas (1999) 
demonstrated that board activity if calculated by its number of meeting is a crucial amplitude of 
board operations. Apparently, the board meetings are important means for the board of directors in 
order to make strategic decisions along with supervising, monitoring and directing the firms. 
 
According to the requirement of the Revised Indian Code on corporate governance, companies are 
encouraged to have regular board meetings for discharging duties and responsibilities. In addition, it 
is mandatory for the board to disclose the number of board meetings held in a year and details of the 
attendance of each individual director in respect to meetings held. 
 
According to researchers like Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Byrne (1996), argued that frequent active 
meetings among the board of directors, are effective mechanism to disseminate the firm specific 
information and are thus more probable to their duties efficiently and with conformity toards the 
shareholders interest. 
 
Hypotheses 4: ceteris paribus, there exist a negative association between the number of board 
meetings and the level of Impression management used in the chairman letter. 
 
Number of audit committee meetings 
 
Board committees are domineering progressively a crucial demeanor in supervising and controlling 
corporations. Studies demonstrate how committees can elucidate the corresponding complication of 
bigger boards (Reeb and Upadhyay, 2010). Likewise, Audit committees are liable for inspecting the 
financial reporting process and safeguarding the goals of the external audit. However, studies like 
Beasley (1996) conveyed that audit committees do not considerably curtail the possibility of 
financial statement fraud. 
 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), necessitate that corporates must have an Audit committee constituted 
by independent directors only, meeting at least four time a financial year. The SEBI (Securities and 
exchange board of India) in its listing agreement required to have an audit committee chaired by an 
Independent director and must meet at least four times a year. Likewise, the NYSE, since 1978, has 
mandated companies to have an audit committee comprised totally of independent directors. Piot and 
Janin (2007) studying the SBF 120 index of French companies between 1999 and 2001 demonstrates 
that the independence of the audit committee alleviates earnings management. In a study Beasley et al, 
(2000), comprised of three different sectors of industries, it was evident that fraud-committing 
companies of two sector among the three had minimum audit committee meetings, while the deceptive 
companies from all the three sectors had minimal internal audit support mechanism. In an analysis for 
the Australian companies (Baxter et al, 2009), found indication of negative association between the 
number of Audit committee meetings and opportunistic behavior. 
 
Hypotheses 5: ceteris paribus, there exist a negative association between number of audit 




The board of directors has the legal authority to approve and supervise the management, along with 
recruiting, decide compensation and termination of the senior management. The board of directors 
are termed as a fundamental mechanism (Fama and Jensen, 1983), of corporate governance that is 
capable of resolving crucial agency conflicts that are essential in functioning any company. 
 
It is often argued, (Jensen, 1993), that efficiency of bigger boards are limited considering lack of 
coordination and issues related to process is greater than the benefits of proximity to extensive 
expertise and skills. According to Reeb et al, (2010) and Lipton et al, (1992), bigger boards have a 
higher free-riding problem. However, Xie et a1 (2003), and Chtourou et a1 (2001), demonstrated 
that bigger boards have negative association with earnings management exhibiting the effective 
monitoring role of larger boards of the managements activity. 
 
Moreover, as per Jensen, (1993), bigger boards benefits in the form of holistic separation of 
assignment through various board committees enhancing further the effectiveness of board and 
coordination among its committees. Bigger boards also tend to have higher proportion of 
Independent directors of financial backgrounds preventing further opportunistic attitude and 
safeguarding the balanced and neutralized approach towards the corporate reporting. 
 
Hypotheses 6: ceteris paribus, there exist a negative association between number of board members 
and the level of Impression management used in the chairman letter. 
 
Control variables 
There are four control variables used in this research. We include Size of the firm, considering the 
larger size of the firm would be less inclined to engage in the self-serving disclosure practices and 
would follow the best code of conduct in its reporting practices. Another control measure for 
incorporating into the model is Return on Equity, as the successful financial companies would be 
less inclined to engage in impression management techniques considering their performance would 
not require any window dressing within the reporting. We follow Osma et al (2011) and also 
include Nifty 50 index listed companies as the index is list of 50 companies that keeps updating 
based on their performance and more importantly their corporate ethics which may include but not 
limited to Corporate governance practices and Sustainability initiatives. Along with Positive news 
for the next year (PNNY), considering the firms reported to announce good news for the next year 
can substantially cover the declined performance of the current year and focus more on the next big 
news for all the stakeholders concerned (Osma et al, 2011). 
 
Measurement of dependent variables 
Disclosure tone 
 
This technique of Impression management draws inferences from the thematic manipulation, which 
examines the patterns of language directed towards the attribution and causal reasoning with the 
intention of portraying the corporate performance in positive lights. The technique deliberately uses 
positive tone while describing the performance of the corporate especially using keywords and 
statements instead of unbiased and negative tone wherever applicable. Prior literature includes 
Frazier et al. (1984), Abrahamson and Park (1994) and Abrahamson and Amir (1996, Clatworthy 
and Jones (2003, 2006), Osma et al (2011) that concludes managers using the thematic 
manipulation in order to convey the performance of the company in the best possible light. 
 
These literatures confirm the usage of thematic manipulation by the managers through the 
disclosure tone either positive or negative in the form of word and sentence used and their 
respective frequencies. As in the previous literature, studies focused on the extract themes and their 
disclosure tones in the company’s annual reports (Frazier et al. 1984) by using the factor analysis, 
and the methods to cover the negative results in the president’s letter (Abrahamson and Park 1994, 
Abrahamson and Amir 1996). On the other hand, thematic analysis by using additional measures in 
the form of sentences (Kohut and Segars, 1992) and personal references (Clatworthy and Jones, 
2006) along with passive and future oriented sentences. 
 
In this study, we measure the thematic manipulation of the chairman’s letter in the annual report by 
following the previous methodology used in the past (Clatworthy & Jones, 2003; Brennan et al., 
2009; Osma et al 2011) wherein capturing the keywords and statements along with the quantitative 
amounts with their implication (performance comparison) either positive or negative. Further details 




Another very important technique of Impression management used by the managers which can used 
in various forms (Brennan et al 2009) while assuming the receiver in this case the shareholder to 
whom the letter is addressed observe the information more which is emphasized more . In this 
study, we analyze the emphasis form of impression management in three forms i.e.: 
 
Location: wherein a positive information is placed in the most emphasized section of the letter 
(Introduction or initial paragraphs) and thus continuing throughout the letter using the visual 
emphasis or degree of prominence. Visual emphasis or degree of prominence refers to the location 
or positioning of information in the chairman’s letter in line with previous literatures (Staw et al. 
1983; and Bowen et al. (2005; Osma et al 2011), which is further classified as, most-emphasized, 
next-most-emphasized and least-emphasized (see appendix for further details). 
 
Repetition: wherein the repeating the same information more than one times with the motive to 
emphasize its reflection on the reader. According to Courtis (1996), repetition of disclosures may 
improve the understandability of financial reports or it may simply intensify the commotion to the 
disclosure practices. An item (statement or amount) is termed to be repeated when it is described 
more than once (Courtis, 1996; Guillamon-Saorin, 2006; Osma et. al 2011). 
 
Reinforcement: According to Guillamon-Saorin, (2006) and Osma et. al (2011) Reinforcement takes 
place when emphasis is laid upon on a particular keyword by use of a qualifier. Despite not a universal 
practice (Brennan et al 2009) it is generally found in the disclosure process prepared by the managers 
(Brennan et al 2009; Osma et al 2011) and therefore its being observed as useful in the study. 
Performance comparisons 
 
It refers to the use of benchmark especially comparing the current result or performance with that of 
the previous or past year’s achievement of the corporate with the motive to demonstrate the changes 
that could be either positive or negative. Yet, this impression management technique is based on the 
assumption managers introduce positive changes by selecting performance comparisons that allows 
them to paint their recent performance in the most favorable image. Prior literature that confirms 
that managers are most likely to use the lowest comparative benchmark item of past years that 
results in the highest current year performance (Schrand and Walther 2000) and firms are more like 
to use performance graphs in narratives when they perform above satisfactory level (Cassar (2001). 
Past research has also concluded the size and the performance of the corporate does impacts the 
tone of the CEO’s (Short and Palmer 2003), if the firm is large and performing better they tend to 




This technique measures the strategy adopted by the managers for the corporate narratives by using the 
financial amounts to emphasize the better performance. Among the available ranges of amounts from 
the profit and loss account and earnings parameters, managers deliberately choosing the amount which 
portrays the earnings in the best possible light even though the chosen amount is not relatively 
important. The practice may use involve the financial amount or ratio which does not even reflect on the 
financial statements of the firm. The purpose of using the pro forma or selective earnings is to manage 
the perception of the readers (Johnson and Schwartz (2005). Firms tend to select the highest earnings 
numbers in order to portray their earnings and thus themselves in the most favorable image (Guillamon- 
Saorin 2006). This practice of managing the perception of the readers of the narratives with the help of 
selective amounts is used for the purpose of impression management and hence, depending on the item 
chosen, a selectivity score is assigned. (For details, please refer the appendix). 
 
Based on the impression management techniques discussed above, in this paper we follow Brennan et al 
(2009) and compute three composite scores of impression management. These composite scores are 
based on qualitative and quantitative items and include both the positive and negative items to arrive at 
the final score; the third score is also quantitative which is calculated without including the technique of 
selectivity (For further details please refer to Appendix). The qualitative composite score is calculated 
by coding the following items: (i) keywords and statements (ii) repetition of statements, 
(iii) reinforcement of keywords, and (iv) location of the information within the letter. Thus, the 
quantitative composite score is calculated as: (i) amounts, (ii)  repetition of amounts, (iii) 
performance comparisons and (iv) location of the information within the letter. 
 
The final score or better the measure of bias score of the impression management is derived by 
using the methodology similar to that of Gordon et al (2008) and Tetlock et al (2008). This 
methodology to derive the bias score is suggested by Brennan et al (2009) and empirically tested by 
Osma et al (2011). The individual impression management bias scores are derived as follows: 
 
IMQL (qualitative): Total positive qualitative composite score minus total negative qualitative 
composite score divided by total qualitative composite scores. 
 
IMQNs (quantitative including selectivity): Total positive quantitative composite score (including 
selectivity) minus total negative quantitative composite score (including selectivity) divided by total 
quantitative composite scores (including selectivity). 
IMQN (quantitative): Total positive quantitative composite score minus total negative quantitative 
composite score divided by total quantitative composite scores. 
 
The scores are calculated by coding each item individually based on the weights assigned. Since the 
weightings are subjective, a sensitivity test carried to check any variations but Osma et al (2011) 
found no differences. These weightings are developed by Brennan et al. (2009) and is further 
empirically tested by Guillamón-Saorín, Brennan, and Pierce (2010) and Osma et al (2011). For 





This study examines the Impression management (both qualitative and quantitative) techniques 
namely disclosure tone, emphasis, performance comparison, and selectivity used in the accounting 
narratives. The sample used for the analysis comes from varied industries and sectors, while the 
accounting narratives used, is the Chairman’s letter of the 85 NSE (National Stock Exchange - 
India) listed companies for the year ended 2011 – 2012. 
 
Development of the research instruments content analysis 
 
The commonly used technique to measure the impression management is content analysis (Smith 
and Taffler (2000), encompassing the various dimensions like motivations and influencing factors 
for their attitude. Although, exhaustive and time consuming, Manuel content analysis helps decent 
and extensive comparisons and analysis despite limiting the size of the analysis. Studies manually 
covering the analysis include Bettman and Weitz, (1983); Staw et al., (1983); Courtis, (1986); 
Jones, (1988); Lang and Lundholm, (2000); and Clatworthy and Jones, (2003). There are studies 
that utilized the software as well for instance Smith and Taffler, (2000); Rutherford, (2005); Henry, 
(2008); Matsumoto et al., (2006) along with the dual approach of programs and manual coding like 
Abrahamson and Park, (1994); Abrahamson and Amir, (1996); Smith and Taffler, (2000). 
 
Measurement of thematic analysis necessitates judgement while coding, and might require greater 
subjective intuition while analyzing Impression management techniques like discussed above. 
 
According to Linderman (2001), comparing human and software program measurement relies on 
the complexity of categories, if categories are simple enough software programs is optimal, while 
with complex classification it advisable to use the manual analysis. Considering the subjectivity 
potential of manual content analysis and the refined and attenuated impression management 
techniques, certifies the use of manual content analysis. 
 
The coding manual is prepared in accordance with the outline provided by Brennan et al (2009), 
and is further tested by two independent coders with a reliability score of above 80% upheld by 
past researchers for example, Hackston and Milne (1996) and Milne and Adler (1999). 
 
Measurement of Independent variables 
 
The independent variables are categorized into corporate governance and control variables. Data are 
taken from corporate annual reports and Ace tech research data. The summary for the 
rationalization of these data’s are provided in the Appendix section in table 1. 
Multiple regression is used to test the relationship between Impression management (based on each 
of the three techniques) and the various corporate governance and control variables. To identify 
potential multi collinearity problems, the variance inflation factors (VIF) computed and the 
correlations between independent variables were reviewed. 
 
Moreover, analysis for all dependent and continuous independent variables were conducted for 
normality, through skewness and kurtosis and shapiro-wilk test, when normality was an issue the 
data were transformed. Meanwhile, linearity along with normality and homoscedasticity conditions 
were reviewed by conducting an analysis of Q-Q plot and of residuals plots of the studentised 
residuals against the predicted values. The regression equation is as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑀 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝑀+ 𝛽2𝐵𝑍+𝛽3𝐵𝑀+ 𝛽4 𝑃𝑟𝐼𝐷+𝛽5𝑅𝑆+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑁𝐶+𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐸+𝛽8𝑁𝐼𝐹𝑇𝑌50+𝛽9ln (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)+ 
𝛽10𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑌+𝜀𝑖 
 
Wherein;   
IM = Qualitative Impression Management score, Quantitative Impression 
  Management score with selectivity or Quantitative Impression management 
  score without selectivity. 
ACM = Number of Audit committee meetings held during the financial year 
BZ = Number of board members 
BM = Number of board meetings held during the financial year 
PrID = Proportion of independent directors within the board 
RS = Takes value of 1 if the position of chairman and CEO/Managing Director is 
  held by two separate individuals 0 otherwise. 
PRNC = Takes the value of 1 if there exist a remuneration and Nomination committee 
  within the board, 0 otherwise. 
ROE = Return on Equity of the companies for the financial year ended. 
NIFTY50 = Takes the value of 1 if the company is listed under NIFTY50 list; 0 otherwise. 
ln (Size) = Logarithm of total assets (proxy for firm size) 
PNNY = Takes the value 1 if the firm has to report positive news focusing towards 
  following year, 0 otherwise. 
β = Parameters; 
ε = Error term 
i = the ith observation 
 
Table 1 of the statistics section represents the correlation among the dependent and independent 
along with the control variables. Kennedy (1985) suggested that multi collinearity be viewed as a 
serious problem only if the correlation between explanatory variables exceeds 0.8. No association 
among the Independent variables exceed the mentioned threshold. In addition, the VIF computed 
for the explanatory variables are not more than five for any of the independent variables (Hair et al., 
1995, Ringle et al., 2015). Consequently, we can confirm there is no multi collinearity issues among 
the explanatory variables. 
 
The correlation table shows strong association among the qualitative impression management with 
that of the corporate governance mechanism. Among all the impression management score analyzed 
the qualitative stands out to be strongly associated with that of the majority of the corporate 
governance variables, especially ACM, BZ and BM from the governance mechanism along with Ln 
(size) and NIFTY50 within the control variables to be significantly (both 1% and 5% level) and 
negatively associated with the governance variables. While the IMQN’s is associated with the 
variable BZ, the score of IMQN is not associated with any Corporate Governance variables. Among 





Table 2 of the statistics section provides the descriptive statistics for all the variables analyzed 
within the study. The mean values for the all the Impression management scores approximate at the 
0.5 levels. While, the median scores for the IMQL, IMQN’s and IMQN is 0.55, 0.76 and 0.63 
respectively.  The  number  of audit  committee  meeting ranges  from 4 to  16 with the  mean being 
6.36. While the Board meeting ranges between 4 to 17 and mean being 6.5, both the meetings 
variable indicates the compliance of the Indian firms with the minimum meeting requirement as per 
the Indian companies act requirement. The size of the board for the companies within the analysis 
ranges from 4 to 18 of which the proportion of Independent directors ranges between 0% to 78%, 
while the mean values being 11 and 41% respectively. Lastly, the mean values for the Role 
separation and Presence of Remuneration and Nomination Committee within the board remained at 
0.65 and 0.75 respectively. Meanwhile, 32% of the companies under the analysis represented 
NIFTY50 nominated participants and 40% of the companies had to report positive news for the next 




Table 3 provides the regression result for the Qualitative Impression management techniques used by 
the companies in the chairman’s letter with that of the various corporate governance mechanism. The 
regression that resulted with the adjusted r square of 42% showed significance negative association with 
almost all the governance mechanism both at 1% and 5% level. The variable ACM negatively  
associated with the Qualitative Impression management at 1% significance. With the exception of the 
PrID rest all, the governance variables are associated at 5% significance level and are negative in nature. 
Among the controls, Ln (Size) (positively) and PNNY (negatively) are associated at 5% significance 
level. While the regression result for the Quantitative nature of Impression Management does not yield, 
any significant results with the exception of PNNY associated negatively at 5% level of significance 
with both the scores that is with and without selectivity. 
 
Examination of hypotheses 
 
Table 4 summarizes the association between the Impression management techniques and various 
corporate governance and control variables used in this study. The hypotheses testing was 
completed on all three formats or techniques of measuring impression management and most of the 
variables tested were found to be negatively associated, especially with the qualitative part of 
Impression management both at 1% and 5% levels. While the measurement for the quantitative part 
of Impression management does not seem to be having any significant impact of the variables 
analyzed, especially with that of the chairperson’s letter in the form of accounting narrative. 
 
Proportion of independent directors was expected to be one of the major corporate governance 
determinants for curtailing Impression management techniques; however, it was found that the 
variable is associated only with the quantitative (IMQN’s) impression management negatively. 
Among the controls, PNNY is significant, negatively with all the measures of the impression 




Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this paper we analyze the association between the impression management practices used in the 
chairman letter of the Indian firms and the corporate governance along with control variables. The 
chairman statement a widely popular and important accounting narrative could be used to manage 
the perception of the readers with the motivation of creating false impression (Clatworthy and 
Jones, 2003). The result strongly suggest the limitation of impression management within the 
chairperson letter if backed by a strong and reasonable corporate governance structure, in line with 
previous analysis (Osma et al, 2011). The result is strongly supported for the qualitative aspects of 
impression management and does not have any significance association with the quantitative 
aspects. One explanation for the same would the chairman letter does not include an extensive 
coverage of the ratios comparatively, to that of management’s discussion and analysis report in the 
annual report. Thus, to get a clearer picture of the same, it would be fruitful to extend the narratives 
section for the analysis of impression management with respect to the extended territory and its 
association with that of corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
The results strongly supported for the qualitative data for almost all the corporate governance 
factors except of independence directors and among the controls for NIFTY 50 and Return on 
equity. The corporate governance variables that are strongly associated of limiting the opportunistic 
behavior for the corporate narrative reporting are the number of audit committee meetings in the 
line previous researches of supporting the shareholders interest in various forms (Piot and Janin, 
2007, and Baxter et al, 2009). And role separation was also significant at 1% confirming the 
separation of role does plays a role in enhancing the quality of voluntary disclosures in the form 
corporate reporting. The analysis also contributes towards the previous researches of role separation 
improving the credibility of the board effectiveness (Dechow et al., 1996, Donaldson et al., 1991 
and Rechner et al, 1991). The regression analysis also proved the presence of remuneration and 
nomination committee does play a crucial role in curtailing the self-interested corporate reporting 
attitude and safeguards the shareholders interest consistent with the previous researches (Dechow, 
Huson, and Sloan (1994) and (Osma et al, 2007). 
 
The paper also establishes the importance of the effectiveness of the board, as board are termed to 
be the crucial mechanism in controlling and governing the activities and functionality of the firm 
(Osma et al, 2011). The empirical analysis in this paper confirms the association of board size and 
board meetings to be strongly associated with the disclosure practices of the firm. Both the variables 
are negatively associated at 5% level with the perception management strategies in the accounting 
narratives of chairman letter. Consistent with the past researches exhibiting the importance of board 
effectiveness in enhancing the shareholders interest and curtailing any agency conflict that may 
arise (Xie et al, 2002, and Chtourou et a1, 2001) and (Adams and Ferreira, 2008, Vafeas, 1999, 
Lipton, Lorsch, and Byrne, 1996). While among the control variables, positive news for the next 
year has a very strong association with the opportunistic behavior of the corporate reporting for the 
performances, clearly indicates that management tactics for voluntary disclosure is indeed a matter 
of perfect timings in line with the previous research (Osma et al. 2011). 
The size of the firm is positively related to that of the impression management usage, confirming 
the larger the base of stakeholders and greater the diversity of them, necessitates the greater use of 
perception management through biased reporting. These demonstrations must be of extreme 
consideration for policy makers and regulators along with accounting professional and certainly the 
investors in particular. The research hypotheses if the corporate governance mechanism does limits 
the self-serving disclosure by the management is being uncovered for the various forms of 
Impression management techniques. This form of literatures supports the agency theory issues and 
uncovers various complex yet effective modes of opportunistic attitude towards the corporate 
reporting (Eisenhardt, 1989). Since, previous literatures argues, that corporate governance 
individual mechanism is not as effective as the combined elements working together (Osma et al, 
2011). We also tested the association of overall corporate governance score with that of the 
individual Impression score, and found the same result for the qualitative and quantitative measures. 
 
This study contributes towards the overall literatures involved in several ways. This would be the 
first scientific study to verify the linkage amid the corporate governance and the accounting 
narrative in the form of Chairman's letter. In addition, this would be the first paper to develop such 
link from the developing country perspective. This would also be the primary research with respect 
to Impression Management as there is no prior study being conducted for Indian Companies. In 
addition, this paper by establishing the link between the corporate governance and its impact on 
better decision-making process directly contributes towards the classical agency theory. While, it 
also contributes towards the Impression management theory from an emerging  economy 
perspective in the light of various measuring technique discussed. The study also contributes 
towards the signaling theory through established result amid the association between the corporate 
governance and the impression management indicating the governance mechanism indeed is used to 
suppress the opportunistic signaling behavior. 
 
The preparers of the corporate reporting in this case the management undertakes approaches from 
various audience perspectives. As Staw et al., (1983), describes the audience is divided into internal 
and external groups and thus, the research design must take into account, the interaction effects 
between the preparers and the audience of these reports. The audience could thus be categorized 
into more meaningful groups like various board committees, employees, creditors and regulators, 
competitors and of course the equity investors. The future research could incorporate various groups 
of audience for further understanding the interaction effects along with the techniques used for 
managing perception and the role of various governance factors that does have any amplitude for 
such practices. In Addition, the quality of corporate governance does have any impact on the use of 
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BM - ROE -0.032  
BM - ln (Size) 0.457 *** 
BM - PNNY -0.159  
BM - NIFTY50 0.168  
RS - PRNC 0.336 ** 
RS - ROE 0.079  
RS - ln (Size) -0.137  
RS - PNNY 0.284 ** 
RS - NIFTY50 0.065  
PRNC - ROE 0.058  
PRNC - ln (Size) -0.070  
PRNC - PNNY -0.033  
PRNC - NIFTY50 0.039  
Pearson Correlations 
  Pearson 's r 
ROE - ln (Size) -0.215 * 
ROE - PNNY -0.051 
ROE - NIFTY50 0.117  
ln (Size) - PNNY -0.049  
ln (Size) - NIFTY50 0.408 *** 
PNNY - NIFTY50 -0.041 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean StDev Minimum Median Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
IMQL 0,5743 0,2414 -0,3125 0,5489 1,0000 -0,46 1,86 
IMQNS 0,5057 0,5331 -1,0000 0,7619 1,0000 -0,47 -1,08 
IMQN 0,4929 0,5409 -1,0000 0,6364 1,0000 -0,51 -0,78 
ACM 6,365 2,632 4,000 6,000 16,000 1,37 1,67 
BZ 11,071 2,781 4,000 11,000 18,000 0,01 0,10 
BM 6,506 2,922 4,000 5,000 17,000 1,69 2,57 
PrID 0,4149 0,1832 0,0000 0,4545 0,7778 -0,71 0,24 
RS 0,6588 0,4769 0,0000 1,0000 1,0000 -0,68 -1,57 
PRNC 0,7529 0,4339 0,0000 1,0000 1,0000 -1,19 -0,59 
ROE 14,41 19,91 -59,07 12,61 131,80 1,84 15,71 
ln (Size) 4,2937 0,7653 2,8277 4,2730 6,2923 0,19 -0,44 
NIFTY50 0,3176 0,4683 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 0,80 -1,40 
PNNY 0,4000 0,4928 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 0,42 -1,87 
 
Table 3. Regression 
 
Model Fit Measures 
 
Overall Model Test 
Model R R² Adjusted R² F df1 df2 p 






Model Predictor Estimate SE Stand. Estimate t p 
IMQL Intercept 1.0156 0.09398 
 
10.808 < .001 
 
PrID -0.0642 0.08342 -0.0854 -0.770 0.444 
 ACM -0.0302 0.00713 -0.5772 -4.243 < .001 
 
BZ -0.0102 0.00443 -0.2061 -2.307 0.024 
 
BM -0.0111 0.00538 -0.2350 -2.058 0.043 
 
RS -0.0831 0.02742 -0.2877 -3.032 0.003 
 PRNC -0.1300 0.04571 -0.2608 -2.843 0.006 
 
ROE 5.91e-4 6.21e-4 0.0853 0.951 0.344 
 
SIZE (Log TA) 0.0427 0.02150 0.2369 1.984 0.051 
 PNNY -0.0649 0.02593 -0.2320 -2.502 0.015 
Model Coefficients 
 
Model Predictor Estimate SE Stand. Estimate t p 
 




Model Fit Measures 
 
Overall Model Test 
Model R R² Adjusted R² F df1 df2 p 






Model Predictor Estimate SE Stand. Estimate t p 




PrID 0.26526 0.15592 0.23541 1.7013 0.093 
 
ACM 0.01278 0.01332 0.16286 0.9595 0.340 
 BZ 0.01204 0.00828 0.16223 1.4550 0.150 
 
BM -0.00653 0.01006 -0.09237 -0.6485 0.519 
 
RS -0.04343 0.05126 -0.10032 -0.8473 0.400 
 PRNC -0.08819 0.08544 -0.11812 -1.0322 0.305 
 
ROE 4.44e-5 0.00116 0.00428 0.0382 0.970 
 SIZE (Log TA) 0.00362 0.04019 0.01342 0.0901 0.928 
 
PNNY -0.11253 0.04847 -0.26860 -2.3216 0.023 
 




Model Fit Measures 
 
Overall Model Test 
Model R R² Adjusted R² F df1 df2 p 
IMQN 0.431 0.186 0.0758 1.69 10 74 0.099 
Model Coefficients 
 
Model Predictor Estimate SE Stand. Estimate t p 
IMQN Intercept 0.39828 0.17705 
 
2.2496 0.027 
 PrID 0.24700 0.15716 0.22029 1.5717 0.120 
 ACM 0.01031 0.01342 0.13208 0.7682 0.445 
 BZ 0.01015 0.00834 0.13735 1.2162 0.228 
 BM -0.00568 0.01014 -0.08076 -0.5597 0.577 
 RS -0.04917 0.05166 -0.11414 -0.9517 0.344 
 PRNC -0.08424 0.08612 -0.11338 -0.9782 0.331 
 ROE 9.47e-5 0.00117 0.00918 0.0810 0.936 
 SIZE (Log TA) 0.00632 0.04051 0.02353 0.1560 0.876 
 PNNY -0.10616 0.04886 -0.25462 -2.1727 0.033 





























Summary of multiple regression results 
Hypothesis support 
 
Hypotheses Predicted Actual sign  
sign 
  IMQL IMQN’s IMQN 
(H1) – PrID (-) NA (+) Weak NA 
(H2) – Role 
separation 
(-) (-) Strong NA NA 
(H3) – PRNC (-) (-) Strong NA NA 
(H4) – BM (-) (-)Moderate NA NA 
(H5) – NACM (-) (-)Moderate NA NA 
(H6) – BZ (-) (-)Moderate NA NA 
ROE (-) NA NA NA 
SIZE (-) (+)Moderate NA NA 
PNNY (-) (-)Strong (-)Moderate (-)Moderate 
NIFTY50 (-) NA NA NA 
Strong = significant at .01 level, Moderate = significant at .05 level, Weak = significant at .10 
  level and NA= Not associated at significant level.  
APPENDIX OF IM 
 
Table 1. Measurement of dependent and independent variables 
Variable Proxy Measurement 






Number of positive qualitative items less number of 
 Qualitative score negative qualitative items divided by total qualitative 




Impression management Number of positive quantitative items (including 
selectivity) less number of negative quantitative items  Quantitative Score with  
(including selectivity) divided by total quantitative  
selectivity 






Number of positive quantitative items (excluding  
Quantitative Score without  selectivity) less number of negative quantitative items 
 selectivity (excluding selectivity) divided by total quantitative 
  composite score. 






Audit committee meetings 
 
Number of Audit committee meetings held during the 
  financial year 
 










Proportion of independent 
 
Proportion of independent directors within the board 
 directors  
 
Takes value of 1 if the position of chairman and 
RS 
Role separation 
CEO/Managing Director is held by two separate 
  individuals 0 otherwise. 
PRNC Presence of Nomination and Takes the value of 1 if there exist a remuneration and 
 Remuneration committee Nomination committee within the board, 0 otherwise. 




Return on Equity 
 
Return on Equity of the companies for the financial year 
  ended. 
NIFTY50 NIFTY 50 listed company Takes the value of 1 if the company is listed under 
  NIFTY50 list; 0 otherwise. 
ln (Size) Size of the company Logarithm of total assets 
  
Takes the value 1 if the firm has to report positive news 






A. Visual emphasis or degree of prominence (adapted from Brennan et al 2009) 
 
 
Ranking of emphasis 
 
Most emphasized 
Opening sentences and introductory paragraph 
Second Paragraph 
Body of the letter 
 
Conclusive Paragraph 
Closing Paragraph Least emphasized 
Appendix A. Measuring impression management 
 
 
Table 1. Method to measure impression management Adapted from Brennan et al. (2009). 
 
 
Technique Object of technique Measure 
(1) Disclosure tone Keywords /quantitative amounts Number of positive and negative 
keywords 
Number of quantitative positive and 
negative amounts 
(2) Emphasis (a) Location / positioning / Most-, Next-most, Least-emphasized 
presentation of disclosure; section 
(b) Repetition of statements/ Number of positive and negative 
quantitative amounts repetitions of statements 
(c) Reinforcement of keywords Number of positive and negative 
 repetitions of amounts 
(3) Performance Quantitative amounts Benchmark, Prior year amount, Both 
comparisons 





Table 2: Method for calculating qualitative composite impression management scores for 








Thematic – keywords/statements 
 
1.0 
2. Emphasis – Location: Most-, next-most, least-emphasized 1.0/0.5/0.0 
3. Emphasis – Repetition (Statements only) 0.5 
4. Emphasis – Reinforcement (Keywords only) 0.5 
5. Maximum possible composite score per keyword/statement 2.5 











































Table 3: Method for calculating quantitative composite impression management scores for amounts 




Measure Selectivity applies No selectivity 
 Weighting Weighting 
 
1. Disclosure of quantitative performance monetary and 
Non-monetary amounts 1.0 1.0 
2. Selectivity - highest/medium/lowest category of amounts 
 from which selection can be made 1.0/0.5/0.0  
3. Emphasis – Location: Most-, next-most, least-emphasized 1.0/0.5/0.0 1.0/0.5/0.0 
4. Emphasis – Repetition 0.5 0.5 
5. Performance comparisons 0.5 0.5 
Maximum possible composite score per quantitative amount 4.0 3.0 




Note: the scores will be either positive (+) or negative (-) depending on whether the amount is positive/negative 
 
 




Assume the chairperson letter on which this example is based has disclosed six positive quantitative amounts 
and four negative quantitative amounts. Three positive quantitative amounts are located in the first paragraph 
(i.e., most-emphasized location) of the press release. Two positive quantitative amounts are located in the 
middle of the press release (i.e., next-most-emphasized location), while the remaining one positive 
quantitative amounts and the four negative quantitative amounts are in the last paragraph (i.e., least- 
emphasized location) of the letter. For simplicity, the letter contains no repetition of quantitative amounts, no 




Measure  Positive Negative Total 
Amount Amount Amounts 
 







Composite impression management score Positive Negative Total 
  Score score score 
(1) Disclosure of quantitative performance monetary    
 and non-monetary amounts 6 4 10 
(2) (a) Emphasis – Location:    
 - Most 3 x 1 0 3 
 - Next-most 2 x 0.5 0 1 
 - Least-emphasized 1 x 0.0 4 x 0.0 0 
 (b) Emphasis – Repetition 0 0 0 
(3) Performance comparisons 0 0 0 
(4) Selectivity - highest/medium/lowest category of amounts   
 from which selection can be made 0 0 0 




Calculating Bias score 
 
10 Positive composite score – 4 Negative composite score = 6 Net positive composite score/14 
 
Total composite score = + 0.43 
 
Key: +1 = completely positively biased; –1 = completely negatively biased; 0 = no bias 
 
Table 5. Calculating impression management score using qualitative disclosures (adapted from Brennan 
et al 2009). 
 
 
Assume the chairperson letter on which this example is based has disclosed six positive and four negative 
keywords. One of the keywords is located in the most emphasized section of the letter, six are placed in the 
next-most emphasized section and four are located in the least-emphasized section of the letter. One positive 




Measure Positive Negative Total 
 Keywords keywords keywords 
Disclosures    
Total keywords disclosed 6 4 10 
Composite score 
   
(1) Disclosure of tone 6 4 10 
(2)(a) Emphasis – Location:    
– Most 1 x 1 0 1 
– Next-most 4 x 0.5 2 x 0.5 1 
– Least-emphasized 3 x 0.0 1x 0 0 
(2)(b) Emphasis – Repetition of statements 1 x 0.5 0 0.5 
(2)(c) Emphasis – Reinforcement of keywords 3 x 0.5 0 1.5 
Total composite score 11 5 14 
 
 
Calculating Bias score 
 
11 Positive composite score – 5 Negative composite score = 6 Net positive composite score/14 
 
Total composite score = + 0.43 
 
Key: +1 = completely positively biased; –1 = completely negatively biased; 0 = no bias 
 
B. The categorization of selectivity, assuming ten earnings amounts are disclosed in the 
profit and loss account (adapted from Brennan et al 2009) 
 
 





Numbers to identify the total possible profit/earnings per share amounts from which to select for 




SELECTIVITY: Selection of amounts from the P&L account 
 
1. Trading profit before goodwill amortization and exceptional, 
2. Trading profit post exceptional 
3. Gross Operating Profit 
4. Net Operating profit 
5. Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
6. Earnings before Interest and Taxes 
7. Earnings before Tax 
8. Profit After Tax 
9. Profits for the year attributable to ordinary shareholders 






















*Graduate School of Economics and Management (University of Verona, Ca foscari Venezia, 





We measure the relation between the qualities of the boards with performance of the firm. We rank 
the board in terms of score defined by self-created index for 150 Indian firms in terms of four 
broad categories of the board quality. Drawing on the classical agency theory, various statistical 
model of univariate and multivariate nature were used in order to analyze the impact of board's 
quality on firm performance. The performance of the firm were measured using two broad 
categories of traditional accounting based measures and value creation based measures. We find 
there exist a close association amid the Board efficiency and the performance of the firm when 
evaluated using traditional performance measures, such as Price to book value, market to sales 
ratio while, Tobin’s Q is negatively associated. Moreover, the association is much stronger to be 
found when the efficiency effect is captured by market value performance measures in the form of 




This paper investigates the association between a set of board quality and the financial 
performance of Indian companies listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE). Specifically, we 
examine if the better-termed quality of the board of these firms do have any consequences in 
terms of generating higher financial performance. Boards tend to be very important for the 
efficient working of corporations in an internationalized and dynamic environment. 
 
Conventionally boards perform and helps the corporation through diverse range of duties, 
including, supervising the activity of the management in order to reduce any opportunist behavior 
and control agency cost (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Especially, advising and counseling to the 
Chief Executive Officer (Vancil, 1987), start and complete the designation of management 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998), and giving value able yet guileful command for the firm (Tricker, 
1984; and Kemp, 2006), being resourceful by equipping and assigning distinct resources (Hendry 
& Kiel, 2004). 
 
There exist an inherent association amid boards of directors and the firm performance (Jensen 
(1993). Specifically, he claims, “the board, at the apex of the internal control system, has the final 
responsibility for the functioning of the firm” (Jensen (1993; p.49). The board of directors are 
selected by the owners or shareholders of the corporation in order to protect their interest. Apart 
from supervising the corporations projected cases and initiatives they have the authority to choose 
and if required remove the organizations managers. Specifically, the board of director's are seen as 
the most crucial aspects for supervising in public sector firms in order to assess the management 
activity. 
 
The wellbeing of our economies, society and organizations depends on identifying how boards can 
effect firm performance (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). Previous literatures that analyzes the board 
characteristics and the performance of the firms can be broadly categorized into two categories of 
which the first outlook denotes analyzing individual quality of the board that influences the 
separate activity, and thus the overall impact that affects the Corporate Performance. Individual 
quality that may also include independence of directors, role duality, Board committees etc. 
Meanwhile, the second outlook analyzes the relationship amid board characteristics and corporate 
performance directly (Bhagat et. al 2002). The former approach's intention is to examine the effect 
of an individual factor of the Board Quality with respect to the overall performance of an 
organization. 
 
This outlook is very plain and smooth while it also gives the potentiality of straightforward and 
tractable data so could provide statistically robust result. Whereas, the latter approach ensures a 
complete scenario or the platform with respect to the quality of board and performance of the firm 
but has the challenge of endogeniety and constructive statistical argument (Bhagat et. al 2002). 
This study while using the second approach also tries to get the statistically significant result using 
univariate and multivariate analysis. 
 
Most of the previous studies tries to capture the performance of the firms using the traditional 
accounting based performance (Dalton et al, 1998, Eisenberg et al, 1998, Bhagat and Black, 2000) 
while there is very limited studies providing information with respect to the Market Based Value 
measures (Adjaoud et. al 2007). Whereas for India, there is no scientific paper, which gives the 
Market based valuation of the performance while analyzing the quality of Board from holistic 
point of view. 
 
For an emerging economy like India, both the valuation and the contracting role of accounting 
information have important implications. Considering the way the quality of these information is 
having an effect by the quality of the board's characteristics is in the better interest for investors as 
well as regulators. Most of the prior literature have studied on the association amid integrated 
Corporate Governance mechanism and financial performance of the corporations, upto now has 
been, concentrated particularly on the advanced and developed economies and stock market of 
Europe, America and Asia-Pacific (Black et al., 2006a, b; Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Cheng  
et al., 2008). 
 
Within the Indian context, a number of previous studies have examined the effect of individual 
corporate governance mechanisms on corporate performance (Sarkar et al 2009, Kumar et.al 
2012). As per our knowledge, this would be the first study to conduct an examination of the 
holistic  version of board quality and its association with the Indian Corporate Performance. 
 
The core fabric of the corporate sector has a major challenge arising from the separation of the 
owners and its Managers giving rise to classical agency conflict. Despite corporate governance, 
system has managed immensely to curtail the agency conflict associated amid the separation of 
ownership and control (Denis, 2001). However, the board of directors are considered as the 
primary means of the shareholders in order to defend their interest as opposed to the managers 
who may act as opposed to their interests. The board of directors are seen as the fundamental structure 
for the corporate governance especially within the firms, which has diffused shareholding (Romano 
(1996). 
According to Daily et al. (2003, p. 372) “The board of directors is the most central internal 
governance mechanism”. Even the media and the major business critics mostly view the board of 
directors as the major line of defense or the corporate governance structure against the challenge of 
ownership and control separation, while other aspects comparatively are given very less attention. 
According to Nicholson and Kiel, (2004), a string of investigation, studies and professional reports 
proposing governance reform have taken place due to the stress on the board of directors. 
 
Intellectuals from diverse areas of organization theory (Johnson, 1997), economics (Tirole, 2001; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976), finance (Fama, 1980), strategic management (Boyd, 1995), law 
(Richards and Stearn, 1999), and sociology (Useem, 1984) have all made additions to the corporate 
governance research account. 
 
As a result, we have number of theories related to corporate governance, originating from these 
sources including of resource dependence theory, agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship 
theory, and institutional theory as the forefront theories from theoretical perspectives. Since the 
board is directly responsible with the supervision of the management, according to agency theory 
the board of directors must consider a competent regulation. The performance of the board with 
respect to its effective monitoring is affected by its various characteristics like its size, diversity, 
culture, composition, role duality, and transparency process. 
 
Even though, the legal system in India gives to the investor one of the best system for their 
protection globally, there is fundamental process of pyramiding and tunneling among the business 
giants in the country, along with the copious reporting obligations (Chakraborty et al 2007). 
Nevertheless, the banking industry within the country has one of the lowest percentage of non- 
performing assets; indicating the practice of corporate fraud and tunneling are not out of control 
(Chakraborty et al 2007). 
 
As with majority of the economies, corporate governance issues are multi-dimensional in India as 
well. According to Topalova (2004), the top 500 market value corporations in India, holds for more 
than 90% of the market capitalization of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), and thus discloses 
further that almost 60% of these corporations (and 65% of total market capitalization), belongs to 
“business groups” or being termed as conglomerates. As an emerging market, ownership of firms is 
relatively concentrated in India (Subramanian, 2006). It is apparent that there is a strong influence 
within the Indian corporate sector of the family-run business groups or such conglomerates 
(Chakrabarty et. al 2007). 
 
Under such scenarios, it is very crucial to maintain a flawless system of the Corporate Governance 
to safeguard the interest of the minority shareholders and the overall stakeholders in general. In 
these situations, the board being termed as the primary line of defense for the shareholders becomes 
an interesting research area. The main findings of this study is directed to calculate the impact of the 
Boards quality as a whole which is calculated with the help of self-created index of the top 150 
Indian Listed firms on the overall performance of the company calculated with the help of Both 
traditional accounting measures and market value based measures. 
 
Especially, the study attempts to establish the links for the following question: If the quality of the 
board has any influence on the comprehensive performance of the corporations? If the quality of the 
board has any relationship with the traditional accounting based earnings measures? If there is any 
impact of Boards quality towards the market based measure of evaluating performance of EVA, 
MVA is used for corporations? Does the Quality of the Board has any impact on the Cash value 
based measures such as CFROTA? Is Board's quality associated with the liquidity of the 
corporation? Does the performance of traditional measures also reflects in terms of Cash Flow of 
the organization analyzed or if the performance of traditional measures is positively associated with 
the CFROTA (Total Shareholder returns) of the firms? 
 
In this research, the main argument within the context of Agency theory contributing the quality of 
the board towards the performance in the light of the various performance measures including that 
of the Cash measures, this paper contributes in several ways. First, using Board Quality data 
collected from annual reports and databases, we construct an integrated Board Quality index for a 
sample of 150 NSE -listed corporations for the year 2011/2012. Our index consists of four broad 
categories of Board quality for Indian corporations with 21 items. Second, we provide evidence on 
the association between Board Quality and financial performance for NSE-listed corporations. 
 
This also extends the international evidence to Indian corporate context. Finally, and distinct from 
prior studies, we offer evidence on how board Quality with Indian context-specific affirmative 
action and CG Provisions by the existing governance system affect the financial performance of 
NSE Listed corporations in the light of Market based value performance measures and its 
differentiation from the traditional accounting measures of performance. Our results shows the 
quality of the board is one of the important determinant that explains the performance of the firm. 
The result is more robust for the market based performance measures compared to that of its 
accounting measures counterpart. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the existing 
research for the related studies. Section 3 develops the link between Board Quality and financial 
performance and thus the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 describes the data and research 
methodology. Section 5 reports empirical results, while section summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Most of the prior literatures analyzing the corporate governance issues globally focused mainly on 
country-specific differences in legal tranches and institutional contexts. Due to idiosyncrasies that 
exist in the legal origins over the countries (La Porta, Lopez-de- Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
1998), the laws made to safeguard the interest of the investors deviate from country to country. The 
impact of these origins have been of higher influence as it also affects through its enforcement to 
various decisions within the corporate and management domain as such including that of market 
valuations, cost and availability of finance, dividend payout and ownership structure (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1999, 2000, 2002). 
 
Various strategies and models have been developed in order to understand the association of the 
board and performance like Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) developed a model that can be utilized 
to ascertain the fluctuation of the association amid CEO and the board, especially with respect to 
the independency of the board from that of CEO. Recent studies (Gaur et al. 2015) demonstrates 
that the presence of internal directors, CEO duality, board size and presence of professional 
directors leads to better firm performance. However, the positive effect of board independence, 
board size and board competence on firm performance decreases in firms that have a high- 
ownership concentration. They (Gaur et al. 2015) also exhibits, the effectiveness of a particular 
governance mechanism (such as board members) may depend on the presence or absence of 
another governance mechanism (such as ownership concentration). Models are also developed in 
order to study the behavior of the board with respect to various forms of environmental 
Inconclusiveness (Boyd (1990)). While the model constructed by Zahra and Pearce (1989), 
determines the effects of the roles and attributes of the board with respect to the performance of the 
corporations. 
 
Black (2001), tried to establish the link for the major Russian corporations during the evolutionary 
scientific phase of such studies that is the association amid the governance and performance, where 
he concluded a strong positive association between the two variables even though the sample size 
was not significant. Significant amount of studies have been carried out in the same vein, to 
ascertain and clarify further this relationship. Ran et al (2015), suggest that supervisors with an 
accounting or academic background, supervisor compensation, and female supervisors are 
consistent drivers of improvements in accounting information quality. Francis et al. (2015) 
demonstrate that companies with directors from academia are associated with higher performance 
and play an important governance role through their advising and monitoring functions. CEO 
duality has statistically significant negative impacts on firm performance while, this effect is 
positively moderated by board independence (Duru et al, 2016). Ararat et al (2015) provide 
empirical support for the importance of contextual factors in the relationship between diversity and 
performance along with framework and the compound diversity and board‐monitoring indices. 
 
On the grounds being the conclusion not very competent, recently, there has been a surge in the 
scientific world of interrogating the positive association amid the firm performance and corporate 
governance. Authors like Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) question few of the conclusion by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) since the results are drawn upon the technology firms and thus 
its effect on the unevenness in the prices of the stock. Studies even conclude that the significant 
above average returns observed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), were due to higher risk for 
the firms as their ranking for the anti - takeover index was very low signifying the level of 
governance mechanism (Yen, (2005) and Ferreira and Laux (2007)). 
 
According to Yen (2005), the existing association reported by these authors (Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003)) is being derived due to quantum reported by “penny stocks” and outliers. Many 
studies also reported of not evidencing any connection amid performance and governance (Pham, 
Suchard, and Zein (2011), Firth, Rui, and Fung (2002). According to Pham, Suchard, and Zein 
(2011) superior corporate governance is even related with reduced stock returns in Australia. On the 
contrary, studies even gives evidence for the negative correlation for example Aman and Nguyen 
(2008) concludes corporations with lower level of Corporate Governance in Japan drastically 
exceed in performance with those of better Corporate Governance. 
 
One possible explanation could be the risk factor as the corporations with fragile governance has  
the higher risk, if curtailed rightly could generate higher returns. Nevertheless, fragile governance  
or complete failure may degrade the shareholder's interest fundamentally or even complete 
destruction. As mentioned board being the primary line of defense for shareholders, it is  very 
crucial to observe the fundamental characteristics of corporate governance and its effects of the 
overall firm performance. 
 
Earlier researchers have clearly outlined the important role played by the boards within the 
corporate governance of public sector corporations (Berles and Means, 1932). The quality 
assessment of the boards actually creates a process within the board to capture the very grounds of 
Inefficiencies and thus helping them to rectify the same before they turn into disaster. For instance, 
the assessment may evaluate the risk management initiative taken by the board or ways its handling 
the information asymmetry for the sake of stakeholder's interest. 
 
Previous studies have claimed about negligible amount of strategic relevance for the board as to 
managing the organization under the dominating management headset, (Mace, 1971). Meanwhile 
there are other theories as well that consider the other way around and viewed the boards an utmost 
important mechanism of strategic decision-making process (Boulton, 1978). Moreover, should work 
hand in hand along with the management to not only monitor every move of the management but 
also provide guidance with their expertise and diverse experience (Andrews, 1980). Motivated by 
theoretical advancements in agency theory (e.g. Hendry, 2002), and coerced by increasing number 
of corporate excesses such as Satyam Computer's in India, Parmalat in Italy, Enron in US, hence, 
shareholders, law makers and society in general are rigorously looking for boards to demonstrate 
leadership and control. 
 
In other words, the boards is being viewed as more being the Leader of the organization rather than 
the management support like in the past. It may not be the universal practice as one of the director's 
statement that is reported by Lorsch and MacIver (1989, p. 67) clearly mentioned that, “the thinking 
through of where the company is going is under emphasized among director’s roles”, where as the 
more focused area was the compliance. According to Pound, (1995), the understanding of the board 
as the leadership figure within the corporation do exist even if standing at the evolutionary phase. 
Nevertheless, there is a change in the perceptions to where new studies (Conger et al., 2001) 
acknowledge directors being guiding the managers about strategic initiatives. 
 
Drawing on classical agency theory, a direct and positive association exist amid performance of the 
corporations and the level corporate governance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In other words, the 
better the corporate governance standards within the corporation, the higher its market value should 
be so as its overall performance. According to Shleifer & Vishny, (1997), the managers tend to 
focus more towards the project of shareholders interest and less towards personal benefits and 
interest when supervised efficiently. Other researches claims for the boards to be an important 
management contributor that helps in the strategic direction of the corporation's (Walsh and  
Seward, 1990; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). 
 
The agency theory underlines the agency relationship wherein the principle hires the agent, but 
there also exist the risk sharing amid the two, which may turn into probable interest collision 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory is grounded on the assumption that agents do operate rationally 
and behave opportunistically and will so maximize their own benefit at the expense of shareholders 
interest (Eisenhardt, 1989). The board being the primary means for the shareholders to defend their 
interest, has the major role to mediate and maintain a control over any opportunistic behavior by the 
Management and provide strategic role on a broader scale (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hill, 1995). The 
statement of providing strategic direction by the board is based on the assumption that due to better 
controlling mechanism, curtailing the opportunistic behavior of the management is surpassed (Hill, 
1995) and such mechanism could be further utilized for the strategic purposes (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001). 
According to Finkelstein and Hambrick, (1996), various academic research have been conducted to 
zero down the overall effects of the board's quality on the corporations performance in the form of 
board composition, role duality, director's tenure and diverse experience, size of the board, and 
others as such producing mixed results not specifying a thorough evidence of the linkage. One of 
the possible explanation for the inconclusive results could be the endogeneity or increased 
complexity and thus difficult to manage statistically and different methodology to measure the 





In a recent report by World Bank named as ‘Doing Business 2014’, India stood at 34
th 
rank in 
regards to protecting investors and providing constructive corporate governance. The ranking was 
based on all the global economy comparing countries globally, surpassing other major emerging 
economies like Brazil, Russia and China repeatedly over the last 5 years (NSE report, 2014). 
 
Clause 49 of the Listing Agreements is termed as the important benchmark in the development of 
the corporate governance mechanism in India. The rules mentioned were applicable to companies 
which has a paid up capital of Rs. 100 million or with a net worth of Rs. 250 million at any time 
during the past five years on March 31, 2002, and to other listed companies with a paid up capital of 
over Rs. 30 million on March 31, 2003. The crucial mandatory features of Clause 49 regulations 
especially that deals with the boards are with respect to composition of the board of directors, the 
composition and functioning of the audit committee, and reporting on corporate governance as part 




According to Weimar and Pape, (1999), Corporate Governance is a foundation of institutional, legal 
and cultural factors influencing the design of control that stakeholders exercise over the 
management’s behavior (Weimer and Pape, 1999). The justification for examining the quality of the 
board is that the board of directors regulate information disclosure in annual reports consequently, 
constituents of boards may be important. We try to highlight few of the important corporate 
governance component used within the index creation for the board quality in the literature review. 
 
Independent Director (Clause 149): With the introduction of clause 149, the notion of Independent 
Directors (IDs) has been brought in for the first time in the Company law in India, wherein the 
composition of the board has been of special attention. The clause defines an ‘independent’ director 
and further advocates for at least half of the board members, especially if there is role duality 
between CEO and Chairperson. In the same vein, agency theory encourages the concept of 
Table 1 :  Country wise ranking in terms of protecting investors  
    
       Parameters India China Brazil Russia UK   
 
Protecting Investors (rank) 34 98 80 115 10 
 Extent of Disclosure Index (0 - 10) 7 10 5 6 10 
 Extent of Director liability index (0 - 10) 4 1 8 2 7 
 Ease of Shareholder suits index (0 - 10) 8 4 6 6 7 
 Strength of investor protection index (0 - 10) 6.3 5 4.9 4.7 8 
               
       Source: Doing Business 2014, (World Bank) 
      
‘dominating outsiders’ namely, to enhance the board’s independency the outside director must 
dominate the boards. The Cadbury code also suggests, that ``the board should include nonexecutive 
directors of sufficient caliber and number for their views to carry significant weight in the board's 
decisions''. 
According to Abdullah, (2004), in order to control the activity and decision making process of the 
management, the board of director is very crucial and so is its independency. Previous literatures 
have found positive relationship amid the performance and the independency of the board (Weir at 
al, 2002), Mura (2007) and Knyazeva et al., 2013). Moreover, Dehaene et al. (2001) along with 
Dahya and McConnell (2003) established a significant positive relationship for the Belgian 
companies amid the independent directors and return on equity. 
 
On the contrary, the Stewardship theory argues the control to be in the hands of managers and 
suppress any needs for monitoring the management. It is based on the assumption of the presence of 
the social and business collaboration amid the top management and the Board of directors which 
promotes and encourages collaborative and strategic (Westphal, 1999; Dalton and Daily, 1999b). 
According to Black and Bhagat, (1999), firms with mostly outside directors is worst off in terms of 
performance along with no difference amid the firms having greater inside director or outside 
director, at least no evidence of improved performance by higher outside director representation. 
Many previous literatures have demonstrated a negative association amid the performance and the 
independency of the board (Bhagat and Black, 2002, Adams and Ferreira, 2009, and Carter et al, 
2010). 
 
A significant number of previous literatures that explores this relationship of performance and 
Independency of board reports little consistency in their findings (Dalton et al, 1998), or any direct 
association (Shivdasani and Zenner, 2002). In their research, Wagner, Stimpert and Fubara (1998) 
carried an empirical research in order to review the relation amid board composition and firm 
performances reported inconsistent result. Among the reasons for the inconsistencies, endogeniety 
that arises from the joint determination and firm value remains on top position (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003), followed by other reasons like CEO influence over the composition of the board 
especially, in terms of selecting the outside director (Mace, 1986). 
 
Role duality: An important monitoring component drawn upon agency theory implications is 
separating the role of Chairman and the CEO of the firm (Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Previous 
literature have argued on a person managing two crucial positions may lead to tendency of pursuing 
personal goals at the cost of organizations interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the same vein, 
Zubaidah et al, (2009) argued about the crucial question of “who monitors management”. In other 
words “who will watch the watchers?" where the CEO even has the possibility to set the board’s 
agenda and can directly impact (if not control) the selection of the Board of Directors. The role 
duality can be detrimental for the board’s ability to supervise executives (Zubaidah et al., 2009) and 
will thus even worsen board's independency making even more challenging to control management 
effectively. 
 
Nevertheless, the empirical investigation with respect to the role duality on performance measures 
of the firm is not very conclusive. For example, researchers like Coles et al. (2001), Judge, 
Naoumova and Koutzevol (2003), Ahmadu et al, (2005), Mustafa (2009) and Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008), and found significant negative relationship between role duality and corporate performance. 
On the contrary, Wan and Ong (2005), Schmid and Zimmermann (2008) found no significant 
association. 
 
Board Size: Size of the board refers to the number of directors on the board. According to Cheng 
(2008) larger boards are not very efficient and are deemed to be slower in decision-making, along 
with the threat of CEO dominating the board and having increased power in decision-making 
process (Jensen, 1993). Researchers also argued that larger boards are detrimental to effective 
monitoring of the management (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) and thus advocated for smaller boards for 
quality monitoring (Jensen, 1993). 
 
The Indian companies’ act 2013 in its clause 166 for Board of Directors states that the company can 
have a maximum of 15 directors on the Board; however, appointing more than 15 directors will 
require shareholder approval. Analysis of the empirical investigation between the corporate 
performance and board size is not consistent. Researchers as if Bhagat and Black (2002), Beiner et 
al. (2004) demonstrated no significant association amid the firm performance and the board size, 
whereas, Ahmadu et al. (2005), Mustafa (2009) and Chan and Li (2008), found the association with 
detrimental performance while others even report a negative association (Yermack, 1996). 
 
Board Committees: The 2013 Act mandates the corporates to setup the Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee that describes the parameters for selecting directors, and provide further 
guidelines towards the remuneration for the directors, Key Managerial Personnel (“KMP”) and 
other important employees alike. These committees must have at least three or more non-executive 
directors and one-half of the members must be Independent directors. Moreover, the act advocates 
for the ability to read and understand the financial statements for majority of the Audit committee 
members including its Chairperson and thus specifying even the academic and professional 
qualifications. Previous literatures, have argued for the audit quality to be a crucial aspect of 
Corporate governance (Defond and Francis, 2005, Fan and Wong, 2005) while its size is another 
important concept for its effectiveness (Cadbury Committee, 1992). Audit committee has been 
reported to control the internal mechanism and providing accurate information to shareholders 
(Anderson et al. (2004), thus strengthening the auditing function and better assessing risk (Hsu, 
2007). Profitability moderates the association between audit committee independence and earnings 
management signifying independent audit committees are more effective monitors of earnings 
management in profitable firms than in non‐profitable firms (Kapoor, & Goel, (2017). 
 
Directors Biography: Previous researches have argued that there exist an implicit association amid 
boards of directors and corporate performance for example, Jensen, (1993) wherein, he argues that 
“(t)he board, at the apex of the internal control system, has the final responsibility for the 
functioning of the firm.” In their research, Coles et al, (2008) demonstrated that corporates are more 
aligned with the internal advice thus benefiting from insider representation on the board, 
underlining the importance of the firm knowledge and industry specifics. Various analysis in the 
past has confirmed the director’s reputation effect on their human capital (Gilson, 1990, Li 1997, 
Ferris et al, 2003, and Keys and Li 2005) 
 
With the analysis of this review, it is very much evident that the board by fulfilling its fiduciary 
duties is a very crucial part of the control mechanism towards controlling and directing the firm 
(Abdullah, 2004). However, also it is evident that the empirical investigation has not revealed a  
very conclusive reporting amid the association between corporate performance and board quality. 
At one part, studies find little to no evidence to suggest that board characteristics affect firm 
performance (Dalton, et al. 1998, and Weir et al. 2002). On the contrary, researches have timely 
demonstrated the positive association amid the Corporate Performance and essential qualities of the 
Board (Bhagat & Black, 1999; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Bonn, 2004). 
 
Considering the analysis, it is quite apparent there are mixed result and are not very conclusive from 
the past researches, which attempt to explore the association amid the performances of the firm and 
the structure and quality of the board. This could be partly explained by the vulnerability to 
calculate the firm performance or the quality of the board or both, or as argued by Rediker and Seth, 
(1995) about the internal control mechanism to be actually “substitutes” and not to be used all at 
once. Past literatures using wide categories of various performance measures and the corporate 
governance variables in the form of board characteristics disclosed an inconsistent and paradoxical 
conclusion. 
 
One of the intention of this paper is to pursuit and improve the measures of corporate governance in 
the form of board quality and the performance of the companies. Specifically, empirically 
establishing the core of the board practices vis a vis its effect on the performance of the firm and 
further elaborating the performance measure that considers the shareholder’s value creation and its 
robust association with the quality of the board. Implying from these inferences, we thus 
hypothesize that: ceteris paribus, the quality of the board is positively related with the performance 
of the firm. 
 
Market based measures 
 
Along with the traditional accounting measure, in this study, we also attempt to establish a link  
amid the quality of the Board and the company performance in the form of market based measure. 
One such measure is the Economic value added (EVA), which is developed and registered by Stern 
Stewart & Company. According to Grant (2003), EVA is a measure that is described upon residual 
incomes of corporations and is more reliable and complete than the traditional accounting measures 
(Adjouad et al, 2007), considering the accounting measures does not imply the cost of equity, but 
focuses solely on the cost of debt. 
 
Consequently, technically EVA computes the difference between the net profit after taxes and the 
total cost of the capital employed. Moreover, it also adjust the operating profit for various 
accounting policies in the form amortization and other such financial obligations. 
 
According to Brewer et al, (1999) EVA focuses on the financial performance based on the after tax 
net operating income and the investment in assets required to generate this income along with the 
cost of investment. It is not surprising, to see many studies based on company performance that 
includes the EVA as their performance measure for instance, Coles et al. (2001) empirically tested 
144 US corporations from 1984 to 1988 to determine the fluctuations in EVA and MVA due to 
corporate governance variables. EVA has also been established as an intertwined measure with that 
of the market adjusted annual returns than Earning and cash flow from operations (Feltham et al, 
2004). While, its superiority over the accounting measures is also being confirmed particularly 
within the context of describing the shareholders wealth (Elali, 2006). 
 
The EVA is calculated as: 
 
EVA = Net income to common shares after taxes - (Cost of Equity) ∗ Common equity 
 
Wherein the Common equity = is equal to value of common stock + surplus capital + retained 
earnings. 
 
We also introduce Market value added (MVA) in the analysis in the form of Market based 
performance measures. According to Shawn (1994), MVA is one of the most crucial form of 
measurement that verifies the value creation process of the companies, and is being confirmed by 
researcher’s alike (John et al, 2000). The MVA is calculated as: 
 
MVA = Market value of shares outstanding - Common equity. 
 
In order to calculate the Cost of equity we used the Capital asset pricing model as follows:  
 
Cost of Equity = Rf + (Rm − Rf) ∗ Beta 
 
Wherein, we used Government Bonds for risk free return (Rf) and BSE S&P 500 for determining 
the market benchmark (Rm). While, the Beta was calculated manually for all the 150 companies by 
downloading the prices of the stocks from the BSE website, on everyday basis for the period of the 
financial year 2011-12. 
The individual beta was calculated using the formula: 
Beta of stock n = Cov(Pn,Pm) 
Var (Pm) 
 
Where in, Pn refers to prices of the stocks and Pm refers to the prices of the market benchmark. 




In this study, we add another company performance measures focusing financial performance, 
which attempts to calculate the efficiency of the boards, and the leaders involved in effectively 
utilizing the resources at their disposal, and signifying their overall quality. Initially, introduced by 
Dulewicz and Herbert (2004), designated as Cash Flow Return on Total Assets (CFROTA). 
 
According to Dulewicz and Herbert (2004), the ratio excels in various ways compared to other such 
measures like, providing a close approximation of the actual company’s cash flow by evading the 
impact of Depreciation, amortization and goodwill. The measure also represents the total resource 
allocation at the disposal of the company financed by the shareholders. Measuring the inflow of 




All the CFROTA data was calculated using the annual reports for the year 2011-12 for the sample 




This study examines Performance measures in the corporate annual reports of Indian companies 
fully listed on NSE (National stock exchange) for the financial year 2011 -12. Firms were selected 
based on the market capitalization as in most of the previous studies (Mcfarland, 2002; Adjouad et 
al, 2008), wherein originally 249 firms were grouped. Which was further reduced to 150 due 
insufficient data availability; all the accounting and market related measure were calculated from 
the annual reports or were directly obtained by the ace tech database. 
 
The index creation is developed by the authors in lieu with the previous researches and is inspired 
by the index used by Mcfarland (2002) in the Globe and Mail Ratings of Business reports. The 
study utilizes the self created index in order to rank them as per their quality of the board. The self- 
Created index utilizes the four major characteristics of the board Quality in the form of Board 
Composition, Disclosure Practices, Shareholder rights, Shareholder Compensation. The data for 
each of these variables that comprises 21 elements representing all the four Broad qualities for the 
board is being collected manually from the Annual reports of the Organization under investigation 
for the year 2011-12. 
The scores pertaining to each of these qualities were further divided by elements belonging to these 
subcategories. A content analyses technique was utilized in order to identify presence of the 
component and its quality for the organization and a score were allotted accordingly. In the index 
all the items used were assigned a fixed score (see appendix) and the prorated score allotted for the 
individual companies were then added up to arrive the final score. 
 
Although, the index is completely self developed but is inspired by the previous studies and the 
variables that has been considered important within these studies (Adjaouad et al 2007). Lastly, the 
index was also prepared considering Indian companies explaining the series of modifications 
attempted to keep it aligned with the sample companies. In addition, is allotted a specific score to 
reach the final score of the overall board quality (See appendix). The scores for each company 




Firms with larger resources are more inclined to provide the security with the help of constructive 
governance mechanism resulting further value creation for the shareholders. Thus expecting a 
positive association amid the governance practices, we include the proxy for the size of the infirm 
in the form of total assets in line with the previous studies (Black et al, 2003). Companies having a 
reputation of being listed in popular indices indicates its overall efficiency with respect to the 
shareholder security and thus the governance practices as well. Having considered this, we add 
another control variable of NIFTY 50, which is the name of a very important market benchmark 
termed in India by NSE (National stock Exchange). 
 
Being listed in a NIFTY50 list, which comprises only 50 companies of all the listed firms, is 
considered a hallmark of quality including of its governance practices giving the value of 1 or 0 
otherwise, thus implying positive effect. In order not to have an effect of sector specific firms, we 
also add sector specific control variable especially the financial sectors name financial dummy to 
wean out such effects on the performance parameters. So if the firm belongs to the financial sector  
it is coded as 1 or 0 otherwise. Following previous literature (Adjouad et al, 2007), we also add the 
leverage position of the firm in the form of debt equity ratio implying the higher ratio will foster 




Various univariate and multivariate regression analysis is used to examine the relationship between 
the performance parameters and the various board characteristics along with the control variables. 
In order, to wean out any multi-collinearity issues the correlations between independent variables 
were reviewed, in addition, various inflation factors were computed for each of them. Moreover, 
normality test were conducted based on skewness and kurtosis and the data was transformed when 
normality was a problem. In order, to test for homoscedasticity, linearity and normality 
assumptions, plots of studentised residuals of the predicted values along with the with Q-Q plot and 




Table 2A presents the correlation for the dependent and independent variables in the form of both 
Performance parameters of accounting and market based values with the various qualities of Board 
characteristics and control variables. It is evident from the correlation table, that all the performance 
parameters with the exception of Return on Equity are significant with at least two of the 
Independent variables examined. The correlation table also reveals all the independent variable 
associations are below 0.60. Whereas, the VIFs for each independent variable (shown in Table 2B) 
are all less than 3.0, suggesting that multi-collinearity is not a problem. It can also be seen that the 
total score of the board quality is significantly associated with all the performance parameters with 
the exception of Return on Equity and Earning per share. Individual analysis of the Board Quality 
with the performance parameters reveals the market-based parameters are highly associated with 
Board Quality individual scores, compared to that of the traditional accounting measures. 
 
Among the traditional accounting Tobin’s Q shows significant relation with most of the  
independent variables, while among the controls Leverage is the most common variable for  
majority of the parameters significant negatively both at 1% and 5%. While among the individual 
quality Board composition followed by Shareholding compensation is closely followed to be 




Descriptive statistics of each measure of Board quality scores, at both overall and subcategory 
levels, for the sample companies are shown in Table 1. The mean total score for the sample 
companies is 74.78, while for Board composition and Disclosure practices the mean stood at 38.77 
and 19.61 respectively. The mean score for the Shareholding compensation and Shareholders rights 
is 3.48 and 12.91 respectively. 
 
With the Total, score ranging from 46 to 92, the Board composition and Disclosure scores ranges 
between 24 to 46 and 3 to 20 respectively. While the Shareholding Compensation and the 
Shareholders rights varied between 0 to 6 and 0 to 20 respectively. The total score for the Board 
quality had a median score of 77.50 with the standard deviation of 13.13 and mean of 74.78 
representing the sample having an above average approach within these companies with respect to 
their Board of director’s efficiency. With the major contributor towards this score is the Board 
composition with the mean of 38.77 and the median of 40 with the standard deviation of 5.390 
clearly demonstrating the importance of this characteristic for the importance of an efficient board. 
Closely followed by the disclosure practices of the board having a mean of 19.61 and the median of 
20 along with standard deviation of 2.402. 
 
Shareholding rights has the median of 20 and the standard deviation of 8.155. Shareholding 
compensation is not very prevalent among the Indian companies for their directors comparing with 
those of the developed countries practices, as it is also evident from the descriptive, having mean 
score of 3.487 with the median and standard deviation of 2.50 and 2.587 respectively. Regression 
Table 3 represents univariate Regression result for the all the parameters individually tested with the 
total score of the board quality and excluding the control variables. The regression was performed 
using the equation Performance Parameter = a + b1 (Total score). The table demonstrates the strong 
relationship amid the efficient board qualities and the performance parameters under analysis. With 
the exception of return on equity (ROE) and Earning per share (EPS), the efficiency of board is 
significantly associated with all the performance parameters. With the exception of Market value 
added all the parameters are significant at 1% while the MVA stood at below 5%. Apart from 
Tobin’s Q, all the parameters are positively associated with the efficiency of the board. While, 
Tobin’s Q is negatively associated at 1%. 
 
Table 4 represents the multivariate regression analysis for the all the parameters individually tested 
with the individual scores of the board quality and excluding the control variables using the 
equation Performance Parameter = a + b1 (Board Composition) + b2 (Shareholding Compensation) + 
b3 (Disclosure) + b4 (Shareholder rights). With the exception of ROE and EPS all,  the parameters  
are significant with at least one of the board characteristics in the analysis both at 1% and at 5% 
respectively. Consistent with the previous regression Tobin’s Q is negatively associated with all the 
characteristics of the Board’s efficiency. In addition, we found the Market value added is negatively 
associated with the disclosure practices of the board’s quality and is significant at 5%. This 
regression analysis continues to exhibit the importance of the total scores on explaining the 
performances even with the addition of control variables in the regression. 
 
In the Table 5 the regression analysis attempts to analyze the parameters tested individually with the 
total score of Boards Quality all the control variables using the equation Performance Parameter = a 
+ b1 (Total Score) + b2 (Size) + b3 (Leverage) + b4 (NIFTY 50) + b5 (Financial Dummy). In this 
regression, analysis while including the controls, Earning per share has shown to be significant 
along with other parameters with the total quality score. On the contrary to its original relation in 
the previous regressions, although it exhibited negative association with the control variable of 
leverage at 1% level. 
 
While ROE continues to be insignificant, Tobin’s Q as expected is negatively associated with the 
total score. Among the accounting parameters, leverage is the most popular control variable, which 
is significant. While, among the market based financial dummy is the mostly significant. Size 
seemed significant with Tobin’s Q and EVA, and the inclusion in the NIFTY50 list is significantly 
associated with MSR, TQ and MVA clearly signifying its impact in the financial market. Although, 
size and leverage is negatively associated with the EVA at 1% and 5% level respectively, and 
CFROTA with financial dummy at 1% level is linked negatively. 
 
Table 6 presents the multivariate analysis that attempts to verify the linkages amid the individual 
performance parameters with the individual board quality characteristics along with the control 
variables. The regression was carried using the equation Table 6: Regression Table of each 
performance parameter with the individual score of Boards Quality and the control variables. 
Performance Parameter = a + b1 (Board Composition) + b2 (Shareholding Compensation) + b3 
(Disclosure) + b4 (Shareholder rights) + b5 (Size) + b6 (Leverage) + b7 (NIFTY 50) + b8 (Financial 
Dummy). The regression shows just like  in previous regressions so far that the explanatory power 
of market-based parameters is far better than compared to that of the accounting parameters, thus 
implying that the accounting parameters are also influenced by the other factors apart from the 
governance factors. 
 
It can be implied based on the regression analysis, that the market is very receptive in the effects of 
governance practices followed by the companies. Among the individual characteristics, 
shareholding compensation (SHC) and the shareholders rights (SHR) is mostly significant  with 
most of the dependent variables. While, leverage (LVG) and financial dummy (FD) among the 
controls demonstrates major linkage amid the performance parameters. MVA is negatively 
associated with the disclosure quality at 5% level. Among the controls, leverage is negatively 
associated at 5% level with EPS, MSR and EVA. While among the market based parameters EVA 
is negatively associated with the size at 1% level. While CFROTA is negatively associated with the 
financial dummy at 5% level in line with previous findings. The other instrumental variables have 
coefficient with expected signs. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we attempt to establish the connection amid the various performance parameters 
broadly classified into accounting measures and market based measures, and the governance 
practices in the form of Board’s quality. The analysis of this extensive study of the top Indian 
publicly listed companies updates the current debate about corporate governance and its implication 
towards performance measures. For the purpose, we used a self-developed index to measure the 
quality of the board with the sub categories in the form of Board composition, shareholding 
compensation, Shareholder rights and disclosure practices with respect to governance. For the 
independent variables, we used both the accounting measure in the form of ROE, EPS, PBV, MSR, 
Tobin’s Q and the market based measure in the form EVA, MVA and CFROTA along with the 
control variables of Size, leverage, inclusion in NIFTY50 list and the financial dummy (FD). 
 
Taking implications from the agency theory, the quality of the board is supposed to be an important 
aspect in governing the corporate to support shareholders interest. Previous research has studied 
various aspect of the board and its overall quality with that of the firm performance with 
inconclusive results, while this research confirms positive association amid the governance 
practices and performances with more robust result for the market based measures. 
 
The mean total score for the board’s quality remaining at 74.78 with the median being 77.50 clearly 
indicates the efficiency of the governance practices in India, reinforcing the idea that the corporate 
governance practices in India does provides an encouraging atmosphere for the investors. While 
also underlying the fact that the practice of governance still not very similar to that of its western 
counterparts, for example shareholding compensation is still not the general practice is clearly 
demonstrated by the descriptive statistics. 
 
The regression clearly demonstrated the association amid the governance practices and the overall 
performance measures. Nevertheless, the very core of the research to identify the primary base 
(accounting or market based) of measure, which is having a direct association with the governance 
practices, is also established. The governance practices showed association with only 40% of the 
accounting performance measures, while it has showed direct association with 100% of the market 
based performance measurement. Moreover, the power to explain the regression is very well 
positioned for the market-based measures compared to that of the accounting based measures. 
Within the accounting measures, the negative association amid the governance practices and the 
Tobin’s Q is consistent with the previous studies (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
 
Surprisingly, among the control variables the size of the firm proxy by the total assets of the firm do 
not have very encouraging relation with the performances. A result that could be attributed partially 
to the simple mathematics of using larger denominator, implying the necessity of greater profit 
through the numerators for return. Thus, contributing to our understanding that the companies that 
desire to achieve greater strong profitability in an accounting sense must have larger revenues on a 
lower asset base. 
 
Drawing on agency theory literature, this paper contributes in several ways towards the studies 
pertaining to corporate governance and more specifically its link towards the firm performances. 
The paper provides the self-developed board quality index for top line publicly listed Indian 
companies, an approach or benchmark that can be used for all the future researches pertaining to 
Indian corporate governance analysis. This is the first paper on Indian companies that establishes  
the link amid the performance measures and the Board quality for both accounting and market  
based value measures. While the variable of liquid performance in the form of CFROTA, along 
with its counterpart EVA and MVA is tested for the first time. The derived result do make an 
inferences with respect to the market based measures vis a vis the governance practices seemed 
more crucial and practical compared to accounting measures at least from the shareholders point of 
view. 
Another important implication of this study is that it provides the board quality specifically its 
composition emerges to be an important from stock market perception rather than the accounting 
based performances, a finding reinforced despite the addition of the control variables. A finding 
consistent with the previous literatures (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, Adjoaud et al, 2007) although in 
advanced manner with respect to its scope and variability. In addition, in this paper it differentiates 
for the fact that accounting measures still go long way with the market-based measures to support 
the governance practices a thread wasn’t evidenced in the past analysis that combines both the form 
(Adjoaud et al, 2007). 
 
The research could be further improved in number of ways, since this study implies only one-year 
data of the financial year 2011-12 as with the previous researches (Larcker et al., 2004; Ashbaugh et 
al., 2004 and Adjouad et al, 2007). The future studies could increase the scope of the data for a 
larger number of years and thus be able to generalize the conclusions. Secondly, the index created 
could also be developed further in terms of additional subcategories and tested on larger sample 
sizes. Nevertheless, this paper provides suggestions to help and guide the future research. 
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Note in the correlation the following abbreviations has been employed: 
 
TOTAL - Total score for the board quality, BCOMP - Board composition, SHC - Shareholding compensation, DISC - Disclosure strategy, SHR - Shareholder rights, SIZE- Size 













Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
  
       
  BCOMP SHC DISC SHR Total   
Mean 38.77 3.487 19.61 12.91 74.78 
 Median 40.00 2.500 20.00 20.00 77.50 
 Std. Deviation 5.390 2.587 2.402 8.155 13.13 
 Skewness -0.8117 -0.1919 -6.297 -0.3892 -0.5661 
 Kurtosis -0.1169 -1.743 39.04 -1.737 -0.7465 
 Minimum 24.00 0.000 3.000 0.000 46.00 
 Maximum 46.00 6.000 20.00 20.00 92.00 
               
        
Table 3: Regression Table of each Performance parameter with the total score of Boards Quality. Calculated using the 
 
following equation: Performance Parameter = a + b1 (Total Score). 
     
              
  
Performance Parameter 
         
              
Parameters ROE     EPS     PBV     MSR   
   Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value 
 Constant 1.74921 19.71 < .001 0.86797 3.58 < .001 111508 19.99 < .001 -0.9988 -4.28 < .001 
 b1 0.00169 1.45 0.150 0.00556 1.74 0.084 0.00364 4.96 < .001 0.0172 5.60 < .001 







  VIF   1.14     1.25     1.43     1.54   
 
              
Parameters TQ     EVA     MVA     CFROTA   
   Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value 
 Constant 5.8560 26.51 < .001 4.13390 160.70 < .001 4.28497 29.00 < .001 0.0810 0.535 0.594 
 b1 -0.0145 -5.00 < .001 0.00210 6.19 < .001 0.00431 2.21 0.028 0.0144 7.202 < .001 







  VIF   2.90     1.45     2.41     1.55   
 
              
 
Table 4: Regression Table of each Performance parameter with the individual score of Boards Quality. 
     Performance Parameter = a + b1 (Board Composition) + b2 (Shareholding Compensation) + b3 (Disclosure) + b4 (Shareholder rights). 
 
              
  
Performance Parameter 
         
              
Parameters   ROE     EPS     PBV     MSR     
  Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value   
Constant 1.88898 11.1722 < .001 1.21959  2.6712 0.008 1.22076 11.477 < .001 -0.4926 -1.118 0.266 
 b1 -0.00193 -0.6494 0.517    -0.01084  -13536 0.178 0.00327 1752 0.082 0.0203       2.631 0.009 
 b2 1.91e-4 0.0241 0.981 0.00165    0.0771 0.939 0.00438 0.878 0.381 0.0332       1.606 0.110 
 b3 5.53e-4 0.0849 0.932      0.01587   0.9016    0.369 -0.00148    -0.362 0.718 -0.0162 -0.956       0.341 
 b4 0.00386 1.5215 0.130     0.01299    18953 0.060 0.00417     2612 0.010 0.0152       2.301 0.023 









   VIF   1.14     1.25     1.43     1.54     
              Parameters   TQ     EVA     MVA     CFROTA     
  Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value   
Constant 6.72219 16.224    < .001 4.15037 85.162 < .001 5.01932 18.417 < .001 0.38308   1.347 0.180 
 b1 -0.02695 -3.707 < .001 0.00146 1.704 0.091 7.05e-4 0.147 0.883 0.00411 0.823     0.412 
 b2 -0.01776 -0.913 0.363 -0.00138 -0.602 0.548 0.00242 0.189 0.850 0.03511   2.629 0.009 
 b3 -0.03970 -2.486     0.014 0.00237 1.262 0.209 -0.02947 -2.806 0.006 0.01617    1.475 0.142 
 b4 -0.00533 -0.857 0.393 0.00327 4.469   < .001 0.01008 2.463 0.015 0.01346    3.151     0.002 









  VIF   2.90     1.45     2.41     1.55     






Table 5: Regression Table of each Performance parameter with the total score of Boards Quality and the control variables.  
Performance Parameter = a + b1 (Total Score) + b2 (Size) + b3 (Leverage) + b4 (NIFTY 50) + b5 (Financial Dummy).   
 
 
      Performance Parameters 
 
Parameters   ROE     EPS     PBV     MSR   
  Coeff. T stat 
p-
value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value 
Constant 1.75694   16.7837   < .001 0.65660   2.393 0.018 1.10539   17.066      < .001 -1.1691   -4.446       < .001 
b1 0.00176    1.3271 0.187      0.00801   2.306 0.023 0.00367     4.471      < .001 0.0189     5.663       < .001 
b2 4.88e-8     0.4681 0.640      8.52e-8    0.312 0.756 2.06e-8 0.319       0.750 -2.14e−7 -0.816       0.416 
b3 -9.64e−4 -0.1849 0.854       -0.04470   -3.269    0.001 0.00787    2.438       0.016 -0.0392 -2.990       0.003 
b4 -0.05602 -1.5259 0.129      0.08200    0.852 0.396 0.01782    0.784       0.434 0.1934 2.097       0.038 










 VIF   1.14     1.25     1.43     1.54   
             Parameters   TQ     EVA     MVA     CFROTA   
  Coeff. T stat 
p-
value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value 
Constant 4.91611   26.696 < .001 4.15795 145.521   < .001 4.01284    26.421   < .001 0.3636    2.1675     0.032 
b1 -0.00518   -2.223     0.028 0.00184 5.088 < .001 0.00664    3.451     < .001 0.0111    5.2323    < .001 
b2 8.05e-7    4.388     < .001 -9.97e−8    -3.501 < .001   2.61e-7     1.727 0.086 -4.68e−9   -0.0280    0.978 
b3 0.00716    0.780      0.437 -0.00319 -2.237 0.027  0.00198    0.262      0.794 -0.0129    -1.5403     0.126 
b4 0.52734    8.165     < .001 -0.00723 -0.721 0.472 0.31417    5.898     < .001 0.0770     1.3089      0.193 














Table 6: Regression Table of each Performance parameter with the individual score of Boards Quality and the control variables. 
 Performance Parameter = a + b1 (Board Composition) + b2 (Shareholding Compensation) + b3 (Disclosure)  
  
 + b4 (Shareholder rights) + b5 (Size) + b6 (Leverage) + b7 (NIFTY 50) + b8 (Financial Dummy).  
   
 
                                                                          Performance Parameters 
Parameters   ROE     EPS     PBV     MSR   
  Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value 
Constant 1.91537 10.4317 < .001 0.95003 1.9858 0.049 1.21981 10.723 < .001 -0.7600 -1.671 0.097  
b1 -0.00205    -0.6397 0.523 -0.00574 -0.6886  0.492 0.00289 1.457 0.147 0.0246 3.105 0.002 
b2 -8.76e−5    -0.0109 0.991 0.00534 0.2552 0.799  0.00431 0.866 0.388 0.0376 1.891 0.061 
b3 1.25e-4  0.0190 0.985 0.01730 1.0080 0.315 -0.00117 -0.286 0.775 -0.0144 -0.882      0.379  
b4 0.00394 1.5192 0.131 0.01326  1.9600 0.052 0.00433     2.692     0.008 0.0152 2.368 0.019 
b5 1.93e-8  0.1798 0.858 -2.15e−8  -0.0769 0.939 1.41e-8 0.212 0.833 -1.75e−7 -0.657 0.512 
b6 -1.20e−4 -0.0227 0.982 -0.04153 -3.0228 0.003 0.00798 2.442 0.016 -0.0411 -3.144 0.002 
b7 -0.05564  -1.5082 0.134 0.08717 0.9068 0.366 0.01707  0.747 0.456 0.1873 2.049 0.042 











VIF   1.14     1.25     1.43     1.54   
Parameters   TQ     EVA     MVA     CFROTA   
  Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value Coeff. T stat p-value 
Constant 552.427 1.731.599  < .001 419.678 84.663 < .001 462.963 18.005 < .001 0.6696 2.310 0.022 
b1 -0.01132 -203.426 0.044 6.74e-4 0.779 0.437 0.00554 1.236 0.219 6.71e-4 0.133 0.895 
b2 -0.00654 -0.46880 0.640 -0.00121 -0.558 0.578 0.00505 0.449 0.654 0.0300 2.363 0.019 
b3 -0.02712 -236.962 0.019  0.00190 1.070 0.286 -0.02504 -2.715 0.007 0.0133 1.283 0.202 
b4 -1.77e−5 -0.00392 0.997 0.00309 4.405 < .001 0.01086 2.986 0.003 0.0103 2.501 0.014 
b5 7.56e-7 405.899 < .001  -1.08e−7 -3.738 < .001 2.51e-7 1.673 0.096 -9.04e−8 -0.534 0.594 
b6 0.00828 0.90367 0.368 -0.00289 -2.028 0.044 0.00189 0.255 0.799 -0.0108 -1.298 0.196 
b7 0.52405 817.595 < .001 -0.00732 -0.735 0.463 0.30746 5.952  < .001 0.0827 1.420    0.158 

















       Index Creation and Score Allotment 
       
        Board Composition     Shareholding Compensation          Disclosure    Shareholder Rights   
Female board Member 4 Directors own stocks 6 Attendance records 
 
Re-election  
 Board Size              5 Directors in option plan 3 of directors 6 of directors 4 
Independent  Directors  9 Loans to director  5 Multiple Directorship 4 Stock options dilutive 6 




Option re-priced,  
 Risk Management Committee 3 
  
biographies 4 extended, exchanged 4 
Compensation Committee 3 
  
Governance practices 6 Voting shares 6 
Nominating Committee 3 
      Board meeting      4 
      Number of committee Meetings 5 
      Role Seperation of CEO and Chairman 5 
      
 
       Maximum score 46 Maximum score 14 Maximum score 20 Maximum score 20 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
